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ABSTRACTS

International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change

By JACK SNYDER

Conventional wisdom holds that the success of Gorbachev's domestic reforms would probably enhance Western security, but that there is nothing the West can do to make this outcome more likely. This conventional wisdom is right on the first count, but wrong on the second. The author supports his conclusion by three bodies of evidence: the effect of the international environment on the domestic politics of great powers in general over the past century; the history of the Soviet Union in particular; and the current constellation of political forces in Gorbachev's Russia.

Third-World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought: does the "new thinking" grow prematurely grey?

By CELESTE A. WALLANDER

"New thinking" in Soviet foreign policy may change Soviet understanding of the nature of conflict in the third world, Soviet interests in those conflicts, and therefore Soviet conflict behavior. While these shifts are widespread and significant, they are being resisted by military analysts, which indicates that Soviet policy may not be so easily or directly altered. Many military writers accept that escalation risks are extreme and threaten Soviet security, and others discuss local, nonclass, and intractable features of third-world conflicts. However, military analysts do not accept revisionist, class-transcendent definitions of Soviet internationalist duty. It is on this point that new thinking is most likely to founder in Gorbachev's attempts to change Soviet third-world policy and behavior. With the changes in Soviet domestic politics, military participation in security and foreign policy debates may be effective in restraining the more radical innovations implied in civilian analyses.

Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: elite formation and social change in post-Mao China

By CHENG LI and DAVID BACHMAN

This essay discusses the social background and career experiences of a previously unstudied group of Chinese elites: the mayors of Chinese cities. The data are compared with available information on basic-level leaders and higher-ranking cadres. China's mayors are relatively young, have not been in their posts very long, are college graduates (usually majoring in engineering), and quite often are mayors in cities in their native provinces. This last finding is counter to all Chinese bureaucratic practice dating back to the early empires. The authors relate these characteristics to broader developments in the Chinese political system. In particular, localism and elitism are reinforced by China's new mayoral elite; furthermore, the patterns identified appear to contribute to growing political immobilism in China.

1992: Recasting the European Bargain

By WAYNE SANDHOLTZ and JOHN ZYSMAN

Under the banner of "1992," the European Communities aim to remove all barriers to the movement of persons, capital, and goods among the member countries. The 1992 movement comprises a set of bargains among European elites. Structural change (relative U.S. decline and Japanese ascent) provoked a rethinking of European roles and interests. The 1992 project emerged as a response because of: (1) the policy leadership exercised by the Commission of the European Communities, with support from a transnational business coalition; and (2) a changed domestic political context in several key countries—specifically, the failure of previous national economic strategies and the transformation of the left. The changes under way will alter regional business competition and politics and will affect the world economic system.

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The USSR as a "Weak State":

AGRARIAN ORIGINS OF RESISTANCE TO PERESTROIKA

By DON VAN ATTA

The party-state apparatus's structure, which makes it incapable of implementing systemic reforms, is a principal source of resistance to Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of radical reconstruction (*perestroika*) in the USSR. This apparatus took form in the struggle to subdue the peasantry in the 1930s. Its basic means for managing agricultural production (and, to some extent, industrial production as well), is the mobilizational campaign. But campaigns are by nature intermittent and thus ineffective at eliciting subtle, long-term changes in organizational or individual behavior. For perestroika to succeed, alternative instruments for policy implementation which offer effective political and economic incentives for increased production must be developed. Despite its pervasiveness and intrusiveness, the Soviet state is incapable of effectively implementing many kinds of change in society. In that sense, it is a "weak state."

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

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

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INTERNATIONAL LEVERAGE ON SOVIET DOMESTIC CHANGE

By JACK SNYDER*

CONVENTIONAL wisdom, as expressed in the views of the *New York Times* and top U.S. officials, holds that the success of Mikhail Gorbachev's domestic reforms would probably enhance Western security, but that there is nothing the West can do to make this outcome more likely.[1] Conventional wisdom is right on the first count, but probably wrong on the second. If successful, Gorbachev's reforms would create institutions to countervail the power of the militant party apparatus and the professional military, key sources of Soviet expansionism and arms racing in the past. In a struggle whose outcome is far from decided, a propitious international environment could provide the all-important margin of victory for the forces in favor of reform.

This article presents a preliminary examination of three bodies of evidence which tend to support that hypothesis. First, illustrations drawn from the experience of the great powers over the past century suggest that the international environment has often decided the fate of many states' domestic institutions. In the economically strong and geographically insular United States, it is easy to forget the decisive effect that foreign dangers and opportunities can have in making or breaking a state's ruling coalition or institutional composition. More backward and vulnerable states, even among the great powers, have had a very different experience.

Hostile international environments have often promoted militaristic, imperialist, or protectionist domestic coalitions. In particular, threatening international circumstances have typically undermined weakly institutionalized liberal regimes like Gorbachev's. Conversely, benign international leadership by a dominant power has sometimes exerted a strong,

* Thomas Bernstein, Douglas Blum, Peter Charow, Matthew Evangelista, Robert Legvold, Stephen Van Evera, and Stephen Walt provided helpful advice or criticism. The National Council for Soviet and East European Research provided financial support.

[1] Editorial, "Who Wins If Gorbachev Wins?" *New York Times*, 30 September 1988. In a 27 July 1989 editorial, however, the *Times* contended that the West could affect Gorbachev's chances "at the margin." See also remarks of Robert Gates to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 14 October 1988, 21, reported in the *New York Times*, 15 October 1988. Gates is now the deputy director of the National Security Council.

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beneficial influence on the domestic politics of other great powers. Once again, this seems especially true for weakly institutionalized liberal regimes.

A second body of evidence, Soviet history, reveals many instances in which the international setting spurred a domestic change with lasting institutional consequences, or at a minimum helped determine who would prevail in a factional fight. Unyielding, highly competitive Western policies have tended to help Soviet doves when Soviet hawks are in power, whereas they help Soviet hawks when Soviet doves are in power. Under Georgii Malenkov in 1953, and again under Nikita Khrushchev in 1960, U.S. failure to reciprocate Soviet moves toward unilateral defense cuts helped to discredit the reformist political coalition. This suggests that the competitive U.S. policies that helped Gorbachev come to power are not at all the policies that will help him stay there. A subtler lesson from the history of U.S.-Soviet interactions is that Western policy can exert a finer-grained leverage on Soviet politics by trying to target incentives for particular constituencies, discredit particular strategic arguments, or foster particular institutional arrangements.

Third, contemporary evidence suggests that current Soviet conditions may be ripe for the exercise of this kind of fine-grained intervention through the use of arms control and foreign economic policy. Especially in the area of conventional military policy, the Gorbachev reformers have been struggling to prove to the Soviet military that cheaper, less offensive forces will enhance, not jeopardize, Soviet national strength and security. Gorbachev has gone out on a limb in unilaterally announcing significant cuts in Soviet troops and tanks, causing considerable dissatisfaction among the Soviet military.[2] In the short run, the military is unable to resist this frontally due to the temporary lack of powerful civilian allies, but the long-run implementation of Gorbachev's innovations in defense policy remains in doubt. To insure their implementation, Gorbachev needs to strengthen Soviet civilian institutions that subject Soviet military programs to public accountability and countervailing analysis. He also needs to show that the West would reciprocate a move to reduce offensive conventional forces. A tepid Western attitude toward conventional arms control would miss an opportunity to reinforce the role of civilian oversight in Soviet conventional forces policy. It would also discredit a key plank in Gorbachev's security and economic platforms. At present, however, President George Bush's positive arms con-

[2] Bill Keller, "Soviet Military Wary of Arms Cuts," *New York Times*, 23 December 1988.

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trol proposals at the May 1989 NATO summit meeting seem to be providing the validation that Gorbachev's security strategy needs.

Likewise, in the foreign economic area, if U.S. complaints have a chilling effect on European and Japanese market-rate credits to Soviet consumer industries, an opportunity will be missed to create a material constituency for reform. Especially in light of continuing bureaucratic resistance to limited market reforms in traditional industrial sectors, foreign loans and joint ventures offer one of the few opportunities, along with the cooperative service sector, to create an opening for fresh approaches. To the extent that the United States succeeded in shutting down this opening, the Soviet would-be yuppies who make up one of the principal constituencies for reform would have to recalculate their options.

Wary Americans fear that, after a temporary breathing spell, Gorbachev's reforms will produce a leaner, meaner Soviet foe. They suspect that reform, if it should work, would mean not political pluralism, a market economy, and a nonoffensive Soviet military posture, but a streamlined command economy, a concentration of political power, and a still offensive—and technologically more competitive—Soviet army. In fact, the consumer priorities and defense cuts announced since the 1988 party conference show that this is not at all what the Gorbachev reformers currently have in mind. However, a derailing of their preferred strategy could drive them in this direction as a second-best solution.

An international environment offering poor prospects for conventional arms control and foreign credits might help to kill plans for nonoffensive defense and market reforms. This could force the reformers to seek instead an alliance with modernizing technocrats, who want a much more limited streamlining of the Soviet military and economic bureaucracies. In doing so, the forces of reform would be allying themselves with, not countervailing, those forces in Soviet society that have in the past provided a good deal of its expansionist and militaristic impulse. Western skepticism about the Gorbachev reforms might thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In pursuing this argument, I will examine, first, the experience of some non-Soviet great powers; second, the impact of international conditions on Soviet domestic politics at key historical junctures; and third, the application of this perspective to the current situation. In none of these instances will I argue that domestic political developments were directly and solely compelled by international circumstances. More commonly, the international setting interacted with preexisting domestic

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conditions in shaping outcomes. Indeed, it is precisely because domestic political institutions have a causal force of their own in shaping a state's foreign policy that it matters what kind of institutions evolve in an opponent's society. The point is to discover how, at the margins, one can influence that evolution for the better.

A brief article cannot purport to offer definitive findings on issues involving such a broad historical and contemporary sweep. Both theoretically and empirically, what follows must necessarily be suggestive and preliminary. Nonetheless, it is hoped that this attempt to bring history and theory to bear on a question of great contemporary importance will help participants in public and scholarly debates to pose their questions in a more fruitful way.

The Experience of Other Great Powers

The history of the past century demonstrates that international circumstances have often exerted a powerful influence on the domestic political coalitions and institutions of the great powers.[3] The direction and strength of this influence has varied, depending on (1) whether international conditions pose threats or offer inducements for international cooperation, (2) whether the already existing domestic regime is oriented toward liberal or imperial policies, (3) whether that regime and its policies are strongly or weakly institutionalized, (4) the size of the country and the degree of its exposure to international forces, and (5) the magnitude of those forces.

By a regime with a liberal orientation, I mean an electoral democracy with a foreign policy oriented toward mutually beneficial trade with other great powers. By a regime with an imperial orientation, I mean an elite coalition formed by groups with expansionist, protectionist, or militaristic interests, pursuing a foreign policy based primarily on coercion and conquest. In a forthcoming book I will attempt to establish a framework of deductive theory, derived from the work of Mancur Olson and Anthony Downs, to justify and elaborate this classification scheme.[4] For

[3] Works on international influences on domestic politics include Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Ronald Rogowski, "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American Political Science Review* 81 (December 1987), 1121-38.

[4] Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and Strategic Ideology* (forthcoming), applying ideas found in Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Fall of Nations* (New Haven: Yale Uni-

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present purposes, however, the reader may wish to consider this regime typology as simply derived empirically from the cases discussed below. Not all regimes fit neatly into these two categories, but many do.[5] Moreover, this distinction is pertinent for understanding the contemporary Soviet situation because I argue that the Soviet regime is now making a tentative transition from an imperial to a more liberal coalition.

This section offers the following hypotheses about the interactions among the five variables listed above. For states whose liberal orientation in domestic and foreign affairs is weakly institutionalized, a highly threatening international environment will turn the state's domestic structure and its foreign policies in an imperial direction. Conversely, international environments favorable to cooperation will help to institutionalize a liberal orientation more deeply. For states with weakly institutionalized imperial regimes, firm resistance to expansionist programs will tend to discredit the imperial coalition and strengthen its liberal opponents. Conversely, lack of resistance will allow the weakly established imperial coalition to persist.

Strongly institutionalized regimes, whether liberal or imperial, will be less easily diverted from their existing orientation, except by major domestic or international failures. Benign hegemonic powers can sometimes use concessions and incentives to encourage favorable change in other powers' domestic coalitions, but it seems doubtful that well-entrenched imperial coalitions can be undermined by such means.

Middle-sized trading states have been the most dramatically affected by international pressure. As a rule, large, geographically isolated, protectionist states enjoying a high degree of economic or military self-sufficiency are less affected by international influences. Nevertheless, even they have not necessarily been immune.

Sometimes the resulting effects have been the unintended consequences of world market forces, but sometimes they have been the conscious object of another state's leverage strategy. Such effects have been achieved through four mechanisms: by reshaping the incentives of particular domestic groups, by enhancing the power and resources of particular groups, by discrediting certain groups' arguments, and in a more

versity Press, 1982), and Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957). Also relevant is Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic, 1986).

[5] A third pattern, which I examine at greater length in *Myths of Empire* (fn. 4), is the unitary autocrat or unitary oligarchy, which checks the logrolling of imperialist interest groups "from above," just as liberal democracy checks it "from below." As I will discuss later in this article, such checks have been an important constraint on imperial coalition making in the Soviet Union.

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enduring way, by shaping domestic institutional adaptation to the international environment.

To illustrate these hypotheses, cases can be grouped according to liberal and imperial types, both weakly and strongly institutionalized. Insofar as the Gorbachev regime might be classified as a *very* weakly institutionalized liberal regime, this ideal type may be of special interest.

1. Weakly Institutionalized Liberal Regimes

Tentatively liberal regimes, experimenting with electoral democracy and liberal foreign policies, are especially vulnerable to adverse trends in the international environment. There have been several cases in which an international depression and the attendant closing of world markets decisively strengthened the hand of imperialists, militarists, and protectionists in the domestic politics of a weakly institutionalized liberal power. In Weimar Germany, for example, the world depression, the collapse of export markets, and the drying up of international credit flows intellectually discredited the pacific foreign policy of Weimar's dominant labor-export coalition, which was based on social welfare policies and high levels of integration into the world market. The change in world markets shifted the incentives of key industrial sectors, like chemicals, away from an export strategy and toward a strategy of military production for the conquest of an autarkic empire. The depression also undermined Weimar's democratic institutions, making it possible for the Nazis to embark on a war for which the German people would never have voted.[6]

For Japan in the 1920s, the story is similar. The comparatively democratic governments of the 1920s attempted to pursue a strategy of economic expansion through free trade with the West and gradual economic penetration of the Chinese market. But the depression and the rise of Chinese nationalism, which coincided with the economic downturn, discredited liberal arguments and institutions. The military's arguments for achieving prosperity and security through the conquest of an autarkic empire became more plausible. Incentives for Japanese business shifted from exporting textiles to the United States to the expansion of heavy industry for military production and imperial development. Finally, the comparatively democratic institutions of the 1920s atrophied as

[6] See James Kurth, "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle," *International Organization* 33 (Winter 1979), 1-34, and Gourevitch (fn. 3). Note also the effect on Germany of the Great Depression of 1873-1896, which ended the agrarian Junkers' preference for free trade and the comparatively liberal phase of Bismarck's political strategy, setting the stage for the formation of the protectionist-imperialist "marriage of iron and rye." Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871-1918* (Dover, NH: Berg, 1985); Gourevitch (fn. 3).

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liberal business support for them eroded, military assaults on civilian control became bolder, and popular sentiment was swayed by jingoistic solutions to ills induced by the depression.[7]

The closure of world markets is not the only international event that has triggered such consequences for weakly institutionalized liberal regimes. Heightened military threats have had similar effects. In France, for example, after the civil-military constitutional trial of strength attendant on the Dreyfus affair, there emerged a left-of-center governing coalition with a clear mandate to "republicanize" the French officer corps and to exert greater civilian control over military strategy. But after 1911, the heightened threat posed by Germany's belligerent stance in the Moroccan crisis and by the offensive Schlieffen Plan convinced the French that civilian control over the military establishment would have to be curtailed in the interests of military morale and national security. A new, powerful post of chief of the General Staff was created, and the military was given free rein to indulge its professional preference for an offensive strategy. In short, a heightening of international threats undermined the arguments of the post-Dreyfus liberal political coalition and allowed institutional changes which promoted an offensive shift in French strategy.[8]

Just as threatening international environments undermine weakly institutionalized liberal coalitions and policies, so too benign environments strengthen them. Sometimes this happens when a dominant great power tries to arrange international incentives such that peaceful, cooperative behavior pays off for the other powers. When Britain unilaterally eliminated tariffs on imported grain in 1846, for example, U.S. midwestern farmers recalculated their interests and decided to switch from a protectionist coalition with northeastern manufacturers to a free trade coalition with southern cotton exporters. Thus, the domestic politics of even a continental-sized, protectionist power was not immune to changes in international incentives.[9]

Periods of relatively benign U.S. hegemony had similar effects. Japan's cooperative diplomacy and relatively democratic polity of the 1920s, for example, was predicated upon access to U.S. markets, the Open Door in

[7] Peter Duus, *Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Bernard Silberman and H. D. Harootunian, eds., *Japan in Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

[8] Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), chaps. 2 and 3.

[9] Scott James and David Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," *International Organization* 43 (Winter 1989), 1-30.

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China, and the Washington treaty limiting naval armaments.[10] These arrangements undercut military arguments about the need for imperial expansion as a response to foreign threat while playing up business incentives for a textile export strategy. These international circumstances also had consequences for domestic institutions because they gave free-trading business interests an incentive to broaden electoral suffrage to include mass groups that supported their policies, while also providing a mechanism for civilian control of military programs. The depression of the late 1920s reversed these propitious international conditions, however, allowing the military to reassert the autonomy granted it by the Meiji Constitution.

After World War II, U.S. policy makers consciously set out to avoid the mistakes of the 1930s, using the Marshall Plan, the loan to Britain, and the free-trading institutions set up at Bretton Woods to undercut pressures for protectionist solutions to the European states' economic problems. They rigged incentives for these states and their domestic constituents in favor of multilateral solutions, and then perpetuated those incentives by embedding them in a liberal international institutional structure that encouraged the development of domestic institutions that dovetailed with it.[11]

2. Strongly Institutionalized Liberal Regimes

Well-entrenched liberal regimes, like Britain's, react differently to threats than do the weakly entrenched. In general, Britain has tended to react to rising threats either by appeasing the source of the threat or by settling disputes with other powers that could help to balance against the threat.[12] For example, in contrast to the French pattern after 1911, heightened military threats to Britain in the late 1930s led to increased civilian control over military strategy. As the German air threat to Britain became more urgent, British civilians became more involved in air strategy, shifting resources from Bomber Command to air defense. Increased threats stimulated increased civilian control and a more defensive strategy. Thus, the outcome was the opposite of the French example before World War I. One explanation for this difference is that institutions of civilian oversight in security policy, such as the Committee for

[10] On the linkage among free trade, the Washington treaty, a peaceful Japanese foreign policy, and Japanese democratization as seen by a contemporary observer, see Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Washington Conference* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1922), esp. chap. 10.

[11] Robert Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 379-416.

[12] Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945* (London: Fontana, 1984), chap. 1.

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Imperial Defence, were much better developed in Britain in the 1930s than in France in an earlier era.[13] Thus, the effect of threatening an opponent may depend on the degree of institutionalization of civilian control over his policy-making process.

3. Weakly Institutionalized Imperial Coalitions

Just as threats can discredit weakly institutionalized liberal regimes, so too international resistance can discredit weakly institutionalized imperial coalitions by demonstrating that the imperial course is counterproductive. This may be especially likely when an essentially liberal regime is temporarily captured by groups or ideologies that lure the state into imperial overcommitments. Examples include the British Unionist coalition, which provided a temporary political base for Joseph Chamberlain's program of autarky within an expanded empire, and the U.S. cold war consensus. These coalitions were discredited, however, when the Boer and Vietnam wars revealed that the imperial policy was yielding counterproductive results. Liberal institutions insuring democratic accountability, such as elections and congressional oversight, brought warnings about imperial overstretch to bear on the political process and thus undermined the weakly institutionalized imperial coalition.[14]

Though the Soviet Union has not had democratic checks "from below" on its imperial coalitions, the Politburo has often acted as an oligarchic check "from above" on logrolling among military and ideological bureaucracies which favor a militant international stance. For that reason, imperial coalitions in the Soviet Union have been weakly institutionalized and thus vulnerable to discrediting by resistance from abroad.[15]

As for the tactics of discrediting a weakly institutionalized imperial coalition, a study of international crisis bargaining by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing found that firmly discrediting the opponent's faith in bigstick tactics must precede wooing him with inducements and concessions.[16] The same rule may apply in discrediting imperialist coalitions.

4. Strongly Institutionalized Imperial Coalitions

Well-entrenched imperial coalitions may be impossible to dislodge either through resistance or through inducements. For example, when

[13] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), and also conversations with the author.

[14] James Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981); Snyder (fn. 4), chaps. 4 and 7.

[15] Snyder (fn. 4), chaps. 1 and 6.

[16] Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), esp. 262-75.

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Wilhelmine German and imperial Japanese belligerence provoked overwhelming international opposition, the solution of retrenchment was shunned because it was antithetical to interests and ideas that had become deeply embedded in these political systems.

Nor is social engineering by a benign hegemon likely to be effective in turning around a firmly established imperial regime. For example, Richard Cobden expounded the theory that free trade would promote peaceful international relations, in part by undercutting the position and arguments of warlike aristocratic elites.[17] In 1860, he had an opportunity to test his theory when he negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier tariff reduction treaty with France. As it turned out, the treaty had only trivial effects on French industrial structure and few positive political side effects. Within two years, the French were embroiled in a military intervention in Mexico, and within a decade they had provoked an ill-fated war with Prussia.[18] Cobden's strategy failed to work in part because Napoleon III's social imperialist system of rule was already well established by 1860. An apparent lesson from this case is that attempts at transnational liberal engineering might help solidify a nonimperialist regime, but they are unlikely to turn around one that is expansionist and already well entrenched.

Three lessons relevant to U.S. strategy towards Gorbachev's Russia emerge from this historical overview. First, hostile international environments create the risk of turning tentatively liberalizing regimes into regimes that are militarized, expansionist, and autarkic. Second, inducements by a benign hegemonic power can help to solidify the emergence of a weakly institutionalized liberal regime. And third, stiff resistance may be helpful in discrediting a weakly institutionalized imperial coalition, but once this is accomplished, a shift towards a more cooperative strategy is indicated.

International Influence on Soviet Politics and Policy

International influences in Soviet history may help explain the development of Soviet political institutions and ideas. They may also help to explain the victory or defeat of contending coalitions at key junctures in the evolution of Soviet foreign policy. Apart from the role of World War I in sweeping away the tsarist state, however, it is hard to identify inter-

[17] Peter Cain, "Capitalism, War and Internationalism in the Thought of Richard Cobden," *British Journal of International Studies* 5 (October 1979), 229-47.

[18] Tom Kemp, *Economic Forces in French History* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1971), esp. 191; Arthur Dunham, *The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930), esp. 294.

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national events that had decisive effects on Soviet political development comparable to the effects of the depression on Germany and Japan. This may be due to Russia's larger size and greater self-sufficiency, which allowed the Bolsheviks to pursue a strategy of buffering the Soviet Union from international economic and military pressures.

Nonetheless, at a less decisive level of causation, external circumstances have often helped to shape internal Soviet political outcomes. Threatening international conditions often reinforced militancy and militarism in Soviet institutional structures, coalitions, and policies. However, firm deterrent policies by the Soviet Union's foes helped Soviet proponents of retrenchment and détente when that firmness was clearly a reaction to Soviet aggressiveness. The effects of conciliatory Western policies are less clear, due to the lack of a good test case. No such case exists because U.S. policy has not been sufficiently conciliatory during those brief moments when Soviet doves might have been strengthened by it.

The external influence that had the most obvious impact on Soviet domestic politics was the pressure of foreign military competition which in 1917 overwhelmed the tsarist state, opening the door to the Bolshevik Revolution. Some scholars go beyond this minimal claim, arguing that the need to build a new state better adapted to the rigors of international competition profoundly shaped all Soviet domestic institutions. In this view, a backward great power wishing to survive against more advanced competitors had no alternative but to adopt something like Stalin's First Five-Year Plan. Arguably, most Soviet political institutions—the planned economy, the mobilizing party, the intrusive police presence, the military-industrial complex, the powerful dictator—follow inevitably from the functional requirements of this task. Gorbachev himself has said that the "grim" international conditions in which the Soviet system was born helped to shape the militant institutions and ideas of Stalinism.[19]

Stalin himself certainly made the most of this kind of argument. Nonetheless, it remains a possibility that allegations about an international threat were more a rationalization for the "revolution from above" than its rationale. In this view, Stalin's authoritarian excesses were not dictated by the military need to catch up economically with the other great powers, but rather by the need to subjugate potential centers of domestic opposition to bolshevism in the countryside and to Stalin

[19] For evidence and citations supporting this line of interpretation, see Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution," *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88), 93-131. But note the anomalous fact that conditions of intense international threat during World War II led to a domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union.

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within the Communist Party itself. Hysteria about foreign spies and saboteurs, imperialist-kulak alliances, and war scares was, according to this argument, largely a fabrication aimed at tarnishing domestic opponents and justifying repression.

Both of these competing explanations capture part of the truth. Evidence reviewed below shows that the degree of militancy in Soviet domestic politics in its formative period does correlate with the intensity of pressure from the external environment. At the same time, largely internal, even manipulative considerations greatly affected how these external threats were viewed.

International Factors and the New Economic Policy

A number of authors have argued that many of the institutions that have come to be associated with Leninism or Stalinism were in fact a product of the Civil War and the struggle against foreign military intervention.[20] These include the command economy, the police state, the curtailment of intraparty democracy, and even the Communist International, whose founding decree in January 1919 cites the need to mobilize the international working class to defend Soviet Russia against the interventionist powers.[21] At a minimum, these authors claim that bolshevism was an ambiguous political movement, with the potential for either democratic or authoritarian development. War Communism, they argue, was a formative experience that prefigured many of the features of Stalin's "revolution from above," and thus helped load the dice, institutionally and intellectually, in favor of bolshevism's authoritarian variant.

Of course, War Communism did not lead straight to Stalin's despotism. On the contrary, Lenin and then Stalin led Soviet Russia through an eight-year detour, the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), featuring a partial market economy at home and increased economic relations with the capitalist states. This turnaround in Soviet policy coincided with the end of foreign intervention and increased foreign interest in resuming relatively normal economic ties.

Indeed, the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, and his circle used Cobdenite arguments to explain why they thought increased trade would have a "civilizing" effect on the Bolshevik movement. "We have

[20] This point is made with varying degrees of emphasis by Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Roger Pethybridge, *The Social Prelude to Stalinism* (New York: St. Martin's, 1974); and Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), 105.

[21] Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, *1917-1924* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 136.

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failed to restore Russia to sanity by force," he announced in February 1920. "I believe we can save her by trade."[22] As his ally H.F.B. Maxse put it, "once they see which side their bread is buttered it is more than probable that the days of Communist Government as such will be numbered." "Whether or not trade results" from the March 1921 Anglo-Russian agreement, Maxse explained, "it will be no longer possible for the Soviet Government to excuse its own failures at home on the ground of capitalist blockade." Another Lloyd George lieutenant contended that a great internal struggle between Bolshevik hawks and doves would be decided by the trade agreement, asserting that "the Moderates are still on the top but ... they cannot expect to remain there unless they can bring off the Trade Agreement and really re-open trade very rapidly."[23] Thus, Britain's leaders thought that conciliatory trade policies would make Soviet Russia a more benign presence on the world scene by shifting her incentives, tipping the scales in her domestic debates, and encouraging the development of market institutions.

Most historians would see this as a vast exaggeration of Britain's impact on Soviet policy. The NEP was adopted primarily for internal reasons as a reaction to the disastrous consequences of the requisitioning economy under War Communism. On the other hand, foreign investments and concessions were part of the NEP strategy from the start. If it had been clear from the outset that propitious foreign participation would be unavailable, proponents of a market economy might have found it more difficult to argue against Trotsky's strategy of repressive labor mobilization as a substitute for imported capital.[24]

As it turned out, the NEP had none of the far-reaching institutional consequences that Lloyd George imagined. The foreign trade monopoly, adopted even before the era of War Communism, continued throughout the duration of the NEP, despite proposals to abolish it.[25] A fuller Soviet integration into the world economy was limited in part by the Bolsheviks' ideological wariness of being turned by foreign capital into a semi-colony, as they believed had been the case before the revolution. In part,

[22] Richard H. Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921*, Vol. III, *The Anglo-Soviet Accord* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 37, also 438.

[23] *Ibid.*, 439-42. Lloyd George and his political allies had strong political motives to believe such things. Their working-class constitutents were arguing that Russia's absence from world markets was driving up the price of food and depriving Britain of a major export market. The government was quite conscious of the fact that promoting an Anglo-Russian trade agreement would fend off criticism on these grounds (pp. 436-70).

[24] Richard Day, *Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 45, 47-68. See also Ulam (fn. 20), 148.

[25] Louis Fischer, *Russia's Road from Peace to War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 56-58; Stephen White, *The Origins of Detente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Relations, 1921-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp, 30, 97.

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it was also limited by the hard bargain that the capitalist powers drove regarding Soviet repayment of tsarist debts. For both reasons, the NEP had switched by 1925 from a strategy of increased international economic integration to a formula for building "socialism in one country," without the aid of foreign capital.[26]

Just as an improvement in international conditions helped usher in the NEP, so too a souring of those conditions facilitated its demise. During 1927, the concatenation of a number of minor international incidents, including a break in Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations over Comintern activities in Britain and China, provoked a war scare in Moscow.[27] In this seemingly tense international atmosphere, even Nikolai Bukharin, the archproponent of the NEP's gradualist strategy of economic development, urged a sharp increase in heavy-industrial investment in order to increase the country's military potential.[28] Under the NEP, the capital for rapid industrialization could come only from foreign loans and direct investment. Though some Soviet leaders sought to take this route, others remained wary, as did potential Western investors. Moreover, the West's economic depression was rapidly closing those avenues even more decisively, leaving open only the draconian, autarkic path of "primitive socialist accumulation" at the expense of the peasant.[29]

Some historians, however, point out that the war scare, which was the ostensible trigger for the urgency of industrialization, was pure fantasy, the combined product of Bolshevik paranoia and Stalin's adept manipulations. The real crisis, if any, was primarily internal. In particular, the fortunes of the pro-Bolshevik urban working class were waning under the NEP, in contrast to the rising economic power of fundamentally anti-Bolshevik peasants, entrepreneurs who could profit from the NEP, and "bourgeois specialists," who still dominated the day-to-day operation of most Soviet enterprises and bureaucracies. According to this view, Stalin used the war scare and the "revolution from above" to resolve these domestic political contradictions, branding peasants and bourgeois specialists alike as fifth columnists of imperialism. At the same time, he calculated that rapid industrialization would enlarge the natural social base of support for the regime. Moreover, the war scare could be used to get rid

[26] Day (fn. 24), 64-65, 104, 110.

[27] Fischer (fn. 25), 169-70; Ulam (fn. 20), 164.

[28] Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1971), 245, 263.

[29] Michal Reiman, *The Birth of Stalinism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 6-7, 75-77. Evelyn Davidheiser puts this in a longer historical and more theoretical perspective in "The Politics of Backwardness: Russian Foreign Economic Policy, 1870-1930" (paper presented to a Soviet studies conference at the University of Toronto, June 1988). See also her dissertation, forthcoming from Duke University.

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of Trotsky, whom Stalin would accuse of treasonous disloyalty in a period of crisis, and the discrediting of the NEP could be used to break Bukharin. In this interpretation, actual international events provided not motives for action, but raw material for Stalin's mythmaking.[30]

International conditions were neither irrelevant nor decisive for the revolution from above. Rather, they added to the already considerable political burdens of proponents of the NEP's continuation. Britain's diplomatic break with Soviet Russia and the unavailability of foreign capital to finance industrialization played into the hands of advocates of draconian, autarkic solutions. In this way, international circumstances helped shape the incentives of Soviet political leaders and constituencies in the late NEP period, undercutting the plausibility of NEP solutions and paving the way for fundamental changes in Soviet political institutions. The German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, trying to salvage Weimar's traditional Ostpolitik, warned of the danger of pushing bolshevism into an economic corner, but to no avail.[31]

International Influences on Postwar Soviet Expansionism

In the post-1945 period, international conditions frequently played a role in shaping and even settling Soviet domestic political debates.[32] Intensely competitive U.S. behavior has tended to discredit whichever Soviet faction was in power at the time, whether hard-liners or soft-liners. The effects of U.S. conciliatory policies are harder to test. In part, this is because the experiment has never been carried out—the United States was never sufficiently conciliatory during those brief periods when Malenkov and Khrushchev were actively seeking a true reconciliation. In part, it is also because other Soviet proponents of détente, especially Leonid Brezhnev and sometimes Khrushchev, have typically believed that the West would accept a relaxation of tension only when increases in Soviet power demanded it. Though U.S. concessions may enhance the political credibility of such "correlation-of-forces" theorists of détente, this is a dubious achievement because it only convinces them that the strategy of détente through coercion is working. Gorbachev is not a "correlation-of-forces" theorist, but because most of his predecessors were, we lack relevant historical tests of the political effects of dramatic U.S. concessions.

[30] See the evidence cited in Snyder (fn. 19), 97-98.

[31] Reiman (fn. 29), 12.

[32] Citations supporting arguments advanced in this section can be found, unless otherwise noted, in Snyder (fn. 19). Alternative interpretations are also cited there, especially in the footnotes on pp. 100-105.

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In the early postwar years, according to the most plausible reconstructions, Andrei Zhdanov, a proponent of militant, ideological policies at home and abroad, vied for Stalin's favor with Malenkov, who sought a relaxation of tensions both internally and externally. A key bone of contention between them, and between their respective stalking-horses, Andrei Voznesensky and Evgeny Varga, was whether the nature of advanced capitalism had changed as a result of the strengthening of the bourgeois state during the Second World War. Varga argued that these changes now gave the U.S. state considerable autonomy vis-à-vis monopoly capital, making the United States a more durable but less reckless adversary. By implication, militant socialist action could hardly be expected to topple such a firmly rooted social order. Moreover, capitalism's increasing reasonableness would make peaceful coexistence possible "for a long time," as Malenkov put it.

Stalin appears to have protected Varga from the onslaught on Zhdanovite criticism, even after the Truman Doctrine speech seemed to undermine the plausibility of his arguments in Soviet eyes. In a published interview with Harold Stassen in April 1947, Stalin asked leading questions designed to elicit Varga-type responses, which he then failed to rebut.[33] However, the Marshall Plan, with its perceived challenge to Soviet primacy in Eastern as well as Western Europe, was the coup de grace that sunk Varga's analysis and gave Zhdanov the upper hand over Malenkov.[34] The Marshall Plan figured prominently in Zhdanov's analysis of the international situation at the meeting where he unveiled the new, more militant line to Europe's Communist parties. There he argued that the West European labor movement had to derail the Marshall Plan's implementation in order to prevent the creation of a strategic U.S. bridgehead, and that Eastern Europe had to take a more orthodox stance in order to resist Western encroachments. Though Zhdanov personally did not last long, running afoul of Stalin due to his close relations with Yugoslav militants, his successors in the Central Committee's International Department used the legacy of his victory to carve out an institutional haven for militant international policies that endured until Mikhail Suslov's death in 1982.

In short, a defensive U.S. policy, though indistinguishable from an offensive policy to Soviet eyes, helped decide a fundamental Soviet polit-

[33] William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy* (New York: Norton, 1982), 136-40.

[34] The Soviets were not entirely wrong in believing that U.S. leaders intended the Marshall Plan to be an instrument to roll them back in Eastern Europe. See John Lewis Gaddis, "U.S. Influence in Europe," in Olav Riste, ed., *Western Security: The Formative Years* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985), 73; and Pollard (fn. 11), 137.

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ical struggle, the outcome of which had lasting institutional consequences. Though U.S. policy did not in an objective sense require a militant Soviet response, read through the prism of Soviet politics and ideology it had that effect. International influences, as mediated by Soviet domestic circumstances, helped shape Soviet domestic political outcomes, which in turn had enduring foreign policy consequences.

The counterproductive consequences of the militant line in foreign policy soon helped Malenkov recover some lost ground. As early as 1949, Malenkov and his supporters rallied, using the argument, for example, that the Berlin crisis had succeeded in goading the United States to deploy bombers capable of delivering atomic weapons within range of the Soviet homeland for the first time.[35] The U.S. military buildup provoked by the invasion of South Korea still further enhanced the credibility of Malenkov's peaceful coexistence line.

After Stalin's death, Malenkov was able to argue with considerable success that his predecessor's policies of aggression in Korea, brinkmanship in Berlin, and massive defense spending were ruining the Soviet economy and endangering Soviet security by provoking the West. Malenkov proposed a budgetary shift away from the military and toward consumer goods, a posture of minimum nuclear deterrence, and concessions on various regional issues. These arguments were undercut, however, by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's "massive retaliation" speech, which implied that a massive U.S. nuclear first strike would be a feasible instrument for prevailing in regional disputes with the Communists. In the context of the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" in defense policy, this inevitably sounded like a belligerent rebuff to Malenkov's own speeches, which had accepted for the first time that atomic war would mean the "end of civilization," not just of capitalism. Malenkov had other political liabilities, especially the blood on his hands from ruthless party infighting in the late Stalin years, but the Dulles speech seems to have been a major factor in his political demise.[36]

This outcome was especially ironic because just a few months earlier the Eisenhower administration's Solarium grand strategy exercise had noted the importance of keeping the door open to negotiation in order to "convince the men in the Kremlin of the fallacy of the fundamental concepts upon which their policies are based" and to "persuade Soviet

[35] Ronald Letteney, "Foreign Policy Factionalism under Stalin, 1949-1950" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1971), 77.

[36] Herbert Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1959), chap. 4. Also making this point is James Richter, "Action and Reaction in Soviet Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989).

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leaders that it is not too late to turn back from their present course."[37] Unfortunately, this part of the Solarium document, drafted by George Kennan, was conjoined in implementation with its other sections on massive retaliation and covert rollback operations, thereby reinforcing rather than counteracting the "fallacies of the men in the Kremlin."

Khrushchev picked up the pieces from Malenkov's failed détente strategy, devising a way to reconcile détente with a continued arms buildup and support for "progressive change" abroad. Khrushchev argued that a stable détente on acceptable terms could be achieved only when a favorable shift in the military and political "correlation of forces" would compel "realists" in the imperialist camp to recognize that they had no choice but to accept it. Initially, this formula satisfied most of the key constituencies in Soviet politics, including the military-industrial complex, the party-ideological institutions, and proponents of a relaxation of tensions within the intelligentsia.

Another of Khrushchev's campaign promises was to increase Soviet living standards sharply and to win the economic competition with the West. Heavy military expenditures, however, would hinder the achievement of this key plank in Khrushchev's platform. Consequently, once the Soviet Union had tested its first ICBM, Khrushchev began to argue that the Soviet Union had already achieved a sufficient shift in the correlation of forces to ensure progress on détente and simultaneously to begin a unilateral transfer of resources into the civilian economy.

But the United States was not cooperating. Eisenhower refused Khrushchev's pleas for a summit, dragged his heels on arms control, played hardball against the Chinese in the Taiwan Straits crisis, gave West Germany de facto access to nuclear weapons as part of the New Look strategy, refused to recognize the East German regime, and maintained the economic blockade against the socialist camp. With Suslov and others balking at unilateral defense cuts, Khrushchev felt he had no choice but to prove his contention that the ICBM had already created the preconditions for a secure, favorable détente. In this way, the Berlin ultimatum of November 1958 was born. Backed up with veiled nuclear threats, the ultimatum was designed to force progress toward a summit, arms control, and recognition of the status quo in Europe, and more generally to validate the correlation-of-forces theory of détente.[38]

This raises the question of whether a more forthcoming U.S. policy in

[37] Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "A" of Project Solarium (Washington, DC, 16 July 1953), 131-32, 137. Thanks to Richard Immerman and Robert Jervis for this citation.

[38] The foregoing interpretation relies on Richter (fn. 36). Malenkov, too, talked about the correlation of forces, but unlike Khrushchev, he did not link that concept to a strategy of

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the spring of 1958 would have allowed Khrushchev to reconstitute his political coalition on the basis of radically reduced military budgets, in essence adopting the Malenkov program of 1953. In this view, more rapid progress toward a summit, test ban, and de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic would have headed off not only the Berlin ultimatum, but the even more dangerous crises of 1961 and 1962, which the events of 1958 helped set in motion. An alternative view is that such concessions would have simply encouraged further demands by appearing to validate Khrushchev's theory that the changed correlation of forces gave realists in the West no alternative but to accede to the socialist wave of the future. Indeed, some have argued that even the very limited U.S. concessions that Eisenhower used to help defuse the crisis in 1959 made Khrushchev dizzy with success, planting in him unwarranted hopes for future diplomatic gains.[39] In this view, Khrushchev, like Napoleon III in 1860, was already too firmly set on a swaggering course by 1958 for transnational leverage to alter the terms of his domestic coalition.

In short, if the United States remained intransigent, it would politically harm the Soviet proponents of détente, but if the United States was forthcoming, it risked convincing pro-détente forces that the pernicious correlation-of-forces strategy was working. This catch-22 has been an endemic problem in the postwar era. For this reason, although there are many cases in which U.S. policy has helped or hurt a particular Soviet faction, we lack clear tests of the effects of U.S. concessions on Soviets who argue that détente rests on mutual security, rather than on one-sided changes in the correlation of forces.

There are numerous examples that seem to demonstrate the counterproductive effects of taking the hard line. The U-2 incident and the Kennedy military buildup weakened Khrushchev's case for unilateral Soviet defense cuts. The U.S. escalation in Vietnam burdened similar arguments advanced later by Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny. The Jackson-Vanik Jewish emigration amendment to the East-West trade bill played into the hands of those in the Kremlin who wanted to define détente as a mere tactical instrument of class struggle. Conversely, West Germany's forthcoming Ostpolitik led to Soviet reciprocation, helping Soviet proponents of détente and paving the way to a stable settlement of the Berlin and German questions. Thus, in these instances, hard-line

offensive détente. Khrushchev had much more ambitious ideas about the compatibility of détente with active Soviet support for "progressive change," especially in the third world.

[39] Jack Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

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U.S. policies helped Soviet hawks, while West European concessions helped Soviet doves.[40]

On the other hand, the U.S. victory in the Cuban missile crisis disabused Khrushchev of the correlation-of-forces theory and, until his ouster, briefly established détente on a more viable, two-way basis. More recently, Brezhnev's policy of military buildup and third-world expansion was discredited by stiff resistance in the form of the Reagan defense effort, the Pershing II deployment, and guerrilla insurgencies against Soviet clients. Conversely, U.S. geopolitical restraint during the post-Vietnam syndrome was not noticeably reciprocated.[41] Thus, in these instances, hard-line policies sobered up Soviet expansionists, while the Soviets saw weak U.S. policies as inviting opportunistic expansion.

This evidentiary muddle is due to the no-win situation, inherent in the correlation-of-forces theory, whereby nothing the United States does leads to a clear improvement in relations. When the correlation-of-forces theory prevails in Soviet politics, as it has for much of the postwar period, helping the proponents of détente in Soviet politics is not necessarily in the U.S. interest because of the peculiarly offensive character of their approach to détente. Only very briefly have there been periods when a Soviet political leader attempted to establish détente on a more equitable basis: Malenkov in 1953, possibly Khrushchev in early 1958, Khrushchev in 1963-1964, and more dubiously, Brezhnev before Jackson-Vanik. Since Gorbachev is now in this mode, these periods would be the test cases of the effects on Soviet domestic politics of U.S. concessions with the greatest contemporary relevance. But in none of these periods was U.S. policy sufficiently conciliatory to constitute a good test.

To sum up the evidence from Soviet historical experience, international conditions have often exerted significant influence over Soviet domestic political outcomes, shaping the interests of Soviet actors, settling arguments between rival factions, and shaping the basic institutions that determine who the actors are and their relative power. Hard-line Western policies typically helped proponents of retrenchment when Soviet militants were in power, while hard-line policies undercut proponents of détente when they in turn were in power. The effects of concessions are more murky, because of the no-win character of the correlation-of-forces

[40] A dissertation-in-progress by Richard Anderson at the University of California, Berkeley, is by far the most detailed and analytically ambitious account of this period. He goes far beyond the simple points I have made here in reviewing the connections between the international setting and the domestic political maneuvering of Soviet leaders.

[41] However, the two major histories of this period disagree about the extent of U.S. restraint, if any. See Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985).

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theory of détente, and because the United States never made sufficient concessions during those brief periods when Soviet leaders adopted a more constructive approach to détente. Overall, the record suggests that the international environment, including Western policy, can have a significant impact on both the long-run development of Soviet political institutions and the short-run fate of Soviet political coalitions.

In cases like Gorbachev's, where the Soviet leader is not rationalizing his pursuit of détente on the basis of the correlation-of-forces theory, there is no historical precedent demonstrating that reciprocating his concessions will help him politically. However, there *is* clear evidence that failing to reciprocate his concessions will either undermine his power, as in Malenkov's case, or turn him into a correlation-of-forces theorist who believes that only coercion can extract détente from the West, as in the case of Khrushchev.

Implications for Current Policy Choices

Gorbachev has embarked on a new approach to détente that rejects the basic notion of the correlation-of-forces theory—namely, that an increase in the coercive power of the Soviet Union will lead to appeasement by the West. Gorbachev in fact argues the reverse: that the opponents' hostility to the Soviet Union can be demobilized only by eliminating the perception of offensive, threatening Soviet power. For this "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy to take root, Gorbachev will have to succeed in his domestic attempts to curtail the political power and central administrative role of the party, military, and bureaucratic groups that have a stake in the old thinking in foreign policy. If his domestic reform fails, it is likely that the domestic political foundation of his foreign policy will collapse. As I will argue below, in an unreformed Soviet domestic order, any foreign policy of retrenchment, arms control, and détente will have the character of a tactical adjustment in pursuit of a breathing spell, not a permanent, fundamental waning of the Soviet Union's expansionist impulse.

If this is so, the policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union should pay at least as much attention to its long-run effect on the Soviet domestic reforms as to its short-run foreign policy consequences. But adopting this perspective raises a number of questions. Precisely what kind of domestic evolution should U.S. policy attempt to encourage? What U.S. behavior will promote this goal? Insofar as adopting such a strategy might entail costs or risks, is its probability of success great enough to warrant accepting those risks?

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Based on historical and contemporary evidence, I will make four major arguments. First, the aims of U.S. policy should be to discredit militaristic and party-ideological cartels and to strengthen Soviet institutions exerting countervailing power against them. Promoting "democracy" in the Soviet Union should be the U.S. goal only insofar as it serves those ends. Second, this can be done by targeting U.S. behavior at discrediting the foreign policy arguments of militaristic and expansionist groups and showing that the international platform of the reformers is sound. Third, the United States can also use arms-control and foreign-economic policy to promote the growth of Soviet institutions that have a stake in a stable détente, the knowledge to argue its benefits in Soviet councils, and the successful track record to make those claims credible. Fourth, this strategy is worth attempting even if the Gorbachev domestic reforms have only a modest chance of success. Implementing this approach does not require making unilateral concessions that would jeopardize Western security in the event that Gorbachev failed.

The following sections take up these arguments.

The Domestic Base of Gorbachev's Foreign Policy

The more enlightened foreign policy of Gorbachev's Soviet Union grows directly from his agenda for domestic political reform. Gorbachev, if he is to succeed, must break the power of military and party-ideological interest groups, which thrive on the perpetuation of the command economy at home and intense competition abroad. *Perestroika*, in contrast, can thrive only if market reforms are implemented at home and if increased economic integration replaces military competition abroad.[42]

For these reasons, his opponents on foreign policy are also his opponents on domestic policy. Striking at the central shibboleth of the traditional party ideologues, Gorbachev's hand-picked foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, has denounced the view that peaceful coexistence is merely a form of the class struggle, asserting moreover that "the struggle between two opposing systems is no longer a determining tendency of

[42] Because of the evolution of Soviet society since the early 1950s, and because of the thorough discrediting of old approaches by the stagnation of the Brezhnev years, Gorbachev now has a much better chance of carrying out such a transformation than did previous reformers like Malenkov, Khrushchev, or Kosygin. For elaboration on this and other points, see Snyder (fn. 19). For an alternative view, stressing the intellectual rather than domestic political origins of Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy, see Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 97-132.

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the present-day era."[43] Yegor Ligachev, the chief opponent of Gorbachev's reform agenda, was not long in rebutting this view. "We proceed from the class character of international relations. Any other presentation of the problems sows confusion among Soviet people and among our friends abroad," Ligachev insisted, deploring "some comrades" who failed to understand this.

Ligachev also echoed the Brezhnev-era argument that socialist geopolitical victories and détente would be mutually reinforcing, since only changes in the correlation of forces in socialism's favor would force the West to accept détente. "The struggle for peace and for the survival of mankind is indeed also the struggle for the root interests of the working class, for the right of the people to choose their own road and to decide on their own fate for themselves. It [the class struggle] makes it possible to fetter the forces of imperialist militarism."[44] Gorbachev, by contrast, has given up the correlation-of-forces theory of détente, arguing instead that détente can be strengthened only if security is mutual and if the West's sense of being threatened is diminished.

Ligachev's remarks on foreign policy were combined with arguments on domestic policy advancing the views of his traditionalist party constituency. He attacked market economics as certain to bring "chronic unemployment, sharp social stratification, a deepening of inequality," and assailed the reformers' attempts to remove the party bureaucracy from day-to-day economic administration.[45]

After Ligachev's demotion at the September 1988 Central Committee plenum, the new secretary in charge of ideology, Vadim Medvedev, authoritatively reiterated Shevardnadze's attack on class-based approaches to foreign policy.[46] One should not think, however, that old thinking has been decisively and permanently defeated in domestic or foreign affairs. The Soviet military chafes under Gorbachev's notion of "reasonable sufficiency" in military expenditure, whereby the level of Soviet effort is not directly pegged to the level of NATO's effort. The military instead prefers the standard of "defensive sufficiency," which implies matching NATO in the development of costly, new, high technology weapons. Even nonmilitary politicians show residual distrust of the United States. As Khru-

[43] Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 26 July 1988, 4; Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS-SOV), 26 July 1988, 29-31.

[44] Ligachev speech made in Gorky, Vremya TV version, 5 August 1988; FBIS-SOV, 8 August 1988, 40-43; see also Elizabeth Teague, "Kremlin Leaders at Loggerheads," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 362, 16 August 1988.

[45] FBIS-SOV, 8 August 1988, 37. For the rebuttal to Ligachev by Gorbachev's ally in ideological matters, A. N. Yakovlev, see *Pravda*, 11 August 1988, 2; FBIS-SOV, 12 August 1988, 40-44.

[46] *New York Times*, 6 October 1988.

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shchev found in 1958, as long as the institutional basis for old thinking remained unbroken, the "hydra-headed opposition" continued to throw up new champions despite the ouster of Marshal Zhukov and Vyacheslav Molotov.[47]

Thus, a continuing goal of U.S. leverage should be to help create the conditions necessary for Gorbachev to combat his own hydra-headed opposition.

Leverage to Achieve What?

In casual U.S. discourse, it is often said that if reform brings "democracy" to the Soviet Union, then Soviet expansionism will end and détente based on mutual security will be permanent. Indeed, in earlier sections of this article, I have argued that democratic checks *in well-institutionalized liberal regimes* help to counteract the formation of reckless imperial coalitions. Nonetheless, this does not mean that rapid increases in mass political participation will necessarily make the Soviet Union more peaceable. In both Britain before the Crimean War and Germany before World War I, sharp increases in electoral participation and mass political awareness contributed to jingoistic foreign policies. Mass passions, stimulated by "social imperialist" elites, outran the control of the sorcerer's apprentice.[48] Democratization does not always lead to runaway jingoism, but when powerful militaristic or imperialist elites are present to push mass opinion in that direction, social imperialism is a danger.

Consequently, democratization of the Soviet political system is a goal only if mass political power is successfully recruited against imperialist cartels and nationalist demagogues, not in support of them. How masses are mobilized into politics is shaped to a significant degree by the elites that are contending for power. For this reason, the United States should not aim to stimulate democratization per se, but to create conditions that undercut the appeals of "social imperialist" elites, while strengthening the hand of politicians who are attempting to seek mass support on a platform of reduced defense expenditure, a more consumer-oriented market economy, and a deemphasis of class conflict as the basis for foreign relations. The Gorbachev reforms are worth encouraging not simply because they promote a limited democratization, but because they do so on a platform favorable to Western security interests.[49]

[47] The term is from Robert Slusser, "America, China, and the Hydra-Headed Opposition," in Peter Juviler and Henry Morton, eds., *Soviet Policy-Making* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

[48] Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Kingsley Martin, *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston* (London: Hutchinson, 1924).

[49] The defeat of several military officers in the March 1989 elections for the Congress of Peoples' Deputies bodes well in this regard.

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Thus, the more fundamental goal is to encourage political reforms that bring countervailing pressure, whether democratic or otherwise, on proponents of expansionist ideas. I will offer two examples of how this might be achieved, one in the area of arms control, the other in the area of foreign economic relations.

Promoting Civilian Control over Military Strategy

The Soviet Union lacks a civilian institution capable of critically analyzing professional military claims on arcane questions of military doctrine, strategy, and the military balance.[50] Not only is there no Soviet Rand Corporation capable of second-guessing the strategic analysis of the General Staff, but unlike all other sectors of Soviet life, there is no branch of the Central Committee Secretariat charged with exercising oversight of military strategy, apart from the mundane questions of the defense industry.[51] Historically, Soviet leaders have exercised civilian control over strategy either through personal intervention by the dictator, through political generals or allies high in the Ministry of Defense, or through the secret police. The Main Political Administration, technically the party's organ of oversight with regard to the military, has largely been coopted to accept the goals and values of its charge.[52]

None of these expedients suffices to ensure civilian control over the shaping and evaluation of strategic alternatives.[53] In the Brezhnev era, in particular, the Soviet military was able to parlay this lack of adequate strategic oversight and analytical competition into a huge military buildup, justified by specious arguments that civilian leaders were poorly equipped to contest. Though the civilians have recently gained increased leverage in the nuclear field, where issues are comparatively stark and simple and where civilian scientists have relevant analytical skills, in the conventional area the military's position remains strong.[54] Despite Gorbachev's 7 December 1988 speech to the U.N. announcing major cuts in

[50] Stephen Meyer, "Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race in the U.S.S.R.," in Robert Art et al., eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense* (Washington, DC: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985); Condoleezza Rice, "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 40 (October 1987), 55-81.

[51] Timothy Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 10, also 26-30, 173-74; Rice (fn. 50), 58.

[52] See Colton (fn. 51), passim.

[53] A dissertation-in-progress by Matthew Partan at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is examining the absence of an independent civilian defense-analytical community as a factor in the failure of Khrushchev's military innovations.

[54] See Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," *International Security* 12 (Spring 1988), 48-77.

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Soviet tank forces in Europe, the reformers' long-run ability to implement a shift toward a less offensive posture remains an open question.

Soviet civilians recognize this problem and have been speaking out about it. Claiming that the professional military's "departmental self-interest" has led to the withholding of military information from civilian analysts, Georgii Arbatov, the director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, has called for fully informed debate on the strength of the Soviet army like that of the 1920s, which "prevented [the Soviet Union] from diverting its limited resources excessively toward military needs." Information monopolies are especially dangerous, he added, because "negotiating positions are, as a rule, worked out through an internal struggle and represent a compromise between different interests and departments, and there are always parties that actually have an interest in thwarting an accord."[55] In a similar vein, Valentin Falin, the head of the Central Committee's International Department, sat opposite the first deputy chief of the General Staff on Soviet television and claimed that the Soviet Union had in the past "overestimated . . . the need to insure our security primarily through military means" because of "people with selective hearing who, more often than not, paid greater attention to arguments of various people, including the military."[56] Both Arbatov and Falin called for an increased role for the reconstituted Supreme Soviet in overseeing military budgets and doctrines.[57]

One target for U.S. leverage, therefore, would be, at a minimum, to promote the development of proficiency in assessing conventional forces among Soviet civilians, and at a maximum, to promote the development of civilian oversight institutions analogous to the U.S. Armed Services committees, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Perhaps even more important, the Soviet Union lacks highly professional organizations like the Brookings Institution or the Congressional Budget Office, which produce alternative defense analyses for the public debate. Efforts to encourage such capabilities, including intensified contacts with Western experts, would reinforce some initial developments in scholarly research institutes, in the Central Committee's International Department, and in proposals for standing military committees in the reformed Supreme Soviet.[58] In order to promote an institutionally grounded check on Soviet militarism, the United States

[55] Arbatov, "Glasnost', Talks, and Disarmament," *Pravda*, 17 October 1988, 6; FBIS-SOV, 18 October 1988, 1-4.

[56] Falin on Moscow TV, 15 October 1988; FBIS-SOV, 18 October 1988, 82-89, esp. 85.

[57] Arbatov (fn. 55), 3; Falin (fn. 56), 88.

[58] Rice (fn. 50), 79; Shevardnadze (fn. 43), 30.

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therefore needs only to find ways to encourage developments that the reformers already have in train.

Alacrity in engaging the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations on conventional forces might help reinforce these trends. International talks with a writ to exchange detailed data on such forces, as the Soviets have proposed, would give Soviet civilian defense intellectuals a hunting license for facts on Soviet force posture that they have heretofore lacked. Western acceptance of the principles of nonoffensive defense as a basis for negotiation would validate the ideas of Soviet civilian security analysts, while also forcing them to get more deeply involved in the details of the conventional forces business. A forthcoming Western attitude on limiting air power as a quid pro quo for limiting Warsaw Pact armor would help the Gorbachev reformers prove to their military critics that the "new thinking" was indeed effectively reducing the very threats to Soviet security that the Soviet military itself trumpets.

These civilian analysts need all the help they can get in making their case. The military has been fighting back, heaping scorn on journalists, economists, and other scholars for their "lack of professionalism" in discussing military affairs.[59] Before Gorbachev's U.N. speech there was even a tone of pessimism in some civilian discussions of conventional arms control because of the expectation that neither NATO nor the Soviet military could be persuaded to accept the principles of reasonable sufficiency or nonoffensive defense.[60]

A second-best strategy to which civilian reformers might resort is to align with progressive elements in the military in favor of a leaner, higher-tech, offensively oriented professional conventional army. This would be more consistent with perestroika than the present bloated, metal-eating, conscript army, but it would appeal more to the military than the civilian's current first preference for nonoffensive defense. Insofar as the appeal of nonoffensive defense to the Gorbachev reformers is largely its diplomatic value in the West, a switch to streamlined offense might be relatively painless for the new thinkers, especially if the drift away from nonoffensive defense can be blamed on NATO's failure to take the idea seriously. Since neutralizing the Soviet army's offensive punch has been the objective of decades of NATO efforts, to let the Soviets escape

[59] Major-General Iurii Lebedev and Aleksei Podberezkin, "Voennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost' " [Military doctrine and international security], *Kommunist* 13 (September 1988), 110-19.

[60] On NATO, Falin (fn. 56), 88; Arbatov (fn. 55), 2; on the Soviet military, author's interviews in Moscow, October 1988.

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from their own rhetoric on nonoffensive defense would be to miss a major opportunity.

As yet, however, this rhetoric is still in place.[61] Likewise, a study by Matthew Evangelista shows that an alliance between civilian and military modernizers in pursuit of a leaner, meaner force posture is not now in place, nor are there immediate prospects for its emergence.[62] Gorbachev's U.N. speech and the resignation of Sergei Akhromeev as chief of the General Staff underscored this point. Thus, the West has the time and the opportunity to head off such a development.

To return to the historical cases by way of conclusion, the current Soviet case may be more like the French case of 1911, where offensive threats from abroad gave the military a free hand to pursue offensive responses, than like the British case of 1939, where offensive threats heightened civilian oversight and led to an improved, defensive strategy. In both the French and Soviet cases, civilians lacked the independent expertise to evaluate the opinions of their professional military. Unlike Britain in 1939, where civilian expertise and oversight potential was greater, an offensive air threat like NATO's currently planned Follow-On Forces Attack will probably undercut the cause of civilian control and defensive strategy in the Soviet Union.

World Markets and Soviet Domestic Markets

Leverage can be exerted on Soviet domestic change not only through arms control, but also through international economic relations. Foreign trade and investment might seem to be unlikely engines for the success of perestroika. Even a reformed Soviet Union could not hope to have a comparative advantage in exports of many manufactured goods, and an unreformed Soviet economy might be an investment-eating black hole. Despite this, joint ventures and foreign credits may play an increasingly significant role in the reformers' strategy.[63]

With bureaucratic resistance stifling the implementation of domestic reform, foreign projects offer one of the few avenues for unleashing profit criteria and innovative management in the Soviet industrial economy. For similar reasons, some forward-thinking economists are now

[61] See, for example, Andrei Kokoshin, "From the Standpoint of the New Thinking," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 16 September 1988, 3; FBIS-SOV, 21 September 1988, 2-5.

[62] Evangelista, "Economic Reform and Military Technology in Soviet Security Policy," *Harriman Institute Forum* 2 (January 1989). Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former chief of the General Staff, was the prototypical military modernizer, though he has no obvious successor.

[63] For relevant arguments and citations, see Jozef van Brabant, "Planned Economies in the GATT Framework: The Soviet Case," *Soviet Economy* 4 (January-March 1988), 3-35.

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arguing that the convertibility of the ruble should precede, not follow, a domestic price reform. They argue that the bureaucracy can block meaningful price reform forever unless some world-market price discipline is imposed on domestic price levels. These could still be buffered from the worst ravages of the market, they argue, by a system of tariffs.[64] Finally, imports facilitating production of consumer goods would provide incentives for the work force to increase productivity, an anti-inflationary sponge to soak up excess purchasing power, and a political cushion to show that perestroika is yielding some material benefit.

None of these measures involves below-market subsidized credits or the dismantling of the West's coordinating committee (COCOM) on defense-related export controls. Nonetheless, some voices in the United States worry that eight billion dollars in European credits to improve Soviet consumer industries will free resources for military production, neglecting to consider that the loans must be repaid from the pool of potential military investment. Such voices reportedly are having a chilling effect on participation by U.S. banks in these loans.[65] This would not matter much were it not for the past record of the United States in trying to extend that chilling effect to Europe, as in the gas pipeline affair. It would seem highly counterproductive to create stumbling blocks to nonsubsidized, nonmilitary imports aimed at both circumventing obstructionist Soviet bureaucracies and giving the Soviet worker a material stake in perestroika.

The NEP was killed in part by a shortage of imported consumer goods that would have given the broad mass of the Soviet population an economic incentive to produce for the market. In part, it was also killed by a lack of the imported capital that the NEP's proponents needed to show that industrial modernization was consistent with a market economy and a pluralistic society. Without overdrawing these parallels, the general point nonetheless remains valid that the Gorbachev reforms will have a greater chance of success in a propitious international economic environment.

Conclusion: The Risks of Attempted Leverage

I have argued that the survival of the new thinking in Soviet foreign and security policy is in the interests of the West, that this hinges on the success of Gorbachev's domestic reforms, and that Western policy can

[64] Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov, *The Breaking Point: Revitalizing the Soviet Economy* (New York: Doubleday, 1989).

[65] Michael Farr, "New Soviet Credit Line Is Expected," *New York Times*, 18 October 1988.

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affect the likelihood of that success, at least at the margins. My argument is based on a review of the historical experience of the great powers in general and the Soviet Union in particular which shows that the international environment has often had a decisive effect on the evolution of a state's domestic institutions and the outcome of its factional struggles. This has been especially true for tentatively liberalizing regimes, like Gorbachev's, which have been easily crushed by adverse international conditions, but also successfully fostered by the efforts of a benign hegemonic power. My argument is also based on an analysis of current opportunities to exert positive leverage on Soviet domestic change through arms control and foreign economic policy.

Even if all of this were granted, a skeptic would still have one final line of rebuttal. The Western concessions needed to salvage Gorbachev's domestic position might prove dangerous if Gorbachev were replaced by a more aggressive successor. Because many Sovietologists rate Gorbachev's chance of success as quite low regardless of Western actions, the skeptic could argue that to take these risks is imprudent.

This argument is not unreasonable. Consequently, it is important to make sure that any efforts to exert leverage on the course of Soviet domestic politics do not, as a by-product, undermine Western security. All of the measures proposed in this article pass such a test. Conventional arms control on the basis of nonoffensive defense, even if that should involve cuts in NATO air power, would be beneficial in its own right, as long as any agreement were carefully constructed. Financing Soviet consumer industries at market rates would be likewise beneficial, or at least innocuous, in its own right. Even if these measures fail to exert decisive leverage on behalf of domestic reform in the Soviet Union, they entail no significant risk to Western security. On the contrary, the greater risk to Western security is that Western heel-dragging might contribute to the already heavy political burdens of the Soviet domestic reformers and thus squander a rare opportunity for the pacification of a troublesome geopolitical adversary.

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THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT: Does the "New Thinking" Grow Prematurely Grey?

By CELESTE A. WALLANDER*

SOVIET foreign policy under Gorbachev incorporates important new ideas on the sources of Soviet security and the nature of international conflict. Many precepts of the "new thinking" signal a significant shift in Soviet understanding of third-world conflict and the Soviet role in it. Whether these changes will endure or have discernible effects on Soviet behavior is a matter of considerable debate in the West. Part of the answer lies in the degree to which recent changes are penetrating Soviet military discussion of third-world conflict: Does military thought give evidence of "new thinking" or does its contemporary analysis exhibit signs of old age?

Perceptions among the leadership, the military, and civilians concerning the nature and prospects of revolutionary change and conflict in the third world have shifted over time. Understanding these perceptions and shifts is an important key to explaining Soviet foreign policy and behavior because of the role they play in the definition of security requirements. Military capabilities are the product of planning that is constrained by perceptions of threat and the nature of international conflict, and opportunities to gain from local conflicts must be perceived in order to be acted upon. Behavior may not be the product of perceptions and ideology alone, but just as an explanation of Soviet international behavior cannot ignore the state of Soviet capabilities and the international environment, it cannot ignore the role of perceptions in Soviet foreign policy.[1] Furthermore, Soviet perceptions of third-world conflict have not

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[1] On the importance of perception in policy and force structure, see Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,

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only varied over time, but the views at any one point in time are not uniform: differences in the perspectives of party leaders, civilian analysts, and military analysts are clearly discernible. The perspectives with the greatest influence in shaping policy are those expressed and held by the leadership, and it has been civilian analysts who have most consistently offered innovations in the study of the third world.[2] Why, then, investigate Soviet military perceptions of third-world conflict?

First, although the military cannot override party decisions, it is a participant in decisions on involvement in crises, on the degree of Soviet military involvement, on the form Soviet action should take, and on whom should be aided. It has long been recognized that knowledge and expertise are sources of influence for the military in Soviet political decision-making processes.[3] While decisions to use force or send arms are political, Soviet leaders must rely on military expertise for estimations of what can and cannot be done and analyses of how military force can and cannot be used.

Second, while the Soviet military has not been the source of perceptual innovation, current Soviet military perceptions seem to clarify much of Soviet policy toward third-world conflict. Mark Katz discerned a clear

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1987), 4-5. There is a considerable literature on the methodology of using the Soviet press as a source for Soviet perceptions and foreign policy. For the seminal argument, see William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 9-24. A more recent discussion is Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986), chap. 2. Particularly intractable is the problem of whether journal articles, editorials, and speeches are to be taken as representational or instrumental communication. See Deborah Welch Larson, "Research Note: Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign-Policy Research: Notes from the Study of the Origins of Cold War Belief Systems," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (June 1988), 241-55. However, the severity of this dilemma depends on the purposes of the researcher, with the goal of establishing what Soviet leaders and analysts truly believe and perceive being the most difficult to determine using these data sources. Indeed, as Larson shows, research on American foreign policy perceptions with its wealth of data has not definitely solved these problems. The goal here is somewhat more modest: to determine what perceptions are expressed and whether the patterns of perceptions analyzed in military writings match patterns expressed in analyses by civilians and the leadership.

[2] See Condoleezza Rice, "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 40 (October 1987), 55-81, for a discussion of the subordinate political role of the Soviet military in defense policy. On innovation in civilian analyses, see Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind* (New York: Praeger, 1983), especially 147-50, and Hough (fn. 1), 6-12, 262-69.

[3] David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), chap. 8; Rice (fn. 2), 64-71; Mark N. Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 143. For example, we know that prior to the invasion by Soviet forces, a Soviet general undertook a reconnaissance mission to Afghanistan to assess the situation and the prospects for Soviet action, and in 1982 a high-ranking Soviet military commander traveled to Syria to investigate the condition of Syrian air defenses and make recommendations regarding Soviet resupply and reinforcements. See Dina Rome Spechler, "The Politics of Intervention: The Soviet Union and the Crisis in Lebanon," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 20 (Summer 1987), 115-44.

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pattern in Soviet military thought from 1964 to 1982: military analysts tended to resist civilian innovations, and if they adopted them it was only after Soviet policy and behavior had already evolved in those directions.[4] In other words, the Soviet military does not "learn"; rather, it "accommodates" itself to successful changes in the leaders' policy.[5] The state of Soviet military analysis of third-world conflicts at a given point in time is valuable not so much as a predictive guide to Soviet behavior, but as a good description of the prevailing assumptions and attitudes underlying contemporaneous or immediately preceding Soviet policy. Insofar as the pattern that Katz identified continues to hold and the military does not adopt new thinking in its analysis of local and regional conflicts, one might infer that achievement of changes in policy is neither complete nor certain, and one should therefore be skeptical that new Soviet third-world policy is grounded upon a strong political base.

We would expect Soviet military thought in the era of new thinking in foreign policy (a) to exhibit resistance to the innovative formulations presented in analyses by the leadership and by civilians, and (b) to the extent that it begins to accommodate itself to those innovations, to indicate that the prescriptions and policies are being implemented. The form of Soviet military debates may guide U.S. responses to Soviet third-world policy under Gorbachev insofar as it helps policy makers to distinguish precepts that are broadly accepted and solidly endorsed from those elements of new thinking that may prove ephemeral. An analysis of new thinking in military writing also provides clues to processes of change and sources of continuity in Soviet foreign policy.

A Framework for Understanding Soviet Third-World Policy

The most important issues in Soviet foreign and security policy are Soviet-U.S. relations and the nature of a Soviet-U.S. war. Soviet military doctrine and analysis reflect this fundamental concern in their primary focus on general war, operations in the European theater, and the relation between conventional and nuclear warfare.[6] All Soviet military analysis of third-world conflict is essentially derivative of this larger and

[4] Katz (fn.3), 10-11, 150.

[5] For a discussion of the role of "learning" in Soviet third-world policy, see George W. Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987), 429-48.

[6] Holloway (fn. 3), chaps. 3 and 5. For a related argument on the central role of Soviet relations with the U.S. and Europe in establishing constraints and opportunities in Soviet third-world policy, see Stephen Sestanovich, "The Third World in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1955-1985," in Andrej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 7-9.

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more important focus. Therefore, the key to understanding military writing on third-world conflict lies in the relation of peripheral conflict to general war and to Soviet-U.S. rivalry. Since Khrushchev, Soviet security has been defined in terms of avoiding direct Soviet-U.S. conflict and protecting the development of socialism. Soviet policy toward third-world conflicts is therefore based upon the escalatory link between local and general war, the nature of socialist internationalist duty to aid progressive change, and the likelihood and sources of national liberation and the development of socialism. These three variables are essential to Soviet calculations of the relationship between its actions in the third world and Soviet security: the link between local and general war determines whether and how Soviet activism jeopardizes or strengthens Soviet defense against the only powers that can militarily defeat or destroy it, the United States and NATO; an international order based on zero-sum class struggle prescribes Soviet support for revolutionary movements to weaken capitalism and thus protect socialism and Soviet global interests; and the social, economic, and political bases of liberation and development define the proper form Soviet aid should take as well as the specific regimes and movements most likely to advance socialist, which is to say Soviet, interests.

While an individual analyst could theoretically hold any combination of views on these three issues, in practice Soviet analysts have adopted one of three policy orientations: radical activism, pragmatic activism, and crisis prevention.[7] The distribution of persons holding each of these orientations is an indication of Soviet policy and perception of third-world conflicts at any given time, and shifts in the distribution denote changes in policy.[8]

Pragmatic activists favor relations with moderate states as the basis of an anti-imperialist strategy and generally advocate moderate means of progressive transformation and aid. They may be supportive of revolutionary change but are cautious in their assessment of a direct Soviet role in the struggle of local forces for liberation and skeptical about building effective Soviet influence through radical states alone. Soviet internationalism is based upon the theory of international relations as a global class struggle between capitalism and socialism and thus entails a duty to aid progressive forces in their struggle against imperialism. A pragmatic ac-

[7] George W. Breslauer, "All Gorbachev's Men," *The National Interest*, No. 12 (1988), 91-100, at 92. Breslauer also discusses "Russia first" orientations, but these are, obviously, not relevant to Soviet third-world policy.

[8] The following discussion of elements of Soviet third-world policy will be very brief. For studies that discuss shifts and debates in Soviet third-world policy in greater detail see, for example, Zimmerman (fn. 1), Hough (fn. 1), Valkenier (fn. 2), and Katz (fn. 3).

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tivist holds that escalation risks lie in competitive interactions and confrontation in local wars; therefore the specific risks of escalation depend on the level of tension in international relations, especially U.S.-Soviet relations. Thus, pragmatic activism can be active: when the broader risks of war with the United States are low, it offers no objections to competitive behavior. However, pragmatic activism remains pragmatic: it prefers moderate means and moderate targets in securing Soviet interests, and it prefers to avoid the risks of military confrontation.

Roughly speaking, Soviet policy from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s was dominated by pragmatic activism. Khrushchev saw escalation from direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation in local wars as inevitable and consequently prescribed Soviet restraint in these instances.[9] Although Soviet policy declared that international relations were based on the struggle between capitalism and socialism, and postulated that Soviet aid to progressive forces was both its duty and in Soviet interests, Khrushchev's was a pragmatic policy that preferred Soviet relations with even bourgeois nationalist leaders to any direct Soviet involvement in national liberation wars.[10] While military analysts were uncomfortable with a number of Khrushchev's positions, particularly his categories of just and unjust wars and the implications of inevitable escalation for Soviet military inaction, the general attitude of the military was consistent with pragmatic activism.

A radical activist holds that the risks of escalation from local conflict to global war are not great as long as the Soviet Union is strong and vigorously opposes U.S. counterrevolutionary actions. Risks of escalation in local conflicts are the result of U.S. attempts to exploit Soviet weakness. The tendency to view the risks of escalation in terms of the opponent's attempts to outmaneuver or dominate oneself is analogous to an "actor image" of escalation processes.[11] The radical activist orientation encompasses the expansive definition of Soviet internationalist duty to aid the processes of world revolution, class struggle, and the establishment of socialism: in this, radical activism and pragmatic activism are based on the same moral foundations for Soviet third-world policy. The expansive definition is coupled with a view of local forces that places great faith in radical movements and governments, and in radical, which is to say armed, means for the defense and advancement of socialism.

[9] Katz (fn. 3), 19-21.

[10] This was, however, a matter of considerable debate. See Hough (fn. 1), 149-56.

[11] "In the phenomenal model, escalation is something that *happens*, in which the participants are caught up. In the actor model, escalation is something that some government unilaterally *does*." Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 22.

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The 1970s saw the strengthening of radical activism in Soviet political and intellectual circles and its coexistence with a highly optimistic pragmatic activism. Civilian and leadership thinking about third-world conflicts exhibited an extraordinary surge in optimism regarding the controllability of conflict and escalation, as well as eagerness to support radical forces in national liberation struggles.[12] Military analysts supported the consensus by arguing that Soviet power had grown to the point where the United States would be restrained by the risks of escalation, therefore local wars need not escalate to global nuclear war. If escalation could be prevented, the Soviet Union was free to consider whether and how it might aid progressive forces.[13] This position on escalation risks was qualitatively different from earlier views because it held that since Soviet *strength* deterred U.S. action, increased Soviet aid to progressive forces would reduce the risks of armed struggle. Pragmatic activists in the 1970s argued that the Soviet Union *could* intervene in third-world conflicts: radical activists argued that it *must*.

As the 1970s ended, the difficulties and failures of beleaguered radical and socialist-oriented regimes led to civilian rethinking of support for such states, and civilian analysts shifted to a preference for political over armed means of struggle.[14] This retrenchment to a truly pragmatic activism was not shared by the political leadership until after Brezhnev's death. Andropov then disavowed radical activism by emphasizing limited Soviet support to revolution, although he did not question Soviet internationalist duty to aid national liberation and progressive forces.[15] Meanwhile, military writers largely remained unrepentant radical activists. Discussion of the ability of indigenous forces to achieve and maintain socialist change grew pessimistic but military belief in Soviet ability to prevent escalation grew stronger, and military analysts even argued that Soviet internationalist duty required more direct Soviet involvement in third-world conflicts.[16] While civilian analysts were retreating to pragmatic activism, and the leadership endorsed existing levels of Soviet ac-

[12] S. Neil MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 140; Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986), 14-16. For a study of the domestic political basis of Brezhnev's foreign policy, see Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

[13] Katz (fn. 3), 67-68.

[14] Valkenier (fn. 2), 99; Francis Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," *Problems of Communism* 36 (September-October 1987), 1-13, at 3.

[15] Fukuyama (fn. 12), 15-19, 25; Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1985), 136.

[16] Katz (fn. 3), 97-109. See also Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988) for evidence of military analyses along these lines in the early 1980s, as well as Papp (fn. 15), 118, and Francis Fukuyama, *Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1987), 37.

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tivism, military writers were arguing for more radical Soviet action in third-world conflicts. In most respects, Soviet military doctrinal obstinacy reflected Soviet behavior in the early 1980s better than the civilian viewpoint. Although the capacity for further direct intervention was limited by the war in Afghanistan, active Soviet aid and support to radical and socialist-oriented allies remained at high levels.

Advocates of crisis prevention hold that risks are inherent in escalation processes—a position similar to the phenomenal view of escalation.[17] In prescribing Soviet policy they accord the risk of escalation a much more important place than do pragmatic activists. They analyze the horrendous (and mutual) consequences of nuclear war and emphasize the urgent Soviet obligation to prevent any such conflict. The development of the crisis prevention orientation in the 1980s, and its predominance in new thinking, has been accompanied by a revisionist definition of Soviet internationalist duty. Civilian analysts, especially in the U.S.A./Canada Institute, argue that this duty is based on humanity's interest in peace and are silent on its traditional class basis. Unlike pragmatic activism, in which there is a potential contradiction between traditional Soviet internationalist duty and heightened risks of escalation, crisis prevention reconciles the need to avoid U.S.-Soviet military confrontation in the third world with the fundamental duty to do so. Note that radical activism is internally consistent also: it prescribes both the exhibition of Soviet strength to prevent escalation and fulfillment of the duty to aid third-world revolutionaries. In keeping with its primary emphasis on the risks of conflict and Soviet duty to promote peace and development, advocates of crisis prevention would be expected to favor moderate means and moderate states.[18]

Table 1 summarizes the position of each Soviet third-world policy orientation on each of the three issues relevant to Soviet understanding of third-world conflict. Armed with this framework, one can track changes in Soviet views of third-world conflict and identify the specific points of resistance and accommodation on the part of the military as it reacts to civilian innovations and leadership positions.

The Third World and New Thinking in Soviet Foreign Policy

A. Analyses by the Party Leadership and Civilians

Advocates of new thinking have not silenced dissent in the Soviet press and academic journals. Proponents of both radical and pragmatic activism still appear, although the former are rare and the latter grow

[17] Smoke (fn. 11).

[18] Breslauer (fn. 7), 5.

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TABLE 1
SOVIET THIRD-WORLD POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND CONFLICT PROCESSES

	Policy Issues		
Policy Orientations	*Escalation Risks*	*Internationalist Duty*	*Local Conditions*
Radical Activism	controllable; lie in weakness in face of opponent; depend on Soviet power and will	expansive definition	radical movements and means
Pragmatic Activism	potential lies in conflict process; depend on state of U.S.-Soviet relations	expansive definition	moderate movements and means
Crisis Prevention	inherent in conflict process; depend on state of U.S.-Soviet relations	revisionist definition	moderate movements and means

ever more pragmatic. The intellectual and political activity associated with new thinking stems from the increased influence of the crisis prevention orientation in Soviet commentary on international affairs—which itself is in a considerable state of flux—and displays no cohesive view of international relations.[19] However, for our understanding of third-world conflict, new thinking is marked by a distinctive confluence on all three issues in the policy orientation framework. Elements of the new thinking are in fact old: what is new is the configuration of the crisis prevention orientation as a whole and the predominance of that view among civilian analysts and the political leadership.

First, new thinkers expand the argument that the conditions of local forces in third-world conflicts argue for the support of moderate means and movements. This is perhaps the oldest element in Soviet analysis of third-world conflict, although the analytic sophistication is greater than

[19] I have not attempted to outline the domestic political basis of new thinking as part of Gorbachev's efforts to consolidate power and the policy agenda. For studies that focus on the interrelationship of power, policy, politics, and personnel, see Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88), 93-131; Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988), 124-63; and Breslauer (fn. 7). For a discussion of the points of difference and agreement between Gorbachev and civilian analysts, see Meyer, 134-55.

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before, and the thrust of observations is different. Civilian analysts in the 1980s emphasize the role of religion, ethnicity, and nationalism in local conflicts and pay greater attention to specific local sources of backwardness rather than the legacy of imperialism.[20] Many writers voice deep pessimism regarding the ability of radical or progressive forces to attain or maintain a path of socialist development. Some assert that the development process is the task of local Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties, and this stance toward conflict in the third world is backed by fewer statements of willingness to provide military assistance to revolutionary movements. In discussion of the socialist-oriented countries, Soviet analysts and leaders "tend to be far more critical and less sanguine than previously about prospects for evolution in the direction of socialism."[21] It is important to keep in mind the limits of new thinking about the third world. As it has filtered through civilian analyses to leadership policy, new thinking does not abandon an international role for the Soviet Union but reorients policy away from heavy reliance upon radical means and regimes.

Second, new thinkers have flooded the Soviet press and academic journals with analyses of the dangers of crisis escalation inherent in conflict, including regional conflict.[22] There are two parts to this thesis. First, writers advance the argument that the risks of U.S.-Soviet confrontation became extremely high in the 1980s, and that confrontation has the potential for disaster because international conflict is inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable. Conflict and instability in the third world are a major potential source of U.S.-Soviet confrontation because they undermine the chances for any U.S.-Soviet détente. This is a complete reversal of the 1970s perception that U.S.-Soviet détente made third-world revolutionary wars possible: now the latter make détente impossible. Second, crisis preventers present a qualitatively new concept of the relation between crisis escalation, Soviet security, and general war. They argue that security is inherently mutual: that actions which threaten U.S. security only reduce Soviet security. A superpower cannot guarantee its own security by confrontation and the attempt to impose losses on the other in crises because loss compels the victim to take actions that increase the

[20] S. Neil MacFarlane, "The USSR and the Third World: Continuity and Change under Gorbachev," *The Harriman Institute Forum* 1 (March 1988), 1-7, at 3; Elizabeth K. Valkenier, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Reassessments," *World Politics* 38 (April 1986), 415-34, at 427-29.

[21] MacFarlane (fn. 20), 3.

[22] For an accessible source of a range of new thinking, see Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman, eds., *Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking* (New York: Walker and Co., 1988), especially chapters by Andrei V. Kortunov, Alexander I. Nikitin, and Andrei Y. Melville.

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chances of war. Thus, an upward spiral in escalation dynamics and the mutually self-defeating pursuit of security at the expense of the other side, taken together, mean that local conflicts are not opportunities to be exploited through confrontation: they are the seedbeds of a direct U.S.-Soviet war, which neither would deliberately choose. This thesis leads to new thinking's focus on the destabilizing potential of third-world conflict, rather than its potential as a means to advance socialism or defend revolution and national liberation.[23]

On these two issues, new thinking sounds similar to thinking during previous periods of caution in Soviet third-world policy. Soviet analysts have favored moderate states and means in the past, and the risks of escalation have counseled caution and avoidance of confrontation.[24] Soviet speeches and writings may exhibit greater concern over crisis escalation risks than ever before and exhibit greater pessimism regarding radical local forces and revolutionary change, but Soviet policy on these issues has undergone cyclical change in the past, and there is nothing to prevent it from reverting to optimism when the international environment grows more favorable.

What makes new thinking analyses of third-world conflict new is the integration of these two positions with a fundamental revision of official Soviet perceptions of internationalist duty. A series of analyses on the implications of mutual security and global interdependence in the context of the risks of escalation from local conflicts have led civilian analysts to redefine the Soviet role in third-world development and peace, and this revised definition is evident in Gorbachev's speeches. In November 1987, Gorbachev explained that Lenin's conception of peaceful coexistence had undergone changes because in the nuclear age the problem of human survival is not solved by a policy based upon the struggle between two opposing social systems. He also claimed that internationalism declined during "the period of stagnation," the term commonly used to describe the Brezhnev era. It is certainly strange to argue that the 1970s was a period in which socialism's internationalist impulse declined, unless Gorbachev is redefining internationalism to exclude Soviet military intervention to aid revolutionary forces in third-world conflicts.[25] For-

[23] Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 68, No. 1 (*America and the World 1988/89*), 82-98, at 86; MacFarlane (fn. 20), 3.

[24] For analyses that are skeptical of the "newness" of new thinking, see MacFarlane (fn. 20) and Fukuyama (fn. 14).

[25] See two speeches by Gorbachev, the first given at the October Revolution anniversary celebration, 2 November 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS-SOV), 3 November 1987, 38-61, at 54, and the second, printed in *Pravda*, 5 November 1987, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter *CDSP*) 39, No. 45 (1987), 17.

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eign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has been even more specific, claiming that peaceful coexistence "cannot be equated with the class struggle."[26]

Apparently taking up this theme, Aleksander Bovin (a political writer for *Izvestia* and reputedly an advisor to Gorbachev) has observed that "the situation may arise in which it will be necessary to sacrifice class interests in favor of wider interests."[27] Concern for global security and interests would certainly appear to leave little room for class analysis of war and peace and at least relegates them to a low priority. This is not merely a return to the pre-1970s Soviet position that since it cannot control escalation in the third world, it must avoid such conflicts. Military conflict and instability by themselves are seen as deleterious to the interests of socialism because of mutual security and interdependence, which create mutual vital interests that have priority over class struggle or class interests.

An important element in this revisionist definition of Soviet internationalist duty is an argument that conflict is no longer a zero-sum game because of nuclear weapons.[28] Since the old view of Soviet security saw international relations as based upon the struggle between capitalism and socialism, Soviet security depended upon socialist gains in the international arena. These were achieved only by Soviet nuclear and military strength. Now, a nuclear deterrent stance serves only to reduce the security of both the Soviet Union and the United States through the threat of mutual destruction. If this analysis is to make any sense, zero-sum international class struggle can no longer serve as the moral basis for Soviet policy toward third-world conflicts. Threats to U.S. interests in regional conflicts are no longer necessarily interpreted as gains for the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, new thinking internationalism continues to pose considerable problems for Soviet policy toward third-world conflicts. Escalation from local or regional conflict to U.S.-Soviet nuclear war remains only a possibility. This is a classic paradox of nuclear deterrence in theory and policy: Are the risks and consequences of escalation so great that the

[26] "XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsia KPSS: Vneshnyaya politika i diplomatia," *Pravda*, 26 July 1988, 2. A recent editorial in the Party's theoretical journal states without hedging that "Marxist humanism proceeds from the priority of common human interests and values before all other particular interests"; "Revolyutsia, perestroika, gumanizm" [Revolution, perestroika, humanism], *Kommunist*, No. 15 (1988), 5-11, at 5.

[27] Quoted in Viktor Yasmann, "The New Thinking in Regional Conflicts: Ideology and Politics," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 493 (3 December 1987), 1-6, at 3.

[28] See, for example, Yevgeni Primakov, "A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy," *Pravda*, 10 July 1987, in *CDSP* 39, No. 28 (1987), 1-4. Primakov is the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

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Soviet Union may *never* act in support of progressive forces in third-world conflicts? Even so strong a spokesman for new thinking as Yevgeni Primakov is uncomfortable with the dilemma this poses for Soviet policy: "How should one regard the problems of armed struggle for independence or just and unjust wars?"[29] He tries to solve the dilemma by claiming that only revolutions with "internal" sources are legitimate targets of Soviet support but quickly turns to joint U.S.-Soviet peaceful conflict resolution as the primary method by which the Soviet Union can aid progressive forces. At some point, Soviet third-world policy may have to choose between supporting progressive forces and avoiding conflict with the United States to preserve common human interests. Ostensibly, Gorbachev's policy is to choose the latter course, but discomfort with such a position is apparent in Primakov's efforts to avoid choosing between the two.

Taken together, these perceptions demonstrate that Gorbachev's conceptions of peaceful coexistence and Soviet internationalism are no longer based primarily on class struggle between the two social systems but on the notion that common human interests best advance Soviet interests in peace and economic development. This mesh of "crisis prevention" and "Russia first" perspectives[30] means that Soviet policy makers will be skeptical of the advantages of intervention and their perception of the Soviet role in such conflicts extremely limited. Proletarian internationalism as understood by new thinking is best served by the absence of third-world conflict because that is the only way to ensure the prevention of global war and the conditions for Soviet economic development.

The precepts of new thinking have not gone unchallenged, and the most visible dispute in the leadership is on the revisionist definition of internationalist duty. Speaking less than two weeks after Shevardnadze's report, Yegor K. Ligachev, then the second-ranking Soviet leader, dismissed the notion that Soviet policy is no longer based upon the class nature of international relations and that common human problems supersede social and national liberation struggles. Ligachev did not express optimism regarding the prospects for revolutionary change in developing countries or disagree that risks of U.S.-Soviet conflict favor caution. He simply affirmed the nature of international class struggle and a legitimate Soviet role in supporting it.[31]

[29] Primakov, "USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 6 (1988), 3-9, at 4.

[30] Breslauer (fn. 7), 92.

[31] "Za delo—bez raskachki," *Pravda*, 6 August 1988, 2. In contrast, Vadim Medvedev, the new chairman of a party commission on ideology appointed when Ligachev was demoted, has endorsed the revised formulation on class struggle, the priority of common human inter-

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B. Military Analyses

Analysis of new thinking by Soviet military writers is in a state of flux. Opposition to *perestroika* and new thinking tenets was evident from 1985 to 1988. However, Gorbachev has been active and successful in placing new people, apparently his own choices, throughout the highest levels of the Soviet military.[32] While there is some evidence that military analysts are resisting the implications of Gorbachev's advocacy of "reasonable sufficiency" and a defensive orientation in their analyses of military science and operational art,[33] effective political opposition by important military figures to the central thrust of new thinking in defense has been absent. Given the lack of effective military opposition to the leadership policies in the area of central concern—the military balance in Europe—it should not surprise us that there is no evidence of high-level direct opposition to new thinking in matters of less importance to the professional Soviet military such as third-world policy. No military figure spoke out in support of Ligachev's defense of traditional internationalism. Indeed, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, unlike his predecessor Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, has demonstrated no interest in a force projection role for the navy. Chernavin has written that the "external function" of the Soviet navy, other than the strategic nuclear mission, is coastline and continental defense, thus it has little to do with third-world conflict.[34] Defense Minister Dimitriy Yazov's perspectives on the meaning of new thinking for local and regional conflicts, such as the Soviet military exit from Afghanistan, have been remarkable only for their absence.

Military writers who discuss third-world conflict profess broad support for new thinking precepts while simultaneously presenting analyses that contradict it on specific points, although the form of resistance to

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ests, and the indefinite course of peaceful coexistence. "Sovremennaya kontseptsia sotsializma," *Pravda*, 5 October 1988, 4.

[32] Dale R. Herspring, "Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military," *Problems of Communism* 36 (July-August 1987), 99-107; Meyer (fn. 19); F. Stephen Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (Summer 1988), 1002-27.

[33] Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces," *International Security* 12 (Spring 1988), 48-77, at 49-53. Meyer identifies "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense" as the two security issues in new thinking that most directly challenge the military's traditional role in Soviet defense policy and that have been the objects of the most vigorous resistance; Meyer (fn. 19), 144-51. Another example is the military commentary on the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium that questioned the wisdom of this unilateral policy; Larrabee (fn. 32), 1013.

[34] Chernavin, "Combat Readiness of Naval Forces—At the Level of Modern Requirements," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 20 (1986) in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS-UMA), No. 1 (1987), 22-30, at 22. In contrast, see Fukuyama (fn. 16), 34-36, for a discussion of the rise and fall of Gorshkov's theses.

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adaptation varies. On escalation, military analysts exhibit a range of opinion from radical activist insistence on Soviet strength and will, to pragmatic activist avoidance of confrontation yet insistence on competition, to military writers who have taken up the crisis prevention orientation on the primary and severe risks of escalation in the nuclear age. Military analysts devote their most vigorous objections to revisions of the notion of internationalist duty. Writers refuse to abandon class as the primary basis of international relations or Soviet duty to aid national liberation, but some do attempt to fit old perceptions into new realities. To make sense of these numerous threads, the following analysis systematically contrasts the arguments of representative writers on the issues of crisis escalation, internationalist duty, and local forces.

1. CRISIS ESCALATION

Even in the Gorbachev era it is not difficult to find radical activists who argue that escalation in third-world conflicts is controllable because Soviet power forces imperialism to back down. For example, to a radical activist, the origins of the Cuban missile crisis lie in U.S. attempts to exploit its position of strength (by invading Cuba), which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Further escalation of the crisis was prevented by active Soviet military countermeasures that forced U.S. leaders to face the certainty of confrontation with Soviet power.[35] In this view of crisis escalation, danger lies in the appearance of Soviet weakness, which the enemy attempts to exploit. Security is guaranteed only by forcing the enemy to back down. Furthermore, crisis management requires forceful action such as the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba—"a bold, justified, and timely international action."[36] Escalation control depends upon the active exercise of Soviet power, and Soviet warnings and attempts at peaceful resolution only encourage U.S. aggression. This position flatly contradicts Gorbachev's advocacy of political means of conflict resolution by claiming that the Cuban crisis proves that peaceful resolutions are achieved only when socialist power forces imperialism to accept them.

In another thinly disguised attack on new thinking precepts, an analyst notes that "some bourgeois public figures" have claimed that war as an extension of policy has become untenable. It cannot have escaped him

[35] Maj.-Gen. I. Statsenko, "Vtorzheniye ne sostoyalos, Karibskiy krizis: istoria i sovremennost" [The invasion did not take place, the Caribbean crisis: History and the present], *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 20 (1987), 82-85, at 83. Statsenko does not appear to worry unduly about a spiral of escalation getting out of hand. He refers to the shooting down of a U-2 spy plane at the height of the crisis as "a suitable rebuff."

[36] *Ibid.*, 84.

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that certain fellow Soviets—including Gorbachev—have also advanced this view.[37] Contrary to new thinkers, certain military analysts continue to argue that conflict and escalation will persist because the United States continues to use force as an extension of its policy to defeat socialism; the Soviet Union, therefore, must be ready to counter aggression.[38] This is, of course, somewhat beside the point, because new thinkers argue that reducing the opponent's security only diminishes one's own, and confrontation risks nuclear war, which no one can survive. The author's view of the sources of escalation in confrontation with the United States is fundamentally different. He is convinced of the ability and duty of socialism to oppose imperialism, and he has no doubt that imperialists would use nuclear weapons as a political tool in the face of socialist weakness. His concern is therefore to prevent the United States from thinking it can do this, and his fear of nuclear war derives not from the risk of uncontrollable escalation but from the appearance of Soviet weakness.

Alongside these vestiges of radical activism, the most common theme in military writings on the problem of escalation and local wars involves a retreat from the optimistic position that the exercise of Soviet power and support in local wars prevents escalation. These analysts argue that the potential for escalation has increased with U.S. aggression. While Soviet power may have a generally salutary effect on the struggles of progressive forces, a preoccupation with instability in local and regional conflicts and a sense that things could get out of control lead many analysts to counsel caution. This return to pragmatic activism is characterized by the juxtaposition of apparently contradictory perspectives. The same writer may continue to accept the thesis, developed in the 1970s, that Soviet power acts as a brake on perennial U.S. aggression and imperialist military adventures, while at the same time calling for the resolution of conflicts and pursuit of international security by political means.[39] Faith in Soviet power to thwart imperialism sounds like radical

[37] See, for example, Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency—Or, How To Break the Vicious Cycle," *New Times*, No. 40 (1987), 13-15.

[38] Capt. 1st Rank A. Belyayev, "Scientific Concepts in Modern Warfare—An Important Element in the Awareness of the Soviet Fightingman," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 7 (1985), in JPRS-UMA, No. 50 (1985), 17-22, at 19-20. Belyayev is discussing general intersystemic war, not local conflicts, so he is not necessarily arguing that the Soviet Union must confront the U.S. throughout the third world. I refer to his position in order to illustrate the sharp differences between the way some military analysts continue to view war, escalation, and policy, and how civilian new thinkers formulate their arguments on the requirements of crisis prevention. For more on military resistance to new thinking ideas on escalation to general war and the political means of guaranteeing security, see Meyer (fn. 19), 135-41.

[39] Maj.-Gen. M. Yasyukov, "The Problem of War and Peace—The Most Critical Problem of Modern Times," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 10 (1986), in JPRS-UMA, No. 2 (1987), 5-13, at 5, 8.

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activism, while the call for resort to political means in security matters is a tenet of new thinking. What are we to make of this?

The answer is complex. The diagnosis of U.S. interventionism and escalatory behavior in the 1980s has led many analysts who previously exhibited boundless faith in the deterrent effect of the Soviet military on U.S. behavior in local conflicts to rethink both the likely outcome of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation and the most useful methods by which the Soviet Union might aid progressive third-world forces.[40] While direct, repeated U.S.-Soviet confrontation is not likely to advance the interests of socialism because of resurgent U.S. aggression, the new military pragmatic activists are unwilling to go so far as to abandon the role of Soviet power in aiding revolutionary change. However, for them, unlike radical activists, Soviet deterrence of U.S. aggression does not require a crisis-by-crisis confrontation. Instead, it is an overarching systemic condition that permits Soviet activism in relations with developing countries. The view is an accommodation to the realities of the 1980s, yet it does not consider the dangers of escalation to be so great as to require a fundamentally different approach to third-world conflicts.

This revision of radical perspectives permits analysts to take both radical activists and crisis preventers to task. They use a detailed analysis of local wars and the lessons of the 1970s to point out that parity and the heightened risk of global nuclear war have not led to restraint in U.S. militarism but to greater emphasis on local wars as a means of conducting foreign policy. Such arguments contradict those of radical activists. On the other hand, new thinkers do not escape rebuke. United States intervention may be indirect, but "this in no way reduces the American role in the outbreak of military conflicts."[41] This runs counter to new thinking's advocacy of cooperation with the United States to resolve local conflicts through peaceful, political means. Another analyst, Lieutenant General D. A. Volkogonov, juxtaposes two similar arguments. On the one hand, the implications of the nuclear era have qualitatively altered ideas of war and peace, therefore military superiority and zero-sum conflicts do not serve Soviet security. Yet conflicts and wars occur not because of competition and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but because of the nature and policies of imperialism

[40] For example, see discussion of an earlier article by Yasyukov in Katz (fn. 3), 113.

[41] Col. G. V. Malinovskiy, "Imperializm SShA—glavnyy istochnik vozniknovenia lokalnykh voin 1945-1985" [Imperialism of the U.S.A.—the principal source of the eruption of local wars, 1945-1985], *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 1 (1986), 51-58, at 53. He argues later that the U.S. not only causes local and regional conflicts but also seeks to prevent conflict resolution, as it did in the Persian Gulf. This directly contradicts those crisis preventers who believe that the U.S. and Soviet Union can resolve conflicts only by joint political means. For an analysis of Malinovskiy's writing before the Gorbachev era, see Fukuyama (fn. 16), 37.

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itself, and "it is only with the help of parity, which the 27th CPSU Congress evaluated as 'socialism's historic achievement,' that we deter the potential aggressor from taking foolhardy steps."[42] Volkogonov sees a United States unwilling to accept "the imperatives of the nuclear age," but he is not entirely certain that parity and socialist strength will prevent aggressive U.S. policies from leading to war. His analysis differs from radical activism, therefore, but because he is unwilling to discuss crisis instability and the threat of nuclear war without blaming the United States, his emphasis differs from that of civilian crisis preventers. The risks of nuclear war are high and the costs great, so political means of conflict resolution might serve Soviet interests, but he warns that these principles cannot become policy until the United States recognizes the new imperatives.

Counsels of caution in pragmatic writings are rarely explicit. Instead, warnings of U.S. aggression are accompanied by a deafening silence on the Soviet role in local conflicts or by praise for progressive forces battling imperialism on their own. Preoccupation with the U.S. threat everywhere and in increasingly aggressive forms would lead a radical activist to advocate Soviet measures to counter aggression. In contrast, Colonel G. V. Malinovskiy's study of U.S. intervention does not mention a directly interventionary or indirectly supportive Soviet role in third-world conflicts. The Soviet role in preventing local wars appears only in the last paragraph and consists of opposition to the threat of a new world war. This is an extremely passive contribution and is far removed from the optimism of the 1970s, when escalation dangers were small and Soviet freedom to aid national liberation great. Soviet restraint is justified by Malinovskiy's optimistic remark that "no force in the world can break the will of people defending their freedom and independence."[43]

While pragmatic activists point to the need to avoid local conflicts stirred up by the United States, civilian crisis preventers argue that crises develop from local causes, and without active U.S.-Soviet attempts to resolve conflicts they may spiral beyond the control of either state. Analogous arguments in military journals are difficult to find. The best example is an essay by Captain V. Yaremenko on the Persian Gulf describ-

[42] Volkogonov, "Questions of Theory: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age," *Pravda*, 30 August 1985, in JPRS-UMA, No. 59 (1985), 3-8, at 3-4, and "Imperatives of the Nuclear Age," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 22 May 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 4 June 1987, V4-V9, at V7.

[43] Malinovskiy (fn. 41), 58. He also points out that analysis of local wars shows the failure of U.S. attempts in Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Namibia. In only *one* of these cases, Afghanistan, was the Soviet Union *directly* involved in defending national liberation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did support and supply progressive forces to varying degrees in each of those conflicts, so perhaps he is advocating a return to limited and cautious support as was the norm before the 1970s.

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ing the limited, local causes of a war that escalated both vertically and horizontally because of Iranian-Iraqi hostility.[44] Here we have a situation that is "explosively dangerous"—escalation occurs because of the interactions of belligerents, not because any one state chooses it. In contrast to pragmatic activists, Yaremenko does not give even vague assurances of the role of Soviet power in restraining the United States. Instead, he describes a conflict in which the Soviet Union clearly has no military means to prevent the escalation of armed acts near its border, and one that directly threatens Soviet security. The solution offered to conflict in the Persian Gulf is "flexibility" and joint U.S.-Soviet leadership in resolving local disputes.[45] This author comes closer to crisis prevention positions on escalation risks than other military analysts. His assessment of how crises begin and escalate differs from that of radical activists, for whom the United States attempts to exploit socialist weakness and only Soviet action prevents larger conflicts. It also differs subtly from that of pragmatic activists, for whom escalation risks may be high and Soviet caution therefore appropriate, but who see the long-term solution to conflict and escalation as the disappearance of imperialism.

The broad range of thought on escalation risks results from the persistently problematic nature of third-world conflict for an ambitious superpower in the nuclear age. New thinking is in many respects more easily applied to U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Europe, where the risks of escalation are more certain and political methods of resolving disagreements more common. Since the regularization of East-West relations in Europe, the incentives for U.S.-Soviet competition for influence in developing countries have been clear. But given the risks of nuclear war, what are to be the limits of that competition? Radical activists answer that Soviet military activism and peace are not incompatible. Crisis preventers answer that such activism undermines real Soviet interests. Pragmatic activists are at a loss: they see risks in competition but are unwilling to abandon Soviet interests in third-world conflicts. In a period when the risks of crisis escalation are considered high, the latent contradiction in the pragmatic activist viewpoint is once again sharp.

Yet a reconciliation is not impossible between the pragmatic activism of military writers such as Malinovskiy and Volkogonov, and Gorbachev's calls for political means of conflict resolution based on common interests in preventing nuclear war. As part of their pragmatism, the military writers counsel caution and limits on direct Soviet action in

[44] Yaremenko, "Grozovye tuchi nad persidskim zalivom" [Stormclouds over the Persian Gulf], *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 24 (1987), 73-77, at 73.

[45] *Ibid.*, 77.

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third-world conflicts. As in the 1970s, when optimism among pragmatic activists regarding détente and crisis escalation permitted their agreement with radical activism, so in the 1980s pessimism regarding those concerns should permit agreement with crisis preventers on Gorbachev's new directions in foreign policy. The possibility of such an agreement is constrained by different definitions of internationalist duty.

2. INTERNATIONALIST DUTY

Through the 1970s, a fundamental agreement on the class basis of international relations and its implications for Soviet interests and obligations in the third world joined radical activists and pragmatic activists in an assertive Soviet policy. That coalition began to erode when civilian analysts and some political leaders emphasized moderate movements and means in the face of heightened risks of escalation and confrontation. The military was very slow to follow these shifts, but by the late 1980s most military writers acknowledge greater escalation risks and the constraints they place on Soviet intervention in third-world conflicts. Yet these changes entail a retrenchment of pragmatic activism rather than a full capitulation to crisis prevention, because nearly all military writers continue to define Soviet internationalist duty in the traditional, expansive, class-based manner.

Soviet military writers most commonly resist revisionist definitions of internationalist duty by recalling the historical context of Soviet aid to national liberation struggles. They remind us that "the most important feature of Soviet patriotism is . . . its indissoluble connection with proletarian internationalism," and posit a direct line of descent of internationalist duty from the Soviet soldiers who liberated Europe in the Second World War to their successors who aided in the defense of Afghanistan.[46] Thus, these writers imply, to question internationalist duty in the third world places the legitimacy of proletarian internationalism in Europe in doubt. Another author links an exposition on the revolutionary, heroic, and fighting tradition of the Soviet armed forces to Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. When he cites examples of Soviet heroes in the October Revolution and Second World War, the author devotes a paragraph to one who "showed himself true to this tradition . . . fulfilling

[46] Gen. Col. G. Sredin, "Sovetskiy patriotizm i proletarskiy internatsionalizm—vazhneishiye istochniki massovovo geroizma v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine" [Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism—the most important source of popular heroism in the Great Patriotic War], *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 2 (1985), 3-13, at 6, 11-13. This article appeared quite early in 1985, so it cannot be seen as resistance to the most recent revisionist formulations, but it contrasts with civilian analyses and leadership emphases of the period.

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his internationalist duty in Afghanistan."[47] An even sharper warning on the dangers of revisionism is based upon the notion that active Soviet internationalism is necessary for security. In this view, Soviet security is a seamless web in which the active exercise of Soviet internationalism is necessary for the defense of socialism. Accordingly, the function of the Soviet armed forces includes not only defense of the homeland and socialist countries but also active military assistance to developing countries to strengthen their defensive capacity.[48]

Military writers are reluctant to abandon old definitions of class struggle and international relations in part because of the continuing importance in Soviet military doctrine of the concept of "just war," which is based on class analysis. Although the clear categories of just and unjust wars and combatants have been eroding for a long time in Soviet military thought, the idea that the Soviet Union has a legitimate role in aiding progressive forces in third-world conflicts is based on its support for the just side in just wars. Without that rationale, the legitimacy of Soviet action in third-world conflicts is suspect—precisely what new thinkers are concluding and military writers resisting. Major General M. Yasyukov takes new thinkers to task for their emphasis on avoiding war by reminding them that traditional Soviet internationalism does not accept peace at any price: socialist countries struggle for a just peace.[49]

Lately, simple assertions of the continuing relevance of internationalist duty are giving way to attempts to reconcile traditional perspectives with the political trends in new thinking. Notions of mutual security and the implications of direct U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation have led some

[47] Maj.-Gen. V. P. Khrobostov, "Vospityvat na revolyutsionnykh i boyevykh traditsiakh" [To educate in the revolutionary and fighting tradition], *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 8 (1988), 3-9, at 6. This soldier apparently blew himself up with a grenade when "armed bandits" (Afghan rebels) drew near in order to make it possible for others in his company to escape. He was posthumously made a Hero of the Soviet Union.

[48] Lt. Gen. V. Serebryannikov, "Lofty Mission," *Soviet Military Review* (September 1987), 4-6, at 5.

[49] Yasyukov (fn. 39), 12. In contrasting traditional internationalism to new thinking revisionism, I have focused on the distinction between the class-based analysis of the former and the supraclass analysis of the latter. This obscures a great deal in the historical development of notions of the appropriate role of the Soviet military in local conflicts. These issues are fully examined by Katz (fn. 3) and Golan (fn. 16). Thus, Soviet internationalist duty was served in the 1960s by supplying weapons and military advisors, but by the late 1970s such comparative restraint would have appeared lax in meeting the Soviet duty to Angola or Ethiopia, at least in the eyes of radical activists. These are important issues for understanding Soviet policy and behavior. However, I prefer to keep the issue of appropriate means separate from the broad notion of duty because Soviet prescriptions of military means have varied with analysis of the prospects for revolutionary change and of local forces to advance Soviet interests, while the concept of proletarian internationalism has remained relatively unchanged. Thus, both radical activists and pragmatic activists have been adamant defenders of proletarian internationalism and have disagreed regarding appropriate means and targets.

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important military writers to discuss in approving tones common gains in peace and interdependence-related human values.[50] But apparently new thinking goes too far in its revisionist internationalism, and two forms of counterattack have appeared in the military press.

First, military writers have made a direct assault on the thesis that human interests have superseded class interests and that therefore Soviet foreign policy must be based upon securing the former even at the expense of the latter. Radical new thinkers, such as the writer Ales Adamovich, have been attacked for their sweeping condemnations of war and their failure to understand the class basis of conflict. In an attempt to deny new thinkers their moral foundations, military writers accuse them of abandoning ideals and spiritual values in a single-minded pursuit of peace at any price.[51] The specific targets of attack are writers who far exceed the political leadership in their zeal to deny a class basis for Soviet internationalism. Since their common premise rejects the primary relevance of class struggle in contemporary international relations, those who question this premise attack a position held explicitly by the leadership.

Second, the military press has reacted to reports, stories, literature, and films about the plight of Afghanistan veterans that question the purposes for which Soviet soldiers were sent there and the role of the military in Soviet society. The military press has strongly rebuked its critics and defends Soviet soldiers who, it argues, were simply fulfilling the internationalist duty assigned them by political leaders, only to return to their homeland to find themselves the targets of antimilitarism and shame.[52] Even the director of the Main Political Administration, responsible for party political education and army life, has reprimanded civilian writers

[50] For example, Volkogonov points out that "for millions of people the struggle for freedom, social justice and equality takes primarily the form of the struggle for the right to life"; Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1985), 8.

[51] Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1987), V6. See Adamovich's chapter in Gromyko and Hellman, eds. (fn. 22).

[52] See V. Dashkevich, "Ostorozhno! Zaplacheno krovyu," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 October 1988, 2; Lt. Col. P. Tkachenko, "Kak ty zhivyosh, moi drug i brat?" *Krasnaya zvezda*, 5 November 1988, 3. These articles purport to defend veterans of Afghanistan who, it is claimed, have been attacked, and their courage and devotion to duty belittled, by novels and films that focus on their pain and guilt. The vigorous defense of the conscientious exercise of military duty in *Krasnaya zvezda* (the newspaper of the Defense Ministry) seems to have paid off: the official line in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* largely concurs that Soviet soldiers were acting in accordance with their duty, although questions about the war itself remain. For example, the reports on the first Soviet columns to reach Termez on 6 February 1989 referred to the "soldier-internationalists," but the article described the long, difficult passage to the Soviet border in sad and sympathetic tones and, unlike *Krasnaya zvezda*, did not discuss any "fulfilled duty." See "Vyugi Salanga," *Pravda*, 7 February 1989, 1, 3; "Zdravstvui, rodina!" *Izvestia*, 6 February 1989, 1.

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who favor pacifism and write fiction that does not portray the contemporary Soviet soldier in the heroic and patriotic tradition of his forefathers. He points out that a Soviet soldier in Afghanistan is a "soldier-internationalist of infinite courage."[53] These debates demonstrate that for the military the issue of international class struggle and Soviet duty is not merely an abstract principle, but is linked to the military's proper role and institutional honor.

Thus, both strident and moderate defenses of traditional internationalism persist in describing a fundamental class struggle in international relations. The argument that conflicts and wars continue to exist as long as imperialism survives is not mere sophistry. Analysts point out that, while the Soviet Union may be ready for a new basis for international relations, unilateral changes are ruled out because U.S. doctrine remains unchanged.[54] These writers seek to protect a traditional definition of internationalist duty by providing a justification for socialism's fundamental principles and commitments, despite the need for political solutions to conflict. For the most part, little in this view precludes practical support for Gorbachev's policies of increased ties with moderate states and reliance on moderate means of pursuing policies. Despite the military's refusal to accept moral revisionism, one finds little advocacy of a direct, active Soviet role in third-world conflicts. Although "our sympathies have always been and will be on the side of the peoples waging a just struggle for their social and national liberation,"[55] it is unlikely that these

[53] Gen. A. D. Lizichev, "Sotsialisticheskaya armia i literatura" [Socialist army and literature], *Znamya* (February 1988), 160–76, at 168, 173-74. *Znamya* is a literary journal, so Lizichev's lecture on the importance of literature to Soviet defense readiness and its proper form may be taken to be aimed at writers with whom he is unhappy. Military commentary during the last days of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan offered no surprises in this respect. Reports continued to refer to "dedicated completion of the internationalist mission by Soviet soldiers," gratitude of the Afghan people to Soviet soldiers, etc. The commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Boris V. Gromov, has consistently referred to Soviet actions in terms of Soviet internationalism and explained the Soviet exit as a result of fulfilled Soviet duty. Upon his departure from Afghanistan on 15 February, he stated "In spite of our sacrifices and losses, we have totally fulfilled our internationalist duty." See Lt. Col. A. Olynik, "Zdravstvui, rodina zemlya!" *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 February 1989, 1, and "Na sklonakh Salanga," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 8 February 1989, 1; Bill Keller, "Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan After 9 Years," *New York Times*, 16 February 1989, 1, 4. In contrast, at a press conference the day of the beginning of the large-scale exit, Shevardnadze made no mention of Soviet duty fulfilled. Instead he discussed the unsettled nature of the situation in Afghanistan and the need to pursue a political resolution and the "cessation of fratricidal bloodshed"; "Press-konferentsia E. A. Shevardnadze," *Pravda*, 7 February 1989, 4.

[54] Maj.-Gen. Yuri V. Lebedev and Aleksei I. Podberezkin, "Voyennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost" [Military doctrine and international security], *Kommunist*, No. 13 (1988), 110-19, at 116; Col. V. Strebkov, "Voyenny paritet vchera i segodnya," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 January 1989, 3. These arguments are accompanied by strong endorsements of the "historic role of parity" and of new thinking's foundation on both parity and respect for the balance of interests.

[55] Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1985), 5.

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sympathies will be allowed to undermine political efforts to prevent nuclear confrontation. The real test of pragmatic activist views will be a conflict in which a progressive regime is being overcome by forces supported by the United States. How could crisis prevention and class-based socialist principles be reconciled then? Furthermore, the risks of crisis escalation and U.S.-Soviet confrontation are what have prompted pragmatic activists to adopt restraint regarding the Soviet role in third-world conflicts. If danger of escalation should subside, they may advocate an active Soviet role again. This is why the refusal to accept a fundamentally new definition of Soviet internationalist duty demonstrates considerable "adaptation" but little "learning."

In short, the dilemma of class interests versus human interests has proven troublesome for military analysts who might be sympathetic to new thinking. They engage in circuitous reasoning in the attempt to fit old justifications to new circumstances. They dismiss as pacifist and unscientific the idea that armed forms of struggle in class conflict are unacceptable, but at least one writer, Major N. Yefimov, has argued (or conceded) that in their determination to preserve peace and prevent nuclear war, the positions of pacifists and communists happen to coincide.[56] To claim that Soviet policy toward contemporary revolutionary conflict is the same as that of pacifists is an extraordinary concession for a military analyst to make.[57] The tortuous logic by which Yefimov defends this position demonstrates the problematic nature of revisionist internationalism for military writers.

First, while he defends class analysis, revolutionary struggle, and defense of liberation by forceful means, Yefimov points out that the nuclear age qualitatively changes the issue of armed struggle. Since intervention can cause regional conflicts, which in turn risk world war, choosing appropriate means in revolutionary struggle "grows into the problem of the very existence of humanity."[58] He does not directly state that human interests transcend class interests, but when choice of means must be dictated by the imperative of global human existence, class conflict is clearly subordinate. Second, while he praises revolutionary struggle, the examples he cites have little to do with direct Soviet action. In fact, he criticizes armed acts by Trotskyite "exporters of revolution" for having

[56] Yefimov, "Revolyutsionny protsess i sovremennost" [Revolutionary process and the present], *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 7 (1987), 84-88, at 87. See Hough (fn. 1), 24, for use of the "false denial" technique in Soviet debates.

[57] Volkogonov, for example, bitterly attacks pacifists. See Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1987), V4-V6.

[58] Yefimov (fn. 56), 86.

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nothing in common with genuinely revolutionary struggle.[59] To avoid taking a "class-transcending" position, therefore, Yefimov argues that while revolution is legitimate, in a nuclear era it is imperative to choose peaceful means of struggle in order to guarantee common human interests, which are somehow class-based. He may cling to an abstract vision of class internationalism, but its practical effect is to protect common human values.

Thus, even military analysts who are willing to hint at the importance of common human interests and the objective need to shift to peaceful (presumably political) means maintain that class analysis is the basis of Soviet foreign policy. The class element becomes quite diluted in warnings about risky regional conflicts in the nuclear age, not to mention discussions of revolutionary struggle in which the Soviet Union plays an entirely passive role. Yet restraint ultimately cannot be justified without adhering to a position that places greater value on common human interests than on class interests.[60]

Soviet military discussions of internationalist duty do not provide us with definitive answers regarding likely Soviet behavior in third-world conflicts. The shift toward defensive assertions and the appeal to class principles evident among pragmatic activists probably means that the military is in agreement with Gorbachev on the need to avoid new interventions in favor of sympathy, limited material support, and simply leaving progressive forces to do their best. The idea of abandoning Soviet duty and the right to assist progressive forces in just wars is distasteful to the military. As long as there is resistance on this point, nothing in their positions would prevent an active Soviet role in conflicts should the nuclear threat and risk of escalation subside. An analyst's position on internationalist duty is therefore the decisive factor in ascertaining the degree to which he is adopting new thinking.

3. LOCAL CONDITIONS

The prospects and nature of local forces in third-world conflicts is the issue on which military writers have been most willing to adapt to new

[59] He notes that partisan war has been especially useful, praises Cuba and Nicaragua, which "found in themselves the courage to rise to the struggle with arms in hands," and observes that the socialist countries have shown that their largest influence on the revolutionary process is their own social and economic development; *ibid.*, 86, 88. His criticism of "Trotskyites" and exporting revolution closely parallels the argument Primakov (fn. 29) makes in defense of national liberation and revolutionary struggle along with revisionist internationalism.

[60] Another interesting possibility would be to argue that international proletarian interests are best served when Soviet interests and security are assured. This was Stalin's position, but explicit advocacy of such a reactionary internationalism is not evident to date.

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thinking. While Soviet experiences in Afghanistan and in support of other clients beset by armed insurgencies and deeply complex development problems have not shaken their philosophical commitment to liberation and internationalist duty, the military's analysis of how revolutionary change is to be accomplished is proving to be less rigid. Heightened risks of escalation joined with complex and diverse local conditions might counsel caution and moderate means, even if one retains an expansive definition of Soviet internationalist duty. The reviewer of a book edited by Volkogonov praises the authors for studying the causes of war in class relations, imperialism, and "the other levels of the causality of wars, in particular the specific particular causes and the single, partial causes." If one understands these various sources, the reviewer writes, it is possible to understand the ways and methods by which to block their appearance.[61] While military writers are reluctant to abandon class struggle as the basis of international relations and Soviet foreign policy, they appear to be willing to admit that class struggle alone cannot explain conflict and war.

Soviet military attention to the contemporary sources of local wars is demonstrated most clearly in analyses of the sources and conduct of the Iran-Iraq war. Yaremenko's discussion of escalatory processes in the Gulf War, discussed earlier, is preceded by a historical background on the causes of the dispute, which predate imperialism insofar as they are rooted in a territorial dispute dating from the seventh century over the Shatt-al-Arab River.[62] There is no reason to believe that a dispute unrelated to American imperialism would be resolved by socialist-imperialist confrontation, and this analysis presumably fits Gorbachev's new thinking better than it would have fitted Soviet policy in the late 1970s.

Analysts also stress the complexity of local wars by assessing interests in those conflicts unrelated to class such as religion, nationalism, or military-civilian relations. Thus, they propose that the Gulf War was due to the attempt of Iran's religious leadership to "export" its Islamic revolution rather than to class or imperialism. Furthermore, they see that national liberation and class are overshadowed in contemporary conflict when, as one author points out, war as a "jihad" has a long history in Muslim countries as a tool of territorial expansion. He points out that Iranian attempts to extend their Islamic revolution into Iraq have failed because of the nationalist feeling of the Iraqi people in the face of Iran

[61] Col. V. T. Login, review of *Marksistsko-leninskoye ucheniye o voine i armii* [Marxist-Leninist training on war and army], ed. D. A. Volkogonov, *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 8 (1985), in JPRS-UMA, No. 3 (1986), 69-73, at 70.

[62] Yaremenko (fn. 44), 74.

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and its propaganda. He makes no claim that Iran has or will fail because of "socialism" or "progressive forces."[63] Complicating matters even further, Iran's internal civil-military conflicts, not class conflicts or imperialist interference, are seen as the source of Iran's very limited successes on the battlefield. A detailed analysis of the attempts of radical religious leaders to prevent the professional military from gaining control of the war justifies this claim and argues that the few battles the military did manage to control were successful.[64] The analysis demonstrates the origin, conduct, successes, and failures of a war in which class struggle and the Soviet Union played no role. Nationalism, tradition, and religion explain the course of events. The proper Soviet role in these circumstances is extremely difficult to derive from old formulations regarding third-world conflict.

At least one writer has even argued that the United States did not really benefit from the conflict in the Persian Gulf. This view marginalizes radical activist prescriptions still further and casts doubt on any military form of competition. That the United States was responsible for heightened tensions is not doubted, but the Reagan administration is said to have taken "an unjustified risk *despite the country's national interests* for the sake of restoring its prestige, undermined by the Irangate scandal."[65] Combined with a discussion of congressional opposition to the action and the observation of favorable congressional responses to Soviet proposals, this would appear to propose the possibility that the United States could contribute to a peaceful resolution of the situation, or that it was not by nature committed to the conflict.

There are at least two reasons why we are seeing military analyses so consistent with new thinking on the subject of local forces. First, analyses of complex and diverse sources of problems in the third world are not unprecedented in Soviet thinking, dating back to debates throughout Soviet history regarding the prospects for revolution in the third world.[66] This is particularly evident in the long history of pragmatic activist arguments in Soviet policy. Second, it may be in the interests of the Soviet military to highlight the complex and multidimensional sources of con-

[63] V. Ivanenko, "Iran: Islam i voina" [Iran: Islam and war], *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 9 (1987), 82-86, at 82-83, 85. The author also discusses Iranian attempts to "export" its revolution to Afghanistan, perhaps to remind us how easily religiously based local conflicts may escalate and to suggest that it is Islam, not the class enemy, that is the primary problem in the region.

[64] *Ibid.*, 83-84. Of course, attributing failure to lack of control by professional soldiers is a self-serving argument for a military analyst to make.

[65] Vasiliy Pustov, "Conflict and Its Consequences," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 June 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 24 June 1987, E1-E3, at E2; emphasis added.

[66] See Fukuyama (fn. 14), 2-4.

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flict given its failures in Afghanistan and Africa and its paralysis in the Persian Gulf. It may simply be looking for a convenient way to shift the blame. Discussion of the sustaining role of nationalism in the face of repeated battle, the driving force of Islam in war, and the beleaguered status of professional soldiers ought to evoke profound resonance in a Soviet military fresh from battle in Afghanistan. To explain war, and by inference its resolution, in terms of nationalist and religious disputes may render it easier for the Soviet military to endorse a "national reconciliation" policy in Afghanistan, because if the armed opponent is not a class enemy, there is little basis for the exercise of Soviet proletarian internationalism.

Traditional analyses of the sources of conflict and the nature of local forces have by no means disappeared. Despite Gorbachev's policy shifts toward favoring large, moderate third-world states and endorsements of mutually beneficial economic relations with capitalist interests, most Soviet military analysts continue to emphasize the negative effects of capitalism on developing countries and the exploitative nature of imperialism. The alternative offered to these countries is closer economic and military cooperation with the Soviet Union, which is "ready to show diverse aid and support—political, economic, moral, and even assistance in strengthening their defenses."[67] This policy suggestion would undoubtedly dismay Gorbachev and his advisors, who are trying to stem the financial drain on limited Soviet resources. The benefits of interdependence for third-world development and the amelioration of local conflict are nowhere in sight in these analyses. Of course, the refusal to abandon defense assistance to socialist-oriented countries in particular may be consistent with Gorbachev's own foreign policy. What is inconsistent are the concepts of two antagonistic social systems continuing to compete for influence among newly liberated countries and of class struggles as the source of third-world conflict.

Evidence of Soviet military adaptation to complex, nonclass causes of third-world conflict, although resisted by some writers, suggests a way for pragmatic activists to avoid the troublesome issue of proper internationalist duty. Having shifted to positions that emphasize the risks of crisis escalation and complex sources of local conflicts, extremely pragmatic activists begin to look more and more like crisis preventers. They may cling to principles of class duty, but if third-world conflicts can be resolved only by ameliorating nonclass problems, then they absolve the

[67] Maj.-Gen. N. Sedov, "Rol natsionalno-osvoboditelnovo dvizhenia v sovremennom mire" [The role of the national liberation movement in the contemporary world], *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 3 (1988), 76-82, at 80.

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Soviet Union of class duty in those conflicts. Reinforced by such analyses, the Soviet military could quite comfortably agree with civilian crisis preventers that Soviet interests are not served by intervention in specific conflicts, and that these conflicts offer no role for the Soviet military. This would not, at least in the short run, contradict the military's adherence to international class duty and the concept of just war. In Soviet military analyses, troublesome local conditions might serve as a functional equivalent to revisionist internationalism.

Accommodation and Learning in Soviet Policy: The Potential for Change and Coalition

Soviet military analysis of third-world conflict in the era of new thinking is beset by many theoretical dilemmas and remains in a state of considerable disarray. A sign of that disarray may be the relative lack of theoretical discussion of the topic. Francis Fukuyama notes that in the early 1980s, the articles published in *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* under the rubric *Lokalnye voiny* (Local wars) were historical analyses of the experiences of imperialist countries in third-world conflicts and focused on issues of operations and tactics rather than political issues.[68] This is in contrast to the 1970s, when Soviet writers were actively engaged in discussion of political and ideological issues of development and national liberation. The new pattern would appear to persist from 1985 through 1988. Of fifteen articles on local wars published in that period, only one, by Malinovskiy in 1986, was on a "theoretical" topic rather than consisting of a technical historical analysis and description of imperialism's actions in local wars. While there is some evidence that the military is learning lessons from Afghanistan, these are lessons of operations and tactics—the *conduct* of third-world conflict—not lessons on the sources of such conflicts and the proper Soviet role in them.[69]

[68] Fukuyama (fn. 16), 39.

[69] These articles focused on U.S. and Israeli operational art in the local wars they fought. To the extent there was any debate, it centered on matters such as the role of moral superiority vs. tactical and strategic skill in successful operations against imperialist forces. Examples include: Col. V. K. Babich, "Neposredstvennaia aviatsionnaya podderzhka sukhoputnykh voisk" [Direct air support of ground forces], *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 11 (1985), 53-59; Lt. Gen. V. A. Sokolov, "Razvitiye taktiki istrebitelei-bombardirovshchikov v lokalnykh voinakh" [Development of fighter-bomber tactics in local wars], *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 4 (1986), 65-72; Col. A. G. Georgiyev, "Ispolzovaniye amerikanskimi voiskami khimicheskovo oruzhia v lokalnykh voinakh v Indokitaye (1961-1971)" [Use of chemical weapons by American troops in local wars in Indochina], *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 1 (1987), 54-58; Col. V. K. Babich, "Deistvia strategicheskoi aviatsii SShA v Koreye i Vyetname" [Operations of U.S. strategic aviation in Korea and Vietnam] *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 8 (1987), 62-67. See also *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* for 1985, Nos. 2 and 9, for 1986 Nos. 3 and 5, for 1987 Nos. 5, 6, 8, and 10, and for 1988 Nos. 1, 6, and 10. See

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Contemporary military analyses exhibit resistance to, caution about, and even hinted advocacy of new thinking concepts. Adventurism on the part of the United States, the risks of crisis escalation, and severe doubts regarding Soviet ability to prevent escalation are discussed at length. Furthermore, the military analysts display considerable pessimism regarding the prospects for revolutionary change and the ability of radical local forces to conduct it. The pessimism is supplemented by growing interest in studying the diverse and complex sources of local conflicts. Some of these analyses show conflicts to be so complex that the Soviet role in supporting progressive or national liberation forces is difficult to define. Not all analysts agree on these issues: there are analysts who are sanguine about escalation, who insist that it is Soviet power and activism that prevent escalation, who analyze local conflicts entirely in class terms, and who insist on a continuing Soviet role in support of national liberation forces, especially in socialist-oriented countries. But on balance, military analysts display considerable adaptation on these issues.

The military's position on Soviet internationalist duty is an entirely different matter. There is broad and vigorous opposition to new thinking's reformulation of internationalism along the lines of interdependence and the priority of human interests over class interests. Yefimov's attempt to incorporate the new internationalism is important, but his insistence on class-based yet class-transcendent internationalism and his acceptance of pacifist positions are unique and have yet to win over others in the military, at least in print. Most writers couple acknowledgment of tense relations and Soviet inability to prevent U.S. aggression with warnings that the source of the problem is still the West and therefore that reports of the demise of class struggle are premature: thus they call for vigilance. The military writers in this discussion generally appear to be moving toward extremely pragmatic pragmatic activism rather than crisis prevention, and in the end that orientation may be close enough to new thinking to provide a fruitful basis for Soviet third-world policy. But top military figures have not signed on to revisionism, and Ligachev's public disagreement with Gorbachev's moral revisionism is evidence that the leadership remains divided on an important conceptual element of new thinking.

Does new thinking look like old reasoning in the hands of military analysts? I would argue that it does, because without an acceptance of the new Soviet internationalism, Soviet military thinking on third-world

Douglas M. Hart, "Low-Intensity Conflict in Afghanistan: The Soviet View," *Survival* 24 (March-April 1982), 61-68, for an analysis of the operational lessons the Soviet military has been learning in Afghanistan.

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conflict lacks a basis for qualitatively shifting its analysis of local wars and of Soviet interests in them. The concern in military analyses over the heightened threat of U.S. aggression and the risk of escalation is more clearly *peredyshka* (a breathing space) than *perestroika*, because it is a re-evaluation of the *level* of threat rather than the *nature* of the threat. The position of a Malinovskiy or Volkogonov does not differ significantly from that of the Soviet military prior to the 1970s, when Soviet doubts about the controllability of crises prescribed avoidance of confrontation. The difference is that the Soviet military is pessimistic about escalation at a time when it has attained parity, but that observation is more likely to lead military analysts to call for renewed strength and caution than for a fundamentally new Soviet understanding of conflict. Renewed Soviet caution in third-world conflicts is not to be dismissed if it prevents interventions of the type the Soviets carried out in the mid- and late 1970s. But it is important to understand the conditions under which the Soviet Union shows caution and the reasoning underlying Soviet policy in order to predict Soviet behavior and construct appropriate U.S. responses.

The new willingness to analyze diverse and nonclass sources of third-world conflict may lead the military away from prescribing support for regimes such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan because the source of conflict in such countries may be "internal" and therefore not require socialist international aid. If that were the case, then there would be little "principled" basis for Soviet support, and the military would have to fall back on relatively bald assertions of Soviet interests in specific conflicts, or become silent on the issue of Soviet aid. The likely place to look for such an argument would be in military discussions of nonclass factors in the Afghan War, especially in the context of a "national reconciliation" policy. The still contentious nature of new thinking precepts means that Soviet analysts and policy makers have by no means entirely abandoned the ideas that led to intervention in the first place. To date, the military has not questioned the reasons for that action and continues explicitly to defend the reasons for and conduct of Soviet military intervention.[70]

If Soviet military analyses in the latter half of the 1980s have moved

[70] See for example, "On the Eve," interview with Col.-Gen. V. Lobov, *Moscow News*, 22-29 May 1988, 4-5. See also the discussion in fn. 52 and fn. 53. While the civilian journals and press freely discuss nonclass sources of conflict and failure in Afghanistan, the military does not. For an example of the former, see Aleksandr Bovin, "Afganistan: trudnoye desyatiletiye," *Izvestia*, 23 December 1988, 5. He writes that while he originally thought intervention by Soviet troops necessary, the conflict became a civil war in which the presence of the Soviet military only exacerbated problems and made the opposition stronger. To successfully implement the "national reconciliation" policy, he notes, requires the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but the withdrawal by itself does not guarantee peace and stability.

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away from the virtually boundless activism and optimism of the previous decade, this development may well be the *result* of changes in Soviet international behavior rather than the *cause*—that is, changed perceptions reflect rationalizations. But the explanation of changes in Soviet policy must be more complex. Soviet failure to win reliable and durable third-world allies, the war in Afghanistan, and U.S. resurgence all occurred in the early 1980s, and, as in the past, it was civilian analysts who responded most quickly to them. While the Soviet military grew demonstrably more cautious in its analyses of third-world conflict through 1984, it did not abandon old precepts. Civilian analysts, on the other hand, introduced changes that may be interpreted as rationalizations for reductions in Soviet military activity in the third world. Soviet military analysts have been quite slow in picking up any of these themes, and they have been quite selective in their acceptance of them.

This confirms the first hypothesis of the accommodationist model. Soviet military writers so far have adapted rather than learned, and most have done so slowly, reluctantly, and selectively. The pattern parallels military resistance to new thinking's implications for "reasonable sufficiency" and conventional forces in Europe. The second hypothesis concerned Katz's thesis that the state of military thinking reflects changes in leadership policy only after Soviet conflict behavior has already changed. We would therefore expect Soviet behavior to exhibit caution and pragmatism, to aim at reduction of crises rather than to attempt to exploit them, and to avoid conflict-laden situations in radical countries. This seems to describe Soviet behavior under Gorbachev well. However, we would also expect there to be limits to Soviet conflict avoidance, because the issue of Soviet internationalist duty is not settled. The obvious test cases will be Afghanistan and Angola since they have long been identified as socialist-oriented countries that the Soviets have a duty and right to aid. This does not necessarily mean a return of the Soviet military to Afghanistan, because pragmatic activism would be consistent with the supply of only military assistance to Kabul, and there is nothing to suggest that a significant part of the Soviet military favors a return to Afghanistan under any circumstances. However, total Soviet inaction in the face of a bloodbath would contradict traditional internationalism. The existence of traditionalists in the military and as high in the leadership as Ligachev means that Soviet passivity in the face of such losses is not a foregone conclusion. The redefinition of Soviet interests and internationalism is in flux, and an international crisis could demonstrate that moral revisionism is only thinly supported at higher political levels.

If extreme circumstances do not provoke such a crucial test, a political

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coalition between crisis preventers and pragmatic activists on the concrete issues of Soviet third-world policy appears to be quite workable, given the cautious and restrained analyses by military writers. The recent changes in the Soviet political leadership favor the resilience of a crisis prevention/pragmatic activist coalition supportive of Gorbachev's foreign policy. The reassignment of Ligachev to responsibility for agriculture and his loss of control over the party's ideological affairs diminishes his status in speaking on matters of international class struggle and Soviet duty. Military leaders, including Defense Minister Yazov, seem to have their hands too full dealing with matters of more central political importance, such as Gorbachev's unilateral force reductions in Europe, to spend much time or effort dissenting on peripheral conflict and military duties owed to governments of troubled developing countries. If the accommodationist model continues to hold, we would expect Soviet military writers to become less vocal in opposition to revisionist internationalism.

However, there is another possibility that accords better with the changes in Soviet domestic politics. With *glasnost* as part of Gorbachev's political strategy to shake up the process and seize policy-making initiative, debates in the Soviet press and scholarly journals are no longer battles about the implementation of policy decisions already taken but debates about policy formulation itself.[71] Thus, the accommodationist model, whereby the military analysts acknowledge changes only after successful implementation, may no longer apply. Cautionary analyses may yet affect the politics of Soviet foreign policy making, and the military may have to engage in real policy debates to defend its resources and prerogatives. Although most recent political developments favor new thinkers, there is nothing inevitable about the process. The political advantages of a pragmatic activist/crisis prevention coalition on third-world policy may prove valuable to Gorbachev and lead him to moderate some of the more radical policy changes implied by new thinking. In third-world policy, a pragmatic activist/crisis prevention hybrid policy is likely to favor moderate states and means and show a preference for avoiding confrontation. It would also mean, however, less idealism and reticence than implied by new thinking when Soviet interests conflict with those of the United States, and when Soviet stakes in a country or conflict are high. Soviet military assistance and training programs would remain policy instruments under such a coalition, although they would most likely be used sparingly. Thus military analysts have an interest in

[71] Meyer (fn. 19), 129-32.

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joining the debate to maintain an active role in third-world policy. Accommodation on the issues of escalation and the prospects for revolutionary change brings analysts into the mainstream of foreign policy debate, while defense of the class foundations of Soviet internationalist duty preserves the United States as a formidable and still dangerous opponent.

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LOCALISM, ELITISM, AND IMMOBILISM:
Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China

By CHENG LI and DAVID BACHMAN*

THE transformation of political elites is often directly related to broad social, economic, and political changes in society. The direction in which the causal arrow points—from elite change to societal change, or vice versa—may vary from case to case, and may in fact be interactive, but recent developments, such as reform in socialist states and the redemocratization of many authoritarian systems, testify to the strength of the connections between elite and societal change.

Over the past decade, there is perhaps no more telling example of the interrelationship of these two processes than the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has moved from a highly factionalized, ideologically driven political system ruled by a very small number of political leaders to a decentralized system where significantly larger numbers of officials are involved with the making of key decisions. The realm of the political has contracted, and the scope of the state's tolerance of, or at least indifference to, societal diversity has expanded dramatically.[1] Furthermore, the highly statist economic system has also been undergoing fundamental change. The appearance and, in a number of cases, success of markets, private ownership, and entrepreneurs not attached to the Chinese Com-

* We wish to thank Solomon Karmel for his helpful comments.

This essay was written in February 1989. The dramatic and tragic events of May-June 1989 in Beijing occurred after the final draft had been edited by *World Politics*. Most of our analysis would remain unchanged even if we had additional time for revision. The importance of mayors is reaffirmed by the appointment of Jiang Zemin (former mayor of Shanghai) as the new party General Secretary and the elevation of Li Ruihuan (mayor of Tianjin) to the Politburo Standing Committee. The purge of the radical reformers led by Zhao Ziyang will narrow policy differences among China's top leaders, and therefore should allow for empirical assessment of our arguments about political immobilism and the increasingly technocratic orientation of Chinese politics. Nonetheless, recent events unambiguously reveal the power of the older generation of revolutionary leaders.

[1] Tang Tsou, *The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), xxiv and passim.

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munist Party (CCP), suggest that the party is no longer the sole route to social mobility.

In the midst of these and other historic social changes, the transformation of the PRC's political elite has received less attention than it deserves. It is often stated that pragmatists and technocrats have replaced ideologies and party hacks, but few detailed studies of the dimensions of elite transformation have been undertaken.[2] In fact, between 1982 and 1988, more than 550,000 better-educated young cadres have come to leadership positions above the county level, while 2,870,000 senior cadres recruited during the pre-1949 struggle for power have been retired under a program of leadership reform devised by Deng Xiaoping.[3] Almost all central government ministers, all provincial governors, and all provincial first party secretaries, as well as 92 percent of the members of the Thirteenth Central Committee are newcomers who were promoted after 1982.[4]

In this essay, we attempt to explicate some of the dimensions of leadership change now taking place in China and to relate elite transformation to the nature of politics and socioeconomic change in that country. We start by analyzing the social background and career patterns of 247 mayors of Chinese cities, using data compiled for 1986. The most salient patterns associated with this elite are then discussed qualitatively in an effort to relate these individuals and their attributes to broader patterns of social change that already exist or are in the process of emerging. More particularly, we show that the pattern of mayoral recruitment raises the issue of localism to a degree of importance perhaps unprecedented in the political history of China. Along with localism, patterns of elitism and immobilism are emerging.

Why are Chinese mayors an appropriate group to study if our aim is to examine elite transformation and societal change in the PRC? Four

[2] For some exceptions, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers," *Asian Survey* 28 (April 1988), 371–99; Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," *Asian Survey* 23 (June 1983), 673-91; William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," *Problems of Communism* 32 (November-December 1983), 16-35.

[3] See *Renmin ribao*, Beijing (Overseas edition), October 28, 1988, p. 1, and Ting Wang, "An Analysis of the P.R.C.'s Future Elite: The Third Echelon," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 4 (Summer 1985), 19-37.

[4] For the data on ministers, governors, and provincial secretaries, see *China aktuell* (Hamburg), November 1987, 23-24. Three leaders were appointed before 1982: Wang Bingqian (Minister of Finance) and Yang Rudai (first party secretary of Sichuan province) in 1980; Mao Zhiyong (first party secretary of Hunan province), who was appointed in 1977, was recently transferred to Jiangxi. For the data on the new central committee of the CCP, see *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 1347, November 15, 1987, p. 3.

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reasons justify the choice of mayors as our focal point. First, the position of mayor has often been a stepping stone to higher political office in China, and this is especially true in the post-Mao period. Of the eighteen members of the CCP Politburo, four have career experiences as mayors or vice mayors.[5] Mayors of cities of all sizes are likely candidates for promotion to leadership posts at the provincial level.[6] In the past, the office of mayor has often helped to establish the eligibility of political leaders to hold higher office, and this trend is likely to continue in the future.

Second, under China's reform, cities have taken on a much greater importance than they did under Mao. Mao actively discriminated against cities in order to prevent urban-rural gaps from widening. A strict separation of countryside and cities was enforced—truncating, if not totally severing, natural economic lines of exchange and cooperation. To overstate the case, the spirit of the countryside dominated the political system under Mao.[7] With reform, the situation has been reversed. Now the spirit of the city largely defines the nature of politics. Many rural counties have been put under the jurisdictions of urban centers. Geographically and politically (if not in terms of results), cities are now the central focus of China's reforms. Urban reforms are facing many serious problems such as inflation, corruption, and political demonstrations; rural reforms have been more successful. The future of China's reform program depends heavily upon the ability and will of Chinese leaders—not only leaders at the national level, but also urban elites, especially the mayors. In Robert Scalapino's words, "they must act—and act correctly as well as in a timely fashion."[8] Just how these new elites will act is subject to constraints imposed by their social backgrounds and career experiences.

The third reason for studying Chinese mayors is closely related to the second. Chinese cities are generally larger than cities in other countries. Of the 324 cities in Chinese statistical surveys, only 11 had populations below 100,000. One hundred forty-two had populations of 500,000 or more, and 57 had more than one million inhabitants. Moreover, the re-

[5] Hu Qili and Li Ruihuan served as mayors of Tianjin; Jiang Zemin served as mayor of Shanghai; and Wan Li served as vice mayor of Beijing.

[6] In our list, for example, Wu Guanzheng, mayor of Wuhan, was recently promoted to governor of Jiangxi; Zhang Renxia, mayor of Tonglin, Anhui province, was recently promoted to vice governor of Anhui; and Ren Qixing, mayor of Shezhuishan, Ningxia, was recently appointed vice governor of Ningxia.

[7] One provocative interpretation in this vein is Wang Xizhe, "Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution," in Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, eds., *On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 177-259.

[8] Scalapino, "Asia's Future," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (Fall 1987), 90.

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sponsibility for city governance is less diffuse in China than in places that have city councils. As noted above, cities have increasingly been placed in charge of the administration of adjacent rural counties. In effect, mayors govern entire metropolitan areas rather than narrowly defined city administrations. According to Chinese statistics, over half of the entire population of China is governed by city officials.[9]

Finally, we analyze China's mayoral elite because of a combination of serendipitous circumstances. We were fortunate to find an almost complete set of data on China's mayors. No one has yet undertaken an extensive analysis of China's mayors; indeed, no broad, quantitative elite study has penetrated below the provincial level.[10] However, a number of studies of elite changes at central and grass-roots levels have recently been published.[11] In the present study, we make comparisons of new Chinese political elites at different levels as we compare certain attributes of mayoral elites with those of national top leaders and grass-roots cadres.

Data and Method

The data presented here are gathered almost exclusively from *Zhongguo chengshi jingji shehui nianjian 1986* (The almanac of China's urban economy and society, 1986).[12] The almanac includes relatively complete

[9] The number and population of cities are found in *Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 74; for rural population under urban control, see p. 58.

[10] Qualitative studies of local leaders and studies of elites in individual cities and provinces have been undertaken, but no analysis of broad sub-provincial elites has been done. See Michel Oksenberg, "Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962-1965: Individual Attributes, Bureaucratic Positions, and Political Recruitment," and Ying-mao Kau, "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-1965," both in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Communist Chinese Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 155-215 and 216-67, respectively; Victor C. Falkenheim, "Provincial Leadership in Fukien: 1949-1966," and Lynn T. White III, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69," both in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 199-244 and 302-377, respectively; Frederick C. Teiwes, *Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1956-1966* (New York: Occasional Paper of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967).

[11] On top national leaders, see Li and White (fn. 2); for a sample survey of grass-roots cadres, see Yang Guansan, Lin Bin, Wang Hansheng, and Wu Quhui, "Dangqian woguo qiye ganbu suzhi de diaocha yu chubu fenxi" [Survey and preliminary analysis of enterprise Cadres of China], in Research Group of Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute (comp. and ed.), *Gaige: women mianlin de tiaochan yu xuanze* [Reform: challenges and choices before us] (Beijing: Chinese Economy Press, 1986), 270-305; for an English abridgement, see Yang Guansan et al., "Enterprise Cadres and Reform," in Bruce Reynolds, ed., *Reform in China: Challenges and Choices* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 74-85.

[12] Zhongguo chengshi jingji shehui nianjian lishihui [The Council of the Almanac of China's Urban Economy and Society] (comp.), *Zhongguo chengshi jingji shehui nianjian 1986* [The almanac of China's urban economy and society, 1986] (Beijing, 1986).

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biographical data on 247 mayors.[13] Three types of information are coded:[14]

1. Demographic characteristics: (a) names of mayors and province and city in which they work; (b) size of the city; (c) distribution of sex, age, and nationality; and (d) correlation between the province or city in which they were born and the province and city in which they later serve as mayor.

2. Educational background: (a) educational level; (b) major field; and (c) year of graduation.

3. Career and recruitment patterns: (a) major career pattern; (b) work experiences in different organizations (e.g., party, government administration, military, youth league); (c) work experiences in different fields (e.g., industry, agriculture, military, propaganda); (d) work experiences at different levels (grass-roots, bureau/county/district, municipal); (e) initial year of party membership; (f) year of assuming office as mayor; and (g) the most recent previous position.

In the following section, we will first present our findings in these three broad areas and compare characteristics of mayoral elites with those of elites at different levels. Then we will explore the correlation among variables by the application of Gamma coefficients. The final section is a discussion on the implications of these findings.

Findings

Demographic Characteristics

Table 1 shows the distribution of sex, nationality, and age groups. The most striking point, while not terribly surprising, is male dominance. Out of a total of 247 mayoral positions, only four (1.6 percent) are occupied by women. Moreover, all of them serve as mayors of small cities. If we compare this with the female representation on the Thirteenth Central Committee of the CCP (7.7 percent) and the enterprise cadres (6.7 percent),[15] we see that there is stronger sex discrimination against women in mayoral selection. Most likely, female leaders are more often ap-

[13] There were 324 Chinese cities in 1986, but the almanac provides information on only 247 persons. All but two of them are full mayors: Diwangker is vice mayor of Xilinhaote, Neimenggu autonomous region, and Ding Shaomin is acting mayor of Wushun, Liaoning province. Data on Chinese mayors in earlier periods are not yet available; we were therefore unable to analyze changes over time.

[14] The data are scrutinized by means of a Microsoft file system, which could not be reprinted with this essay for technical reasons. It is available from the authors on request.

[15] See Li and White (fn. 2), 375, and Yang et al. (fn. 11), 271.

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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION BY SEX, NATIONALITY, AND AGE
(1986)

	Number	*Percentage*
Sex		
Male	243	98.4
Female	4	1.6
Total	247	100.0
Nationality		
Han	226	91.4
Hui	2	0.8
Manchurian	4	1.6
Mongolian	5	2.0
Weiwuerzu (Uygur)	6	2.4
Zhuang	2	0.8
Unknown	2	0.8
Total	247	99.8[a]
Age Group		
35-39	8	3.2
40-44	57	23.0
45-49	67	27.1
50-54	71	28.7
55-59	35	14.1
60-64	7	2.8
Unknown	2	0.8
Total	247	99.7[a]

Average age is 48.9. The youngest mayor is 35; the oldest is 64.
[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

pointed to deputy leadership positions such as vice governor, vice mayor, or deputy factory director.

It is also not surprising that, with respect to representation of ethnic groups, most of the mayors are of Han nationality. In cities that have large minority populations, however, most of the mayors are members of minorities. For example, among ten mayors in Xinjiang, six are Uygur, one is Hui, and the rest are Han. In Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia), six of twelve mayors are Mongolian or Manchurian. In the case of Lhasa, the mayor is not even a member of a local minority. He is a Zhuang, governing a city of Tibetans.

Most of the mayors (78.8 percent) were born between 1932 and 1946.

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They not only can be defined as a "biological generation," but also as a "political generation": "a group of human beings who have undergone the same basic historical experiences during their formative years."[16] This generation of elites did not participate in the pre-1949 Communist Revolution. They grew up in the 1950s and 1960s. Most of them graduated from college before or during the Cultural Revolution (97 of 159 whose graduation year is identified; see Figure 1). Their average age in 1986 was 49—about 6 years younger than the average member of the Central Committee of the CCP, and almost 7 years older than the average enterprise cadre.[17]

One of our most important findings is the change in the distribution

FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION BY YEAR OF COLLEGE GRADUATION



[16] For a further discussion of "political generation," see Rodolfo Garza and David Vaughan, "The Political Socialization of Chicano Elites: A Generational Approach," *Social Science Quarterly* 65 (June 1984), 290-307; Marvin Rintala, *The Constitution of Silence* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979); Ting (fn. 3).

[17] See Li and White (fn. 2), 376; Yang et al. (fn. 11), 271.

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of birthplaces of elites and the increasing number of native-born mayors. Previous studies showed that the majority of CCP elites came from central China, especially from Hunan and Hubei province;[18] most of the major local leaders were not born in the area in which they served. In his study of Wuhan municipal elites, Ying-mao Kau noted "the overwhelming majority of the numbers of the elite sampled were 'outsiders,' in the sense that they were not born and brought up in Wuhan."[19] Our study shows a different picture. (See Tables 2 and 3.) Six of the eight coastal provinces and the three centrally administered cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin have produced more mayors than there are cities in each of these areas. Overall, the coastal area has provided thirty-one more mayors than it has cities (or eighteen, if we subtract the somewhat special cases of the three centrally administered cities). On the other hand, of the eighteen interior provinces and autonomous regions, only two have provided mayors in excess of the number of cities in the province, while fourteen have a ratio of mayors to cities that is less than one (in other words, they "imported" mayors). The interior has a net mayors-to-cities deficit of forty-one. Thus, the coastal areas are becoming the major recruiting grounds for China's mayoral elite, with Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Shanghai supplying more than 20 percent of all of China's mayors. Equally important, over 70 percent of all mayors were natives or were born in a neighboring province. (See Table 3.)

Educational Background

The increasing number of political elites with college degrees is a significant element of China's current elite transformation. Table 4 shows that 78 percent of the mayors in the PRC received some college-level education or above. This number is comparable to the educational attainment of other Chinese elites at higher levels. (See Table 5.) But if we compare this number with the percentage of college-educated elites at municipal, prefectural, and county levels before 1981, we find a striking increase in college education, from 2 percent to 78 percent.

Table 6 shows a preponderance of engineers among the mayors. No more than 6 percent of them are found in any other single field of spe-

[18] For earlier discussions of the origins of the CCP elites, see Franklin W. Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: A Study of an Elite," *American Political Science Review* 51 (June 1957), 396; Jürgen Domes, "The Ninth CCP Central Committee in Statistical Perspective," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong) 9, No. 2 (1969), 7; Paul Wong, *China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition* (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 190-203; Scalapino (fn. 10).

[19] Kau (fn. 10), 226.

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TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF BIRTHPLACE BY PROVINCE

Province	*A: Number of Cities in Province*	*B: Number of Mayors Born in Province*[a]	*B − A*	*Ratio of B to A*
Beijing	1	4	3	4.0
Tianjin	1	4	3	4.0
Hebei	12	11	−1	0.9
Shanxi	8	6	−2	0.8
Neimenggu	12	8	−4	0.7
Liaoning	9	20	11	2.2
Jilin	6	7	1	1.2
Heilongjiang	14	10	−4	0.7
Shanghai	1	8	7	8.0
Jiangsu	13	23	10	1.8
Zhejiang	8	8	0	1.0
Anhui	12	12	0	1.0
Fujian	4	3	−1	0.8
Jiangxi	10	9	−1	0.9
Shandong	14	18	4	1.3
Henan	14	12	−2	0.9
Hubei	13	10	−3	0.8
Hunan	12	13	1	1.1
Guangdong	12	8	−4	0.7
Guangxi	6	5	−1	0.8
Sichuan	18	9	−9	0.5
Guizhou	4	0	−4	0.0
Yunnan	9	4	−5	0.4
Xizang (Tibet)	1	0	−1	0.0
Shaanxi	8	7	−1	0.9
Gansu	11	5	−6	0.5
Qinghai	1	1	0	1.0
Ningxia	3	1	−2	0.3
Xinjiang	10	8	−2	0.8
Unknown	13	13		
Total	247	247		

[a] Refers to all mayors in sample.

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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION BY BIRTHPLACE

Birthplace	*Number*	*Percentage*
Native Province	144	58.2
Neighboring Province	31	12.5
Distant Province	59	23.8
Unknown	13	5.2
Total	247	99.7[a]

[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 4
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

	Number	*Percentage*
Post-Graduate	5	2.0
Foreign Study	2	0.8
University	147	59.5
Some College	39	15.7
High School	22	8.9
Middle School	9	3.6
Unknown	23	9.3
Total	247	99.8[a]

[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

cialization, such as politics, economics, law, or business administration; but 64 percent of the mayors who have a college education majored in engineering. Before we analyze this new generation of technocratic leaders, we should first look at their career patterns.

CAREER AND RECRUITMENT PATTERNS

China's current mayors are not only comparatively young and well-educated; they also came to power through new career patterns. Table 7 shows that all of these elites rose to their positions after Mao's death; only 3 percent had been appointed before 1982. About 52 percent had some experience as vice mayor or deputy party secretary of the city. Such tenure is identified in the case of fifty mayors, but their experience is very

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TABLE 5
COLLEGE EDUCATION OF PRC LEADERS
(PERCENTAGES)

	Before 1981	*1982-1983*	*After 1984*
Politburo	23	32	67
CCP Secretariat	N/A[a]	45	83
CCP Central Committee	26	55	73
Ministry	38	50	71
Province	20	43	62
Municipal/Prefectural/County	2	50	78[b]

Sources: *Remin ribao*, June 29, 1986: *Liaowang*, No. 2, 1985; Ting Wang, "Cultivation of the Third Generation by the Chinese Communists and the Change of Roles," *Lianhe Yuekan* (July 1985), 110; Ch'en Yung-sheng, "Reform of Mainland China's Cadre System," *Issues and Studies* (December 1985), 102; Li and White (fn. 2), 379; *Guang Jiao Jing* No. 162, March 16, 1986, p. 21. Some figures are rounded.

[a] Secretariat not in existence, 1967-1979.

[b] This percentage refers to mayors only. In the PRC, municipal government can be administratively equivalent to provincial, prefectural, or county government, depending on the size of the city.

short. Sixty percent worked in these positions for less than one year; the average is 1.6 years and the median is 0.9 years. (See Figure 2.)[20]

Some of these mayors joined the Chinese Communist Party only recently. (See Table 8.) Only 2 percent of those mayors whose date of party membership is identified joined the party between 1960 and 1964.

Five major kinds of career patterns—administration, party, expert, office/personal secretary, and youth league—emerge from our data. Many mayors have had experience in some or all of these five categories. For example, a majority of the mayors are concurrently deputy municipal party secretaries. (See Table 9.) Also, most of the mayors are engi-

[20] The formula used for the calculation of the median tenure is:

$$M_d = L + \frac{i}{f_m}(50\% \text{ of } n - cf_b)$$

where

M_d = median,
L = lower real limit of the class interval that includes the median,
i = interval width,
f_m = frequency of the class interval that includes the median,
n = total frequency,
cf_b = sum of the frequencies (cumulated frequency) of all class intervals below the interval that includes the median.

This formula appears in Lyman Ott, William Mendenhall, and Richard F. Larson, *Statistics: A Tool for the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978), 97.

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TABLE 6
MAJOR FIELD OF COLLEGE STUDY

	Number	*Percentage*
Natural Science & Technology		
Engineering	107	64.4
Agronomy	7	4.2
Physics	4	2.4
Chemistry	3	1.8
Mathematics	2	1.2
Architecture	1	0.6
Subtotal	124	74.6
Social Science & Law		
Economics	8	4.8
Politics	5	3.0
Business Administration	4	2.4
Finance	2	1.2
Accounting	1	0.6
Law	1	0.6
Subtotal	21	12.6
Humanities		
Education	10	6.0
Literature	7	4.2
History	3	1.8
Philosophy	1	0.6
Subtotal	21	12.6
Total	166	99.8[a]

[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

neers by training. In order to present their career patterns in a more comprehensive manner, we have tabulated three kinds of information. (See Tables 10, 11, and 12.) Table 10 shows the mayors' main career patterns as determined by the length and frequency of their work experience. Table 11 shows that the majority have worked in administrative fields for a long time.

"Expert" refers to career patterns of those who have worked more in a technical field than in administration. For example, Yuan Zhengchong, mayor of Xian, holds a postgraduate degree and several honorary memberships in academic organizations, and has taught at the prestigious Dalian Engineering Institute. Though he worked as a factory director and as a bureau director, his previous work experience was mainly as chief engineer.

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TABLE 7
YEAR OF ASSUMING POSITION OF MAYOR

	Number	*Percentage*
1976	1	0.4
1979	1	0.4
1980	1	0.4
1981	2	0.8
1982	3	1.2
1983	60	24.2
1984	74	29.9
1985	62	25.1
1986	17	6.8
Unknown	26	10.5
Total	247	99.7[a]

[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF YEAR(S) OF EXPERIENCE AS A VICE MAYOR/SECRETARY BEFORE BECOMING MAYOR OF A CITY



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TABLE 8
DATE OF JOINING THE CCP

	Number	*Percentage*
1941-1944	5	4.5
1945-1949	22	19.8
1950-1954	19	17.1
1955-1959	20	18.0
1960-1964	3	2.0
1965-1969	15	13.5
1970-1974	13	11.7
1975-1979	10	9.0
1980-1982	4	3.6
Total	111[a]	99.2[b]

[a] Total number whose year of joining the CCP is identified. The actual number of CCP members among the mayors is not available. Judging by those with working experience in party organizations, the overwhelming majority of the PRC's mayors are CCP members.
[b] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 9
AFFILIATION WITH PARTY POSITION

	Number	*% of Total (N-247)*
Central Committee Member	5	2.0
Municipal Party Secretary	2	0.8
Municipal Party Deputy Secretary	163[a]	65.9

[a] Mayors whose party affiliation is identified. The actual number may be higher.

TABLE 10
MAIN CAREER PATTERNS

	Number	*Percentage*
Administration	168	68.0
Party	43	17.4
Expert	19	7.6
Office/Personal Secretary	12	4.8
Youth League	5	2.0
Total	247	99.8[a]

[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

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One of the major new channels of elite recruitment and advancement in post-Mao China appears to be that of office or personal secretary. For example, Zhu Xingming, the mayor of Xianyang, Shaanxi province, successively served as an office secretary for county, prefectural, and provincial party organizations. Cai Zhongyi, the mayor of Shaowu, Fujian province, did not have any previous administrative experience other than office secretary. Probably the most significant example is Chen Xitong, mayor of Beijing, who served as personal secretary to Liu Ren, the vice mayor of Beijing, from 1953 to 1966.

Table 11 presents previous work experience. Several points are worth noting: (1) Over 80 percent of the mayors have had administrative experience. (2) Most mayors have worked in industrial fields—37 percent as bureau director and 46 percent as factory director; 47 percent are engineers, and more than 80 percent have worked in industry overall. (3) Only a small number of the mayors have had experience in party organizational and ideological work, and not many have any military experience.

Tables 12 and 13 indicate the mayors' work experiences in terms of levels, and their most recent previous positions. There are no clear trends in these aspects of their careers. Some have had only grass-roots work

TABLE 11
TYPES OF PREVIOUS WORK EXPERIENCES

	Number	*% of Total (N-247)*
Party	125[a]	50.6
Organization	25	10.1
Propaganda	32	12.9
Administration	198	80.1
Economic Planning	35	14.1
Industry	204	82.5
Bureau Director	92[b]	37.2
Factory Director	114[b]	46.1
Agriculture	41	16.5
Cultural/Education	34	13.7
Office/Personal Secretary	57	23.0
Military/Police	20	8.0
Youth League	24	9.7
Engineer	116	46.9

[a] Does not include the position of municipal deputy party secretary because it is often attached to the office of mayor.

[b] Some mayors worked first as factory directors and then as bureau directors.

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TABLE 12
PREVIOUS LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE

	Number	*Percentage*
First level only (grass roots)	24	9.7
Second level only (bureau/district/county)	40	16.1
Third level only (municipal)	15	6.0
First and second levels	28	11.3
First and third levels	47	19.0
Second and third levels	50	20.2
First, second, and third levels	42	17.0
Unknown	1	0.4
Total	247	99.7[a]

[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 13
MOST RECENT PREVIOUS LEADERSHIP POSITION

	Number	*Percentage*
Vice Mayor	68	27.5
Vice Secretary	61	24.6
Bureau Director	35	14.1
Bureau Secretary	8	3.2
County Head	10	4.0
County Secretary	11	4.4
Factory Director	18	7.2
Project Director	10	4.0
Office/Personal Secretary	3	1.2
Newly transferred from other cities	22	8.9
Unknown	1	0.4
Total	247	99.5[a]

[a] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

experience before assuming the position of mayor, while others have had various experiences at different levels. One important finding is that only about 9 percent had recently been transferred from other places. Most had worked for a long time in the city of which they later became mayor. How this low number of transfers compares to the previous practice is not known.

HIGHEST RANK AND FASTEST RUNNER

The preceding part of the analysis has highlighted the comprehensive characteristics of social backgrounds and career patterns. However, it has

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told us little about the attributes that are the most important determinants for selection and promotion.

Analysis by means of Gamma coefficients can help us explore the correlations between these attributes and make inferences about the rankings for a dependent variable based on our knowledge of an independent variable.[21] In other words, if we know the rank of one mayor relative to another mayor on one variable, we may also be able to predict the possible situation of the former relative to the latter for the second variable. In order to meet the requirements of the analysis, we worked out two variables: "highest rank" and "fastest runner."[22] Although the elites under study are all mayors, the cities they head are different in size and importance. We therefore rank the 247 mayors by administrative level and population of each individual city.[23] Based on each individual's position on the highest rank list, we determine a mayor's rank on the fastest runner list through his or her age.[24]

In the correlations between these two variables and various attributes of social background, Gamma coefficients can provide both positive and negative association (ranging from $+1$ to -1). If an association between two variables in a table is strong, the Gamma coefficient closes to an absolute value of $+1$. If an association is weak, the coefficient approaches zero. If an association is negative, the coefficient carries a minus sign, indicating an inverse relationship between the two variables.[25]

[21] Our use of Gamma coefficients is based on Ott et al., *ibid.*, 361-70. The formula of association Gamma is:

$$\text{Gamma} = \frac{N_s - N_r}{N_s + N_r}$$

N_s is the number of concordant pairs; N_r is the number of discordant pairs.

[22] We derive the concepts of "highest rank" and "fastest runner" from "highest office" and "fast runner"—two analytical tools used by Peter Smith and Ying-mao Kau respectively; our methodology is different from theirs, however. See Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), 106; Kau (fn. 10), 246.

[23] Mayors of cities that have over 3 million population or are provincial capitals are ranked highest; mayors of cities with a population between 500,000 and 3 million are ranked in the middle; and mayors of cities with a population below 500,000 are ranked lowest.

[24] Our method of ranking their positions on the fastest runner can be illustrated as follows:

	Highest Rank (Size of City)		
Age	*Highest*	*Middle*	*Lowest*
Below 45	Very Fast	Very Fast	Fast
46-50	Very Fast	Fast	Slow
Above 51	Fast	Slow	Slow

[25] This discussion is based on Smith (fn. 22), 107-8.

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Our findings are presented in Tables 14 and 15. As expected, seniority of both age and membership in the CCP bears a positive correlation to the highest rank in administrative levels of municipal government. This agrees with our findings in the prior discussion of seniority in elite formation at different levels. Seniority, of course, cannot contribute to the fastest runners, because these are defined as younger leaders in higher positions. One of the interesting findings is that the attribute of native born is negative for both the highest rank and fastest runner categories. Superficially, this seems to be in sharp contrast with our finding on the increasing number of native-born mayors. The latter indicates that more small or middle cities choose their mayors from their own province than do large cities; it may also suggest that, at present, the attribute of native born may help a person to attain a mayoral position, but that it cannot do much to advance him or her further or faster.[26]

High educational attainment, especially training in engineering, is one of the most important attributes in recruitment and promotion. Here our study suggests that high educational attainment not only contributes to "climbing up," but, more significantly, to "climbing fast" (+0.31 and +0.48, respectively).

Tables 14 and 15 also show that the mayors whose main career is in the party and who have had experience in ideological and/or propaganda fields are less likely to attain the highest rank and to be the fastest runners. By contrast, those who have worked as administrative directors at either the factory or the bureau level appear to have an advantage in promotion and the speed of their career advancement.

TABLE 14
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HIGHEST RANK AND OTHER VARIABLES, BY COHORT
(GAMMA COEFFICIENTS)

	Correlation with Highest Rank
Seniority (joining the CCP)	+0.67
Seniority (age)	+0.34
Experience as administrative director	+0.16
High educational attainment	+0.05
Occupation of engineer	+0.05
Ideological/propaganda experience	−0.03
Party as main career	−0.16
Native born	−0.21

[26] *Ibid.*, 132. The terms small and middle cities do not have clear numerical referents.

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TABLE 15
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FASTEST RUNNER AND OTHER VARIABLES, BY COHORT (GAMMA COEFFICIENTS)

	Correlation with Fastest Runner
High educational attainment	+0.48
Occupation of engineer	+0.31
Experience as administrative director	+0.26
Native born	−0.24
Party as main career	−0.26
Ideological/propaganda experience	−0.26
Seniority (joining the CCP)	−0.37
Seniority (age)	−0.70

Figure 3 presents the differentiation of certain attributes by age group. It also suggests the change and direction of mayoral elite formation. We can see the decrease in the percentage of military, ideological, and agricultural experience and the dramatic increase in college education and professional training, especially in engineering, among the younger mayors.

FIGURE 3
DIFFERENTIATION BY YEAR OF BIRTH[a]



[a] Date of birth is unknown for two of the mayors.

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TABLE 16
COMPARISON OF CERTAIN ATTRIBUTES BY REGION[a]
(PERCENTAGES)

	North (*N* = 34)	*Northeast* (*N* = 29)	*East* (*N* = 62)	*Central South* (*N* = 57)	*Southwest* (*N* = 32)	*Northwest* (*N* = 33)
Fastest Runner	23.5	20.6	20.9	22.8	18.7	21.2
High educational attainment	73.5	72.4	79.0	77.1	81.2	81.8
Native or born in neighboring province	82.3	72.4	83.8	77.1	40.6	60.0
Party as main career	23.5	24.1	9.6	22.8	6.2	21.2
Occupation of engineer	41.7	34.4	53.2	50.0	56.2	21.2
Age below 50	47.0	48.2	54.8	68.4	62.5	69.6

[a] North includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, and Neimenggu; Northeast includes Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang; East includes Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Shandong; Central South includes Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Guangxi; Southwest includes Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Xizang; Northwest includes Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.

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Our final observation is a comparison of certain attributes by region. (See Table 16.) Although several differences exist, all the regions present similar percentages in most respects. (For example, only about 40 percent of mayors in the Southwest were born in the same area, while in the North and East, respectively, over 80 percent of the mayors were native born.) Overall, Table 16 suggests that our findings at the national level are generally replicated in each region.

Discussion

What does this dramatic elite transformation mean to Chinese society at large? How can we explain the changes in the Chinese political system from the perspective of the change in elite formation? Three trends, in both elite formation and sociopolitical life, are associated with our observations. They are localism, elitism, and immobilism.

Localism

At various stages of its history in power, the CCP has been faced with serious problems of "localism"—the inability of the central leadership to ensure that lower levels in the political system obey directives. One type of such behavior, "political localism," occurred in the early 1960s. Many provincial leaders, especially first party secretaries, had been in their leadership positions for over a decade, and it appears that Mao felt that his power was weakened not only by other top leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, but was also challenged by leaders at the provincial level.[27] He therefore replaced almost all provincial first secretaries during the early period of the Cultural Revolution.[28] Another type might be called "military localism." With the virtual destruction of the CCP as an effective organization in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1968), the military was the only organization to escape the disaster relatively unscathed. By the early and mid-1970s, military commanders held top provincial leadership positions and quite effectively controlled the levers of power in the provinces.[29] China was faced with the danger

[27] Teiwes (fn. 10) documents the stability of provincial personnel between 1956 and 1966.

[28] For further discussion, see Parris Chang, "Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival During the Cultural Revolution," and Richard Baum, "Elite Behavior under Conditions of Stress: The Lessons of the 'Tang-ch'uan P'ai' in the Cultural Revolution," both in Scalapino (fn. 10), 502-39 and 540-74, respectively; David S. G. Goodman, "Li Jingquan and the South-West Region, 1958-1966: The Life and 'Crimes' of a 'Local Emperor,'" *China Quarterly* 81 (March 1981), 66-96; Peter R. Moody, "Policy and Power: The Career of T'ao Chu 1956-1966," *China Quarterly* 54 (April-June 1973), 267-93.

[29] For further discussion, see George C. S. Sung, *China's Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, No. P5272, August 1974), 12; Gordon Ben-

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of being split into separate military regimes. Only a prolonged series of maneuvers by Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping gradually weakened the power of the military at the provincial level.

A third type of localism, which is apparent today, has been developing since the late 1970s.[30] It is "economic localism"; people within China call this phenomenon "economic warlordism."[31] Under the reform program, and especially under the policy of decentralization, economic localism has reached an unprecedented scale. As one PRC journal reported, "China today is split into more than 20 independent kingdoms and more than 2,000 fiefdoms."[32] The origin of these two numbers is not identified, but they probably refer to the number of provinces and counties, respectively, in China. Indicative of the severity of the problem is (then) General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's warning to the Third Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee in September 1988: "If there are instances of violations of the central government's unified guidance on allocation, the provincial party secretary and the provincial governor will be held responsible."[33]

Economic localism poses a more difficult challenge to the central leadership than political and military localism. Li Pan, director of the Shanghai Economics Research Institute, summarized four factors contributing to the rise of economic localism: (1) The profit retention policy and the increase in extrabudgetary funds have given local governments greater financial independence, especially with regard to investment. (2) With the rapid increase in the scale of capital construction, local governments face growing competition for scarce raw materials, which, in turn, encourages a mercantilist or import-substitution strategy of provincial development. (3) The partial reform of the price system and continuing

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nett, "Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly* 54 (April-June 1973), 294-357; Frederick C. Teiwes, *Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Papers, No. 4, 1974).

[30] On the emergence of economic localism, see Barry Naughton, "The Decline of Central Control over Investment in Post-Mao China," in David Lampton, ed., *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 51-80; Christine Wong, "Material Allocation and Decentralization: The Impact of the Local Sector on Industrial Reform," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China* (Cambridge: Harvard Contemporary China Series, No. 2, 1985); Thomas P. Lyons, *Economic Integration and Planning in Maoist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

[31] See Ellen Salem, "Things Fall Apart, the Centre Cannot Hold," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 27, 1988, pp. 38-40.

[32] Quoted from *Zhonggong wenti ziliao zhoukan* (Taipei) No. 339, November 7, 1988, p. 11; also see *New York Times*, December 11, 1988, p. 1.

[33] Zhao Ziyang, "Report to the Third Plenary Session of the 13th CCP Central Committee," *Beijing Review* 31 (November 14-20, 1988), p. III.

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economic shortages have created a highly complex and ambiguous situation, in which provincial officials are eager to manipulate prices to the benefit of their locality. (4) Local governments have more power to allocate loans and to offer tax exemptions to enterprises under their control.[34] Consequently, provincial and municipal governments are "writing their own laws," many of which run counter to directives of the central government.[35]

An additional factor that explains the rise of economic localism is the rise of local officials to leadership positions in their native areas. This trend in elite formation is not only new in the history of the PRC; it also violates the "law of avoidance" (by which mandarins were prohibited from serving in their native province) that was characteristic of imperial China. As Ying-mao Kau has observed:

> Beginning in imperial days, officials were in principle not to be assigned to posts in their own native *hsien* [counties] or provinces. Briefly, two reasons may have accounted for this. In the first place, working in his home district, an official could more easily be induced to commit bureaucratically undesirable acts because of extensive kin ties and personal obligations. Secondly, the imperial court was ever suspicious that a mandarin could more easily conspire against the imperial authorities in his own home base, because of these same ties and obligations. . . . Such reasoning, in slightly altered forms, appears to influence Communist behavior.[36]

In his study of Wuhan, Kau pointed out that 91 percent of municipal elites were non-native "outsiders."[37] But this "Communist behavior" as well as the traditional "principle" has been changed, as demonstrated by our study of mayoral elites in post-Mao China. Over 70 percent of Chinese mayors are natives or were born in a neighboring province. Among the remainder, many went to college or have been working in the same city for some time.

[34] For Li Pan's detailed analysis of the problems caused by decentralization and localism, see *Zhonggong wenti ziliao zhoukan* (fn. 32), 11. Under the decentralization policy, local governments have the potential for both gain and loss. For example, according to the contract between the central government and the municipal government of Shanghai, the city is supposed to hand over a specific lump sum (10.5 billion *yuan*) to the central treasury annually; the city may retain any surplus. (Quoted from *China News Analysis*, no. 1363, July 1, 1988, p. 5.) This probably liberates Shanghai from burdens it has carried for decades. On the other hand, Shanghai also suffers from the rise of localism. For example, certain inland provinces were obliged under the national plan to sell 2,000 tons of raw materials to Shanghai in 1988 for processing, but the city actually only received 13 tons because the provinces kept the rest for their own factories. (See *The New York Times*, December 16, 1988, p. A4.)

[35] Salem (fn. 31), 39.

[36] Kau (fn. 10), 229-30. For further discussion on the formation of imperial elites, see Chang Ching-chien, *Zhongguo wenguan zhidu shi* [The history of the Chinese civil service system] (Taipei: Chinese Cultural Press, 1955); and Chu Tung-tsu, *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

[37] Kau (fn. 10), 227.

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Our findings are closely connected with the ongoing reform of the Chinese *nomenklatura* system (the list of positions and candidates qualified to fill them that is the hallmark of the personnel systems of communist states).[38] In the early 1980s, the system was changed in China: in general, the immediately superior administrative and party levels made choices for appointments, instead of the more traditional policy of a "two-level" reach of superior organs.[39] In practice, this means that provincial governors and provincial party secretaries are responsible for appointing mayors of small and medium-sized cities. Formerly, this was likely to have been controlled by the Central Committee. (Large cities, and certainly Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin remain under the Central Committee's *nomenklatura*.) The lists of names for the province-level *nomenklatura* are probably composed disproportionately of people from the province in question. In view of the degree to which Chinese officials defend their "turf," it is hard to imagine that provinces have the ability to reach into other jurisdictions to find candidates for their posts.

The trend toward recruitment of more native-born elites will be strengthened by the local cadre elections that are on the agenda of political reform. It is highly likely that the people will choose a native candidate to be their local leader if the candidates' other qualifications are roughly equal. These elected local elites may, in turn, make further localist demands.

The findings suggest the need for a series of studies on the nature of municipal-central relations, and how they have changed over time. Our quantitative, cross-sectional analysis and interpretation of the data cannot replace research that explicates the effects of changing patterns of resource allocations, the political skills of actors at the city and central government level, and different and changing sources of bargaining power available at each level to mayors and other urban elites in the pursuit of their interests. The emergence and changing rules of the bargaining regime that increasingly characterizes the relationship between the central government and municipal authorities can perhaps best be analyzed by in-depth chronological case studies of relations between the center and particular cities.

If this preliminary explanation is correct, the central government will be hard-pressed to reverse the localistic tendencies that are now occurring so widely. The center must develop new forms of federalism (clearly

[38] John F. Burns, "China's *Nomenklatura* System," *Problems of Communism* 36 (September-October 1987), 36-51; Melanie Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao China," *China Quarterly* 102 (June 1985), 203-33.

[39] Burns (fn. 38), 37-38 and 40-41.

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defined, stable responsibilities, and fixed revenues commensurate with those responsibilities) if the localistic activities of mayors are to be channeled in constructive directions. Mayors in almost any political system attempt to defend and expand the interests of their municipality. The key to preventing Chinese mayors from going too far or from ignoring central directives is to reintegrate the political and economic bases of a reformed Chinese society. This is unlikely to happen soon. The rise of localism, from the perspective of elite analysis and in-depth case studies, is a subject that deserves further scholarly investigation.

Elitism

Under Mao Zedong, the vast majority of party members were drawn from peasant, worker, and soldier backgrounds. Because of their political activism, most were recruited during periods of mass mobilization.[40] Although party leaders occasionally attempted to expand the numbers and percentage of intellectuals (in the Chinese sense of anyone with a college education) in the party, such people always remained a small minority of the membership. Certainly during the last ten years of his life, and at other times as well, Mao took an actively hostile attitude toward intellectuals. The "red versus expert" contradiction was a pervasive theme in Chinese politics from the late 1950s to the late 1970s, with Mao expressing a decided preference for the ideologically pure over the technically competent. Educational credentials were not a prerequisite for entrance into the political elite. Indeed, they could often hinder a career.

After four decades in power, the CCP has completely reversed its policy. Virtually all new leaders come from the pool of college graduates—a minuscule proportion of the Chinese population. Figure 3 indicates that almost 100 percent of the mayors under the age of fifty are college graduates, while the number of college graduates in the labor force in 1986 was only 0.8 percent.[41] The elitist orientation is probably best reflected in a proposal by Qian Xuesen, Chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology. He suggested that by the year 2000, all cadres must be university graduates, all cadres at the county level must have a M.A. degree, and all leaders at the provincial and ministerial level must hold a Ph.D. Although his proposal is unlikely to be adopted, it indicates the direction of change and the aspirations of some of the elite.[42]

In this connection, we should point out that the negative Chinese-

[40] Roberta Martin, *Party Recruitment in China: Patterns and Prospects* (New York: Occasional Paper of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1981).

[41] See *Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986* (fn. 9), 89.

[42] For the original citation, see Qian Xuesen, "On the World Fourth Industrial Revolution," *Shije jingji daobao*, October 10, 1983, p. 2.

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language version of elitism, *baizhuan luxian* (the white-expert line) is no longer used, while the positive translation of the term elite, *jingying* (excellent people), has found its way into the language in post-Mao China. Such meritocratic views are widely held not only by the elites themselves, but also by ordinary people and even dissidents like Fang Lizhi. The change of elite recruitment patterns to a great extent reflects a societal preference for certain values and orientations associated with an educated elite. In one survey, the answer to the question, "When opinions differ about a public problem, whose ideas do you believe most?" was most often "specialists and experts" or "party and state leaders."[43]

The rise of elitism is closely related to the changing basis of legitimacy in China today. The first generation of CCP leaders—whose legitimacy was based on charisma, their roles in the revolution, and their positions as representatives of the former exploited class—is disappearing from the scene. Its successors have been searching for alternative means to justify their authority. The new generation of largely technocratic elites argues that, under the impact of an accelerating worldwide scientific and technological revolution, technical expertise should be a basic credential for leadership and a fundamental reason for popular support. According to these leaders, modern society is so complex that only experts can estimate the implications of a decision. In other words, they argue that the scientific revolution has brought them to power; in return, they will best serve the interests of society.[44]

The technocratic and elitist orientation, however, does not lack ambiguities. Although Chinese intellectuals as a group have undoubtedly made the greatest political gains in the reversal of the state-society relationship in the post-Mao era, they have paid a price because the economic reforms have generally undercut their living standards. In addition, the tension between "humanistic" and "technical" intellectuals, and the conflict between economic entrepreneurs and political technocrats, are important issues for the years ahead.[45]

A further ambiguity is that post-Mao China has been moving toward liberalization and institutionalization, while at the same time techno-

[43] Yang et al. (fn. 11), 2.

[44] A detailed discussion on the technocratic views of these new leaders and the origin of Chinese technocracy is in Li Cheng and Lynn White, "Elite Transformation and Social Transition in Mainland China and Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of the Theory of Technocracy" (forthcoming).

[45] See Tsou (fn. 1), 159. For a detailed study of the diversification of intellectuals in the post-Mao era, see Lynn White with Li Cheng, "Do Open Doors Open Minds? Reform and Intellectuals," paper presented at the Seventeenth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (Taipei, June 5-11, 1988); the revised version is titled "Diversification Among Chinese Intellectuals" (collection of the conference papers, forthcoming from Westview Press).

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cratic elitism is becoming increasingly prominent. Political recruitment is not diversified, let alone pluralistic. The demand for democracy has greatly increased among the Chinese people, but technocratic views and elitist values have not received much criticism in Chinese society.

Experience in other countries suggests that technocrats find it difficult to legitimize their rule. They are often perceived as unfeeling, and more comfortable with machines than with people. Moreover, the record of technocrats' managing the economy and technology for the betterment of humanity is mixed at best. Although ordinary Chinese citizens may prefer experts in power to ideologies in command, they may also reasonably wonder just how well this educated elite understands the problems of workers and peasants. The prospect of a technocracy may raise fundamental questions about the nature of equality and inequality within China.

As a new educated elite is coming to power, the implications for patterns of stratification, welfare, and democratic evolution are only beginning to emerge. The indications are that Chinese society will be characterized by increased social stratification; that the elite will tolerate growing degrees of inequality; and that elitist, technocratic values are likely to provoke growing social conflict as ordinary citizens become progressively dissatisfied with elitist rule.

Immobilism

The most debatable point we wish to raise is a trend toward immobilism in the Chinese political system. By immobilism, we mean two things. First, the state, and particularly the central leadership, lose the ability to make binding decisions that can significantly alter the prevailing patterns of power and resource allocations. Second, the state and the political center lose the ability to enforce or elicit compliance for any of their major policies. Today, the Chinese state still retains considerable capacity to affect change in China. Yet, the state and the Chinese Communist Party, its most important political organization, have seen their reach and scope of power diminished in recent years. This is the result of a number of factors: the nature of elite transformation and political demobilization; deliberate policy initiatives; the unintended effect of reform; and the characteristics of the new political elites themselves.

Unlike many postrevolutionary societies, Chinese politics and society were not demobilized upon gaining control; demobilization had to wait until the end of the Maoist Era. The reasons for this prolonged mobilization under Mao are multiple and need not be fully detailed here. But one root cause lies in the characteristics of the Chinese communist elites.

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At the outset, the Chinese Communist Party was composed of soldiers, peasants, and members of the urban lower middle class. The educational level of party members and cadres was extremely low.[46] Political mobilization, revolutionary campaigns, and ideological indoctrination were the usual ways in which these cadres made their living and built their careers. The CCP's revolutionary legacy and managerial weakness led it to rely on mobilizing society rather than on learning the art of administration. Therefore, positions such as head of the propaganda or organization department used to be the most important and prestigious ones.

This state of affairs has also changed completely in recent years. Our study shows that most of the new leaders have made their careers in administrative, industrial, and technical fields. A background in ideological work has become disadvantageous rather than advantageous in elite recruitment and promotion. As pointed out in studies of Soviet elites, "political helping hands" have given way to "professional hired hands," and "political agitators" have been replaced by "economic organizers."[47]

This elite transformation contributes to political liberalization by deemphasizing ideological concerns and accentuating social tolerance in Chinese society. However, it presents a serious challenge to the communist regime, which has passed the "mobilizational phase," but does not yet appear to have arrived at the "institutionalization phase."[48] This transitional situation raises the possibility of immobilism because new elites have not yet developed the ability to guide and control society through new means. As Robert Delfs has observed, "the old methods for unifying opinion and mobilizing action no longer work. The party faces no organized challenge, but its authority is eroding because it is becoming increasingly irrelevant to people's lives."[49] For a country that has suffered upheavals in the recent past and has undergone systemic changes, weakness in the authority of its political leadership and institutions can be highly dangerous.

Proof that the state is losing capacity can be found in the realm of the economy. In the early 1980s, the World Bank noted that "perhaps the most outstanding feature of the Chinese economic system has been its

[46] According to the PRC's 1982 census, only 4% of CCP members had a college degree. Most (52%) had received only a primary-school education or were illiterate.

[47] Stephen Sternheimer, "Modernizing Administrative Elites: The Making of Managers for Soviet Cities," *Comparative Politics* 11 (July 1979), 405; Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "Elite Recruitment and Functional Change: An Analysis of the Soviet Obkom Elite 1950-1968," *Journal of Politics* 34 (February 1972), 148.

[48] For further discussion of these phases, see T. B. Oommen, *From Mobilization to Institutionalization* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1985).

[49] Delfs, "Helmsmen's Lost Bearings," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 27, 1988, p. 36.

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ability to mobilize resources, both physical and human, for achieving an unambiguously defined goal."[50] Today, the central allocational processes are not very flexible, and the state has trouble mobilizing resources to match pressing priorities. Indeed, the state has so many tasks confronting it that it is hard to determine what its key priorities are. The decentralization of resources means that lower levels of government often behave quite independently, as suggested above. Complex chains of bargaining and bureaucratic politics render the policy-making process disjointed and incremental at best; at worst, it becomes incapable of doing much of anything.[51]

One of the often unacknowledged virtues of ideology is its ability to set goals. (For our purposes, it does not matter that such goals are often inappropriate and/or impossible to achieve.) With the decline of ideology and the rise of expertise in China, the goals of the CCP, except for vague calls for modernization and reform, have become much more difficult to determine. The politics of expertise, with its emphasis on process and (supposedly) rational decision making, tends to replace the setting of substantive goals and priorities. Chinese elites recognize the linked nature of reform and modernization; but, because of the indispensability of each link in the process, the state has had great difficulty in ranking its tasks.

A related subject is the nature of policy debates. Each bureaucracy and organization in China now mobilizes expert opinion to justify and support the key mission of the units in question. Rival groups of experts contest any policy proposal, often leaving generalist political leaders incapable of assessing the analysts' proposals or arguments. There is no satisfactory method for arbitrating these competing claims; no ideological or democratic political process exists to generate resolutions of issues. Thus, technocratic elites play a major role in the decision-making process, but decisional rules incorporating the politics of expertise have yet to emerge.

It might be argued that the fundamental source of immobilism in China today is the stalemate among the top leadership in the central government—that the leadership is divided and cannot agree. We do not necessarily reject this argument; but, even if top leadership were united, the trends we identify—particularly localism and the concomitant decentralization of resources to lower levels in the political and economic

[50] The World Bank, *China: Socialist Economic Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1983), 146-47.

[51] David M. Lampton, "Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill," *Issues and Studies* 23 (March 1987), 11-41; Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

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system—would still create great difficulties for the center in eliciting compliance at lower levels. Whether divisions in the top leadership or the trends we identify best account for (emerging) immobilism is subject to empirical analysis, but the question is beyond the scope of this essay.

Immobilism is related to the two other trends we have discussed—localism and elitism. Obviously, the ability of local areas to pursue their interests independently of central desires contributes significantly to immobilism, and the intellectuals' conception of themselves as China's leading elites will limit the degree to which other voices are allowed to shape and influence the political agenda. Elites will be co-opted to serve in various formal organizations, and will be expected to defend and advance institutional interests. The quality of evidence in policy debates will no doubt rise; but, due to the influence of organizations on individual behavior, it is unlikely that a consensus of expert opinion will be formed.[52] Organizations continue to determine life chances in China and to provide major consumer goods and social welfare. Few individuals can stand up to the might of the collective unit. Thus, the power of bureaucracies will increase as a result of the professionalization of the administrative system, and each bureaucracy will have greater ability to argue its point of view. Without countervailing powers—either from a leadership not bound to the bureaucratic and technocratic structures, or from society in the form of democratic articulation—immobilism will increase in the Chinese political system.

Conclusion

The Chinese Communist Party is no longer the party it was when it came to power. A new generation of leaders whose socialization, educational background, and political experience differ significantly from those of the old elite, has risen to high positions. However, new conditions also pose new obstacles and new issues. The problems that confront the country now are not the ones that confronted it years ago. The dilemmas faced by China's new leaders are how to decentralize economic initiative to microeconomic units while retaining some form of macroeconomic control; how to increase functional efficiency while maintaining political control; and how to continue their elitist orientation while legitimizing their governance.

This paper has attempted to explore these issues by analyzing the new

[52] The finest discussion of organizational structure and individual behavior in China (albeit in factory settings) is Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neotraditionalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

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Chinese elites. Studies of the social background and career patterns of elites must always be viewed with caution. It is hard to know what these characteristics explain about concrete political behavior. Situational variables, be they international, bureaucratic, and/or resource constraints, may effectively strip elites of choice. Social background and career patterns in the aggregate also do not tell us much about creative acts of political leadership that aim to reshape patterns of political preferences within a polity, or about the individual psychological dimensions of key leaders that may significantly influence policy making.

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the linkage between the characteristics of elites in China today and the broader patterns of societal change. There is no doubt that the political elites have changed dramatically. Broader social trends are emerging that are closely related to the leadership transformation. We have focused on the implications of elite transformation for the issues of economic localism, elitism, and political immobilism as they signal emerging trends, some more definitely established than others. Many Chinese and foreign observers are clearly aware and worried by some of them—particularly localism—and the central leadership may take action to mitigate or reverse any of these tendencies.[53] We argue that, without policies to control these trends, the continuing process of elite transformation will contribute significantly to, and sometimes cause, problems of localism, elitism, and immobilism.

[53] Chinese leaders are becoming increasingly concerned with localism. Hainan province recently promulgated regulations barring leading city and county officials from governing their native places. See *Renmin Ribao* (overseas ed.), May 10, 1989, p. 1.

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1992: RECASTING THE EUROPEAN BARGAIN

By WAYNE SANDHOLTZ and JOHN ZYSMAN*

UNDER the banner of "1992," the European Communities are putting in place a series of political and business bargains that will recast, if not unify, the European market. This initiative is a disjunction, a dramatic new start, rather than the fulfillment of the original effort to construct Europe. It is not merely the culmination of the integration begun in the 1950s, the "completion" of the internal market. The removal of all barriers to the movement of persons, capital, and goods among the twelve member states (the formal goal of the 1992 process) is expected to increase economies of scale and decrease transaction costs. But these one-time economic benefits do not capture the full range of purposes and consequences of 1992.[1] Dynamic effects will emerge in the form of restructured competition and changed expectations. Nineteen ninety-two is a vision as much as a program—a vision of Europe's place in the world. The vision is already producing a new awareness of European strengths and a seemingly sudden assertion of the will to exploit these strengths in competition with the United States and Japan. It is affecting companies as well as governments. A senior executive of Fiat recently declared, "The final goal of the European 'dream' is to transform Europe into an integrated economic continent with its specific role, weight and responsibility on the international scenario vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan."[2]

But why has this process begun, or begun again, now? In this article, we propose that changes in the international structure triggered the 1992 process. More precisely, the trigger has been a real shift in the distribution of economic power resources (crudely put, relative American decline and Japanese ascent). What is just as important is that European elites perceive that the changes in the international setting require that they rethink their roles and interests in the world. The United States is no

* The authors thank Jeffrey Hart, Peter Katzenstein, Stephen Krasner, Helen Wallace, and William Wallace for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

[1] See Centre for Business Strategy, *1992 Myths and Realities* (London: London Business School, 1989).

[2] Clemente Signoroni, "The ECU, a Success Factor for the 1993 Community Market," address in Madrid, January 12, 1989, p. 6.

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longer the unique source of forefront technologies; in crucial electronics sectors, for example, Japanese firms lead the world. Moreover, Japanese innovations in organizing production and in manufacturing technologies mean that the United States is no longer the most attractive model of industrial development. In monetary affairs, some Europeans argue that Frankfurt and Tokyo, not Washington, are now in control. In short, shifts in relative technological, industrial, and economic capabilities are forcing Europeans to rethink their economic goals and interests as well as the means appropriate for achieving them. American coattails, they seem to have concluded, are not a safe place when the giant falters and threatens to sit down.

While economic changes have triggered the 1992 process, security issues may shape its outcomes. Europe's economic relationship with the United States has been embedded in a security bargain that is being reevaluated. This is not the first reassessment of the alliance, but it is the first time that it takes place against the backdrop of Soviet internal reform and external overtures to dismantle the symbols of the cold war. The point is that the security ties that underpinned U.S.-European economic relations are being reconsidered in Europe. But we need not look deeply into the security issues to understand the origins of the 1992 movement, though some believe that the nuclear horsetrading at Reykjavik accelerated the 1992 process.[3] Eventually, the economic and security discussions will shape each other.

We hypothesize that structural change was a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the renewal of the European project. It was a trigger. Other factors were equally necessary and, in combination, sufficient. First, 1992 emerged because the institutions of the European Communities, especially the Commission, were able to exercise effective policy leadership. International structural shifts and a favorable domestic setting provided a motive and an opportunity for restarting the Communities. The Commission played the role of policy entrepreneur. The renewed drive for market unification can be explained only if theory takes into account the policy leadership of the Commission. To be sure, the Commission did not act alone; a transnational industry coalition also perceived the need for European-level action and supported the Commission's efforts. The Commission, aided by business, was able to mobilize a coalition of governmental elites that favored the overall objective of market unification. Member governments were receptive to the 1992 initiatives because of the domestic political context in the member states,

[3] Enrique Baron, *Europe 92: Le Rapt du Futur* [Europe 92: Kidnapping the future] (Paris: Editions Bernard Coutas, 1989), 88.

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which had altered in ways that made European-level, market-oriented initiatives viable. The most important elements of the domestic political setting were the failure of existing, purely national economic strategies, the decline (or transformation) of the left, and the presence of vigorously market-oriented governments on the right. Without these shifts, an EC-based response to the changing international structure would have been politically impossible.

We therefore propose to analyze 1992 in terms of elite bargains formulated in response to international structural change and the Commission's policy entrepreneurship. In the sections immediately following, we lay out an analytical framework and examine the origins of the 1992 movement and its constituent bargains. In a later section, we discuss the crucial bargains that are not formally part of 1992, but that will help to shape its outcomes.

The 1992 process has so far been limited to the Community institutions, the governments, and leaders of major companies. National parliaments, political parties, and trade unions have not yet become centrally involved. That will change. How and when the 1992 process will draw in other political actors (like labor) is one of the many uncertainties. Indeed, the beginnings of the broader political debate are evident in the summer of 1989. What does appear certain is that the bargains being struck in advance of 1992 will change the terms of business competition and probably those of politics as well. Moreover, as we show in the final section, events in Europe will have powerful repercussions on the international trading and financial systems.

Explaining 1992: Alternative Approaches

Analysis of the 1992 project in Western Europe could follow any one of three broad approaches, each with a different focus. One approach would look to the internal dynamics of the integration process itself, as in integration theory. A second would concentrate on the domestic politics behind the regional agreements. The third approach, for which we argue, focuses on elite bargains in response to the challenges and opportunities posed by international and domestic changes. The analysis of elite bargains incorporates the strengths of the other two approaches while avoiding their major weaknesses. Although we have no intention of elaborating three different theoretical frameworks, we will briefly describe what appear to be the chief shortcomings of the integration theory and domestic politics approaches.

Consider integration theory. Instead of a single theory, there were nu-

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merous permutations, each employing different concepts and definitions.[4] But what distinguished integration theory from other, traditional analyses of international politics was that it assigned causal significance to the process of integration itself. Indeed, a genuine integration theory would have to posit some specific political effects stemming from the internal logic of integration. This was the contribution of neofunctionalist integration theories, which were in turn partly inspired by the functionalist theory of David Mitrany.[5]

Integration begins when governments perceive that certain economic policy problems cannot be solved by national means alone and agree to joint policy making in supranational institutions. Initially, therefore, experts in the supranational organization apply technical solutions to (primarily) economic problems. Integration proceeds through the "expansive logic" of spillovers. Spillovers occur when experience gained by one integrative step reveals the need for integration in functionally related areas. That is, in order to accomplish the original objectives, participants realize that they must take further integrative steps. Creating a common market, for example, might reveal the need for a regional fund to manage short-term current accounts imbalances among the members. That would constitute a spillover. In the long term, according to the formulations of Ernst Haas, as more technical functions shift to the integrated institutions, the loyalties and expectations of the populations transfer from the historical nation-states to the larger supranational entity.[6]

Haas and other scholars later modified these initial neofunctionalist conceptions. Nye noted that integration could progress by means of deliberate linkages that created "package deals." He also argued that functional links among tasks did not always lead to spillovers, but could have a negative impact on integration.[7] Others further refined the kinds of internal dynamics of integration to include "spill-back," "spill-around," and "forward linkage."[8] Haas recognized that spillovers could be limited

[4] This is the problem aptly identified by Donald Puchala in "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 10 (March 1972), 267–84.

[5] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946).

[6] Ernest B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). It would be impossible to do justice, in this short article, to all the contributors to the development of integration theory and to the variety of integration theories. Our intent is simply to capture the central notions. We begin with the formulations of Haas because his seminal works launched neofunctionalism.

[7] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[8] See Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization* 24 (Autumn 1970); and Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

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by the "autonomy of functional contexts" and that integration turned out not to be the steady, incremental process originally envisioned.[9]

For a number of reasons, we do not believe that integration theories are well suited for analyzing the 1992 movement. The major weaknesses were recognized by the integration theorists themselves; two of their criticisms are most relevant to the concerns of this paper. (1) The internal logic of integration cannot account for the stop-go nature of the European project. One possibility, suggested by Lindberg and Scheingold, is that the Community attained many of its objectives, which led to "the disappearance of many of the original incentives to integrate."[10] The question then becomes, why did the renewed drive for the single internal market emerge in the mid-1980s and why did it rapidly acquire broad support among governments and business elites? (2) Even where the Community did not meet expectations or where integration in one area pointed out problems in functionally related areas, national leaders could frequently opt for national means rather than more integration. That is, even in issue areas where the pressure for spillovers should have been strong, national means appeared sufficient and were preferred. In the 1960s, efforts to establish a common transport policy fell flat because national policies appeared adequate to interested parties.[11] During the 1970s, the Commission's efforts on behalf of broad Community science and technology planning (the Spinelli and Dahrendorf plans) got nowhere because governments perceived science and technology as areas in which national policies could and should be pursued. The national option always stands against the EC option and frequently wins.

An explanation rooted in the domestic politics of the various European countries is a second possible approach to explaining 1992. Certainly the shift of the socialist governments in France and Spain toward market-oriented economic policies (including privatization and deregulation) was essential for acceptance of the 1992 movement. The Thatcher government in the U.K. could also support measures that dealt primarily with reducing regulations and freeing markets. Thus, the favorable domestic political context was one of the necessary conditions that produced 1992.

[9] On the first point, see Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization* 15 (Autumn 1961). To explain the failure of the incremental model of integration, Haas identified the policy "turbulence" brought on by adding "post-industrial" issues to the agenda and the effects of "externalization" (significant economic interdependencies outside the region). See Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*, Institute of International Studies Research Series No. 25 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1975).

[10] Lindberg and Scheingold (fn. 8), 23.

[11] *Ibid.*, 179.

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But domestic politics cannot carry the full analytical burden, for three main reasons. (1) An argument based on domestic politics cannot answer the question, why *now*? Such an argument would have to account for the simultaneity of domestic developments that would induce states to act jointly. Attention to changes in the international context solves that problem. International changes posed challenges and choices to all the EC countries at the same time. (2) The political actors that figure in analyses of European domestic politics have not yet been mobilized in the 1992 project, though perhaps that is now beginning. Although the political parties and the trade unions now talk about 1992 (and will act in the future as the social dimension moves to the top of the agenda), they were not involved in the discussions and bargains that started the process. Governments (specifically, the national executives) and business elites initiated and defined 1992 and have moved it along. (3) An argument based on domestic politics cannot explain *why* domestic political changes produced the 1992 movement. The project did not bubble up spontaneously from the various national political contexts. On the contrary: leadership for 1992 came from outside the national settings; it came from the Commission.

The third approach to analyzing 1992 is the one we advance in this paper. It focuses on elite bargains formed in response to changes in the international structure and in the domestic political context. The postwar order of security and economic systems founded upon American leadership is beginning to evolve after a period of relative U.S. decline and Japanese ascent. These developments have led Europeans to reconsider their relations with the United States and within the European Communities.[12] The international and domestic situations provided a setting in which the Commission could exercise policy entrepreneurship, mobilizing a transnational coalition in favor of the unified internal market.

The 1992 movement (as well as the integration of the 1950s) can be fruitfully analyzed as a hierarchy of bargains. Political elites reach agreement on fundamental bargains embodying basic objectives; subsidiary bargains are required to implement these objectives. The fundamental bargains agreed upon for 1992 are embodied in the Single European Act and in the Commission's White Paper which outlined specific steps toward the unified internal market. The Single European Act extended majority voting in the Council and cleared the way politically for progress toward unifying the internal market. Endorsement of the Commis-

[12] In succeeding sections, we will look more closely at the changing international structure and the domestic European political context.

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sion's proposals in the White Paper represents agreement on the fundamental objective of eliminating barriers to the movement of persons, goods, and capital. The specific measures proposed by the Commission (some 300 of them) can be thought of as implementing bargains. Further implementing bargains have yet to be considered in areas like the monetary system, taxation, and social policy.

The original European movement can be seen in terms of this framework.[13] The integration movement was triggered by the wrenching structural changes brought about by World War II; after the war, Europe was no longer the center of the international system, but rather a frontier and cushion between the two new superpowers.[14] Political entrepreneurship came initially from the group surrounding Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. The early advocates of integration succeeded in mobilizing a transnational coalition supportive of integration; the core of that coalition eventually included the Christian Democratic parties of the original Six, plus many of the Socialist parties.[15]

The fundamental objectives of the bargains underlying the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the expanded European Communities were primarily two: (1) the binding of German industry to the rest of Europe so as to make another war impossible, and (2) the restarting of economic growth in the region. These objectives may have been largely implicit, but they were carried out by means of a number of implementing bargains that were agreed upon over the years. The chief implementing bargains after the ECSC included the Common Market, the Common Agricultural Program, the regional development funds,[16] and, most recently, the European Monetary System (EMS).

The fundamental external bargain made in establishing the Community was with the United States; it called for (certainly as remembered now in the U.S.) national treatment for the subsidiaries of foreign firms in the Common Market. That is, foreign (principally American) firms that set up in the Community could operate as if they were European. American policy makers saw themselves as willing to tolerate the dis-

[13] We have no intention of providing a detailed history of the EEC; that story has been well told many times. We seek only to show that the major elements of that history fit the analytical framework we are proposing here.

[14] Many of the early students of European integration recognized that structural changes caused by the war were crucial in triggering the process. See, for example, Lindberg and Scheingold (fn. 8), especially chap. 1.

[15] See Walter Yondorf, "Monnet and the Action Committee: The Formative Period of the European Communities," *International Organization* 19 (Autumn 1965), 885-912.

[16] The regional development funds had a precursor in development programs created at Italy's insistence in 1956. They acquired more importance after the accession of Britain and Ireland, and have become vital elements of the EC bargain since the addition of Greece, Spain, and Portugal.

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crimination and potential trade diversion of a united Europe because the internal bargain of the EEC would contribute to foreign policy objectives. Not only was part of Germany tied to the West, but sustained economic growth promised political stability. All of this was framed by the security ties seen as necessary on both sides of the Atlantic to counter the Soviet Union.

The European bargains—internal and external—were made at the moment of American political and economic domination. A bipolar security world and an American-directed Western economy set the context in which the European bargain appeared necessary. Many expected the original Community to generate ever more extensive integration. But the pressures for spillover were not that great. Economics could not drive political integration. The building of nation-states remains a matter of political projects. Padoa-Schioppa has put it simply and well: "The cement of a political community is provided by indivisible public goods such as 'defence and security'. The cement of an economic community inevitably lies in the economic benefits it confers upon its members."[17] The basic political objectives sought by the original internal bargain had been achieved: the threat of Germany was diminished and growth had been ignited. When problems arose from the initial integrative steps, the instruments of national policy sufficed to deal with them. Indeed, the Community could accommodate quite distinct national social, regulatory, and tax policies. National strategies for growth, development, and employment sufficed.

Several fundamental attributes of the economic community that emerged merit emphasis, as they prove important in the reignition of the European project in the mid-1980s. First, the initial effort was the product of governmental action, of intergovernmental bargains. Second, there was the partial creation of an internal market; that is a reduction, but not an elimination, of the barriers to internal exchange. The success of this initiative was suggested by the substantial increase in intra-European trade. Third, and equally important, there was toleration of national intervention; in fact, in the case of France such intervention was an element of the construction. There was an acceptance of national strategies for development and political management. Fourth, the European projects were in fact quite limited, restricted for the most part to managing retrenchment in declining industries and easing dislocations in the rural sector (and consequently managing the politics of agriculture) through

[17] Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *Efficiency, Stability and Equity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

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the Common Agricultural Policy. There were several significant exceptions, including the European Monetary System that emerged as a Franco-German deal to cope with exchange-rate fluctuations that might threaten trade relations; however, the basic principle of national initiative persisted. Fifth, trade remained the crucial link between countries. Joint ventures and other forms of foreign direct investment to penetrate markets continued to be limited. Sixth, American multinationals were accepted, if not welcomed, in each country.

When the global context changed, the European bargains had to be adjusted for new realities. Wallace and Wessels have argued that "even if neither the EC or EFTA had been invented long before, by the mid-eighties some form of intra-European management would have had to be found to oversee the necessary economic and industrial adjustments."[18]

The Political Meaning of Changing Economic Structures

Changing international economic structures altered the choices and constraints facing European elites. Europe's options shifted with the changes in relative economic power resources. The relative position of the United States declined, prior to 1970, as its trade partners reconstructed themselves and developed. Gaps closed in technology, wealth, and productivity. The U.S. now has difficulty controlling its own economic environment, let alone structuring the system for others. The changed international setting is equally a story of the emergence of Japan, which has grown into the second-largest economy of the world, overtaking all of the individual European nations and even the Soviet Union. The significance of Japan's rise is frequently hidden rather than revealed by data about its growing share of world gross domestic product and its booming exports. The substantial consequences of the international changes are qualitative as well as quantitative. They alter the political as well as the economic choices for Europe. It is not a matter of trade quantities or economic well-being, though it may eventually be viewed in that way. For now, the problem is one of control and influence. To capture the essence of the phenomenon, we note shifts in technology, money, and trade.

In this essay we cannot trace out in detail the strategic consequences for governments and corporations of the multiple manifestations of this

[18] Helen Wallace and Wolfgang Wessels, *Towards a New Partnership: The EC and EFTA in the Wider Western Europe*, Occasional Paper No. 28, European Free Trade Association, Economic Affairs Department (March 1989), 4.

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structural change. Let us take technology, for example. European elites (both in government and in business) face new choices regarding the acquisition of advanced technologies not developed at home. Japan has assumed a leading position in a number of key high-technology sectors, especially in electronics. By 1988, total Japanese electronics production virtually equaled that of the United States, and in 1989 should surpass it. Competition in semiconductors (one market segment in electronics) suggests both the changes and the shifting European choices. In 1985, a Japanese company, NEC, became the world's largest producer of semiconductors.[19] A year later, Japan's total world market share for integrated circuits surpassed that of the United States for the first time, at just over 45 percent.[20] Japanese producers emerged suddenly and now dominate the market for memory chips, a product sold in enormous volume and one that serves to drive the advances in production technology. In the early 1970s, Japanese makers were absent from the world market for one-kilobit memory chips, but by 1984 they held 90 percent of the world market for 256-kilobit chips. By 1985, all but two American merchant producers of dynamic random access memories (DRAMs), the basic memory chips, had been driven from the market. (Texas Instruments and tiny Micron Technology remained.) Japanese firms were the first to produce 1-megabit memory chips (with four times as much memory capacity as a 256K chip) and 4-megabit circuits. Even when sharp restrictions on Japanese exports to the United States were instituted, American producers did not reenter the market for advanced DRAM chips. Furthermore, by 1986, Japanese companies were beginning to challenge U.S. dominance in the microprocessor realm.[21]

Microprocessors, and logic circuits more broadly, are the brain cells of computers. Japanese dominance here would alter the balance of industrial power in both the computer and telecommunication sectors. In part as a defense against Japanese entry and in part to capture the full profit from their innovations, the dominant American producers of microprocessors—Intel and Motorola—have recently protected technology information about their advanced products more tightly than in the past. As a result, the most advanced circuit technologies needed by European companies are frequently to be found in Japan and are more difficult to obtain from the United States. Japanese makers of semiconductors and semiconductor technology are not just suppliers of components. They are also competitors in final products—from television sets through comput-

[19] *San Jose Mercury News*, January 4, 1988, p. 2C.
[20] *International Herald Tribune*, April 1, 1987.
[21] Michael Borrus, *Competing for Control* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 176-77.

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ers and telecommunications. The risk that a competitor in a final product will use his leverage in component technologies is a serious one. Recent experience with global DRAM shortages suggests that leverage is beginning to be used. In short, global events have upset the traditional technology relationships tying Europe to the United States. This is important, not only for commercial production, but also for military equipment. It is a strategic matter for companies as well as for governments.

The Europeans have responded aggressively to break their dependence on the U.S. and Japan, as key microelectronics technologies acquire ever greater commercial significance. At the core of the effort are joint development programs for DRAMs and for microprocessors. The Mega project launched jointly by Philips and Siemens to develop state-of-the-art DRAM production processes and the Joint European Semiconductor Silicon (JESSI) project for microprocessors that includes SGS-Thomson as well as Siemens and Philips are straightforward responses to the changed structure of global markets in this critical sector.

In the second arena—monetary matters—after decades of a dollar-based fixed exchange-rate system and a managed system that still revolves around the dollar, a system is beginning to emerge in which U.S. policy is increasingly dictated by Tokyo if not Frankfurt. The dollar remains the financial core of the world system, but because of America's huge and growing debt, the dollar remains the basis of the system by the choice of others, not so much by American decisions. Japan's export boom has put immense financial resources under Japanese control. Japan has already assumed a more powerful position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with American agreement, and unsuccessfully sought a greater role in the World Bank. Japanese funds are now a key part of plans to ease the debt crisis of the third world. For Europeans, decisions in Tokyo will have as much or more impact on monetary conditions as decisions taken in Washington or New York. Perhaps the European Monetary System (EMS) will soon need to be conceived as a mark zone moving in relation to the yen. The dollar is no longer the obvious sole choice for the world's reserve currency. At any rate, the structure of monetary and current relations has changed, and therefore the choices and constraints for European elites have changed also.

A third arena is trade. For most of the postwar period, the United States has been the leader in a system of free trade and multilateralism. Now, although the executive branch maintains the rhetoric of free trade, the new U.S. trade bill has adopted a different logic and carries veiled protectionist threats. Furthermore, the percentage of American trade

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covered by bilateral agreements has risen in the last years. At the same time, Japan has emerged as a major exporter to Europe while its markets remain difficult to penetrate; it is not as open as the American market was. Consequently, a unified EC market has become vitally important for European development. The structure of Europe's trade environment has changed in recent years, and so have the choices and challenges for European government and business elites.

In sum, the choices for European elites in technology, money, and trade have changed. Previously, the options had centered on the United States. If Europe could not lead in technology, at least it could acquire it relatively easily from the U.S. If Europe could not structure financial rules to its liking, at least it could accommodate to American positions. If Europe was not first, it was second, and a series of individual bargains by governments and companies could suffice. However, it would be quite another matter to be third. To be dependent on Japan in monetary and technology matters, without the integrated defense and trade ties that link the Atlantic partners, was a different problem. The new international structure required new bargains.[22]

The structural changes we have been depicting do not "cause" responses. Structural changes pose challenges and opportunities. They present choices to decision makers. Three broad options, individually or in combination, were open to the countries of the EC. First, each nation could seek its own accommodation through purely national strategies; but, for reasons we explore below, going it alone appeared increasingly unpalatable. Second, Europe could adjust to Japanese power and shift ties from the U.S. to Japan. But the Japanese option had significant counts against it: (1) there were no common security interests with Japan to undergird the sorts of relations Europe has had with the United States; and (2) Japan has so far been unwilling to exercise a vigorous leadership role in the international system. The third option was that Europe could attempt to restructure its own position to act more coherently in a changing world. The international changes did not produce 1992; they provoked a rethinking. The 1992 project emerged because the domestic context was propitious and policy entrepreneurs fashioned an elite coalition in favor of it.

[22] Again, we are not the first to suggest that external, international forces trigger changes in regional integration politics. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. proposed that "outside actors or events" could act as "catalysts" in regional integration efforts, and that drastic changes in the international environment had been crucial in bringing about European integration. See Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration," *International Organization* 19 (Autumn 1965), 870-84, at 882-83.

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Political Entrepreneurship: Understanding the Changing Bargains

The surprisingly sudden movement by governments and companies toward a joint response does not have a clear and simple explanation. Uncertainty abounds. In a situation so open, so undefined, political science must rediscover the art of politics. The 1992 movement cannot be understood as the logical response to the situation in which actors and groups found themselves, and cannot therefore be understood through such formal tools as theories of games or collective action. Neither the payoff from nor preferences for any strategy were or are yet clear.[23] European choices have been contingent on leadership, perception, and timing; they ought to be examined as an instance of elites constructing coalitions and institutions in support of new objectives.[24]

This is not a story of mass movements, of pressure groups, or of legislatures. In the 1950s, the European project became a matter of party and group politics. In the 1980s, the EC institutions were not the object of debate; they were a political actor. Indeed, the Commission exercised leadership in proposing technical measures for the internal market that grabbed the attention of business and government elites, but were (in the

[23] Strategic games are useful heuristic devices that can help us reason about structured situations by clarifying the logic of interaction. In this instance, whatever the general methodological case, substantial investment in specifying and manipulating a multiplayer, multiissue game will have limited payoffs in our understanding of 1992. Indeed, the crucial analytic issues must be resolved long before a set of games can even be devised. Games of strategic interaction require preference functions for each player. With 1992, decision makers do not possess the intellectual means to foresee alternative outcomes, much less rank them. Game theory, as even its most enthusiastic proponents recognize, cannot yet deal with changing preferences. Given all of these lacunae and uncertainties, game models of the international interactions involved in 1992 cannot possibly capture the political dynamics that matter. Behind the games are the crucial factors: political strategies, constraints, and leadership.

Nor is this really a problem for theories of collective action as traditionally conceived in political science. The problem is not one of inducing actors to contribute to the production of a collective good (i.e., avoiding free riders). The institutional structure of the community compels participation and shared leadership. At issue are the areas that should be opened to joint policy making and the institutional arrangements that might prove acceptable to the parties. Not only are there substantial risks and costs for all, but imposing European decisions on domestic politics requires domestic political action by the national executive, not just acquiescence in the European Commission and Council of Ministers. There are, in other words, multiple layers of politics.

[24] This is not a matter of elite learning that can be explained by theories of learning. Our proposition would clearly be that what has altered behavior is changed circumstances, not increased knowledge. By knowledge we mean formally specified relationships (information and theories about it) that suggest what outcomes will result from what causes. It is not a better understanding of an existing situation, but the discovery of a new situation that is at issue. The necessary ingredient for adaptation is therefore vision and leadership, an image of arrangements or relationships that will respond to new tasks, and the skill to mobilize diverse groups to construct that future. Rather than greater technically rooted knowledge, it is politically founded insight that is called into play.

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initial stages at least) of little interest to the organs of mass politics. The governments and business elites had already been challenged by the international changes in ways that the parties and unions had not been. Some business and government leaders involved in 1992 are, in fact, trying to sidestep normal coalition politics in order to bring about domestic changes.

Consequently, any explanation of the choice of Europe and its evolution must focus on the actors—the leadership in the institutions of the European Community, in segments of the executive branch of the national governments, and in the business community (principally the heads of the largest companies)—and what they have achieved.[25] These are the people who confronted the changes in the international environment and initiated the 1992 process. Each of these actors was indispensable, and each was involved with the actions of the others. The Community remains a bargain among governments. National governments—particularly the French—have begun to approach old problems in new ways and to make choices that are often unexpected. The Commission itself is an entrenched, self-interested advocate of further integration, so its position is no surprise. The multinationals are faced with sharply changed market conditions, and their concerns and reactions are not unexpected. The initiatives came from the EC, but they caught hold because the nature of the domestic political context had shifted. The interconnections and interactions among them will almost certainly defy an effort to assign primacy, weight, or relative influence.

In this section, we first address the domestic political context that prepared the ground for the Commission's plans. We then look at the Commission's initiatives, and finally at the role of the business elite in supporting the 1992 project.

The question is why national government policies and perspectives have altered. Why, in the decade between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, did European governments become open to European-level, market-oriented solutions? The answer has two parts: the failure of national strategies for economic growth and the transformation of the left in European politics. First, the traditional models of growth and economic management broke down. The old political strategies for the economy

[25] We have attempted (without fully succeeding) to distinguish between the politics of coalitions and the role of institutions in shaping the present response. In the first European movement that established the Coal and Steel Community and then the EEC, there were no European institutions shaping and activating the players. Now there are, and the game is consequently quite different. The most important "spillover" probably lies in the creation of a permanent advocate of more extensive integration as well as a permanent location for it.

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seemed to have run out. After the growth of the 1960s, the world economy entered a period of stagflation in the 1970s. As extensive industrialization reached its limits, the existing formulas for national economic development and the political bargains underpinning them had to be revised. Social critics and analysts in fact defined the crisis as the failure of established formulas to provide even plausible guides for action.[26] It was not simply that the price of commodities rose, but that the dynamics of growth and trade changed.[27]

Growth had been based on the shift of resources out of agriculture into industry; industrial development had been based on borrowing from abroad the most advanced technologies that could be obtained and absorbed. Suddenly, many old industrial sectors had to be closed, as in the case of shipbuilding. Others had to be transformed and reorganized, factories continuously upgraded, new machines designed and introduced, and work reorganized. The arguments that eventually emerged held that the old corporate strategies based on mass production were being forced to give way to strategies of flexibility and adaptability.[28] Despite rising unemployment, the steady pace of improvement in productivity, coupled with the maintenance and sometimes reestablishment of a strong position in production equipment in vital sectors, suggested that Europe's often distinctive and innovative approaches to production were working. However, that was only to come toward the end of the decade. In short, during the 1970s, national executive and administrative elites found themselves facing new economic problems without adequate models for addressing them.

The 1970s were therefore the era of Europessimism. Europe seemed unable to adjust to the changed circumstances of international growth and competition after the oil shock. At first, the advanced countries stumbled, but then the United States and Japan seemed to pick themselves back up and to proceed. Japan's growth, which had originally been sustained by expansion within domestic markets, was bolstered by the

[26] Stephen S. Cohen, "Informed Bewilderment," in Stephen S. Cohen and Peter Gourevitch, eds., *France in a Troubled World Economy* (London: Butterworth, 1983). Cohen makes this point here in a particularly clear and jargon-free fashion.

[27] See John Zysman, *Governments, Markets, and Growth* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), chap. 1.

[28] There is both a European and an American school of discussion. In the United States, the debate is led by Charles Sabel and Michael Piore. Their book, *The Second Industrial Divide* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), brought many of the issues into the public arena, though the scholarly work underlying it is much more important. In Europe, the group is diverse, including Robert Boyer, Benjamin Coriat, Giovanni Dosi, and Jacques Mistral. A particularly interesting version of the debate is found in Peter Hall, ed., *International Journal of Political Economy: European Labor in the 1980s* 17 (Fall 1987).

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competitive export orientation of major firms in consumer durables. New approaches to manufacturing created substantial advantages.[29] In the United States, flexibility of the labor market—meaning the ability to fire workers and reduce real wages—seemed to assure jobs, albeit in services and often at lower wages, despite a deteriorating industrial position in global markets. Japan experienced productivity growth; the United States created jobs. Europe seemed to be doing neither and feared being left behind by the U.S.-Japanese competition in high technology.

For Europe, the critical domestic political issue was jobs, and the problem was said to be labor market rigidity. In some sense that was true, but the rigidities did not lie exclusively or even primarily with the workers' attitudes. They were embedded in government policy and industrial practice. In most of Western Europe, the basic postwar political bargain involved governmental responsibility for full employment and a welfare net. Consequently, many European companies had neither the flexibility of their American counterparts to fire workers or reduce wages, nor, broadly across Europe, the flexibility Japan displayed in redeploying its labor force.[30] As unemployment rose, the old growth model built on a political settlement in each country was challenged—initially from the left by strategies of nationalization with state investment, and then from the right by strategies of deregulation with privatization. The political basis, in attitude and party coalition, for a more market-oriented approach was being put in place.

For a decade beginning with the oil shocks, the external environment for Europe was unstable, or turbulent, but its basic structure remained unchanged. While the United States was unwilling or unable to assure a system of fixed exchange rates, it remained the center of the financial system even as it changed the rules. The European Monetary System was an effort to create a zone of currency stability so that the expansion of trade inside Europe could continue. In the 1960s and 1970s, a long debate on technology gaps and the radical extension of American multinational power had not provoked joint European responses. During the 1970s, the mandate for the European Community was not altered; it was stretched to preserve its original objectives in the original context. The international economic turbulence and fears of a relative decline in com-

[29] Robert Boyer makes this point particularly well. One interesting collection of these arguments is Boyer, ed., *La flexibilité du travail en Europe* [The flexibility of labor in Europe] (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1986).

[30] There was a another twist as well: David Flannagan at Stanford has argued that companies hesitated to invest in training new workers, and that when they had to expand, they tended to hire back those that had been laid off, thus creating a substantial pool of young unemployed.

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petitive position did not provoke a full-blown European response. The extent of the shifts in relative economic power was not yet apparent. National strategies in many arenas had not yet failed, or at least were not yet perceived as having failed. In other arenas, the challenges could be dealt with by accommodations within the realm of domestic politics.

The question remains: Why did national policy change, why did the perceptions of choice evolve, the range of options shift? Policy failure must be interpreted; it can be assigned many meanings. National perceptions of position are filtered through parties and bureaucracies, shaped and flavored by factions, interests, and lobbies. In 1983, the French Socialist party was divided between those led by Laurent Fabius, who concluded that pressure on the franc was a reason to reverse policy direction and to stay within the European Community, and those like Chevenement, who felt the proper choice was to withdraw from the EMS, even if that resulted in an effective weakening of the Community. The choice, to stay in the EMS, was by no means a forgone matter.[31] The French response to the currency crisis was a political choice made in the end by the president.

Thus, the second aspect of the changed domestic political context was the shift in government coalitions in a number of EC member-states. Certainly the weakening of the left in some countries and a shift from the communist to the market-socialist left in others helped to make possible a debate about market solutions (including unified European markets) to Europe's dilemma. In Latin Europe, the communist parties weakened as the era of Eurocommunism waned. Spain saw the triumph of Gonzalez's socialists, and their unexpected emergence as advocates of market-led development and entry into the Common Market. Italy experienced a weakening of the position of the communists in the complex mosaic of party positioning. In France, Mitterrand's victory displaced the communists from their primacy on the left. The first two years of the French socialist government proved crucial in turning France away from the quest for economic autonomy. After 1983, Mitterrand embraced a more market-oriented approach and became a vigorous advocate of increased European cooperation. This had the unexpected consequence of

[31] There is a parallel story in Britain some fifteen years earlier. In the early 1960s, the British Labour party had refused to devalue the pound sterling, even though it meant in effect abandoning a growth strategy. The debate on sterling was suppressed within the party; it was settled only when there was truly no choice left. See Stephen Blank, "Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Anthony Howard, ed., *The Crossman Diaries, Selection from the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister 1964-1970* (London: Methuen Paperbacks, 1979).

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engendering independence for the state-named managers of nationalized companies. When the conservative government of Jacques Chirac adopted deregulation as a central policy approach, a second blow was dealt to the authority of the French state in industry. In Britain and Germany, the Labour and Social Democratic parties lost power as well as influence on the national debate.

Throughout Europe the corporatist temptation waned; that is, management of the macroeconomy by direct negotiations among social groups and the government no longer seemed to work. In many union and left circles an understanding grew that adaptation to market processes would be required. (As the 1992 movement progressed, unions in most countries became wary that the European "competitive imperative" might be used to justify policies that would restrict their influence and unwind their positions and gains.[32] As a counterpoint on the right, Thatcher began to fear a bureaucratized and socialized Europe.)

In an era when deregulation—the freeing of the market—became the fad, it made intuitive sense to extend the European internal market as a response to all ailments. Moreover, some governments, or some elites within nations, can achieve purely domestic goals by using European agreements to limit or constrain national policy choices. The EMS is not only a means of stabilizing exchange rates to facilitate trade, but also a constraint on domestic politics that pushes toward more restrictive macroeconomic policies than would otherwise have been adopted. There is little doubt that the course of the social experiment in 1981 would have been different if France had not been a member of the EMS, which required formal withdrawal from commitments if a country wanted to pursue independent expansionary policies. In a different vein, some Italians use the threat of competitive pressures as a reason to reform the administration. As one Italian commentator put it, "Europe for us will be providential. . . . The French and Germans love 1992 because each thinks it can be the key country in Europe. The most we can hope for is that 1992 straightens us out."[33]

In any case, in Europe we are watching the creation of like-minded elites and alliances that at first blush appear improbable—such as Mitterrand and Thatcher committed to some sort of European strategy. These elites are similar in political function (though not in political basis) to the cross-national Christian Democratic alliance that emerged in sup-

[32] Hall (fn. 28).

[33] Philip Revzin, "Italians Must Change Their Business Style in Integrated Europe," *Wall Street Journal*, November 21, 1988, p. 1. Italian businessmen quoted in the article expressed the same sentiment.

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port of the original Community after World War II in Germany, France, and elsewhere. European-level, market-oriented solutions have become acceptable.

This was the domestic political soil into which the Commission's initiatives fell. Traditional models of economic growth appeared to have played themselves out, and the left had been transformed in such a way that socialist parties began to seek market-oriented solutions to economic ills. In this setting, the European Community provided more than the mechanisms of intergovernmental negotiation. The Eurocracy was a standing constituency and a permanent advocate of European solutions and greater unity. Proposals from the European Commission transformed this new orientation into policy, and, more importantly, into a policy perspective and direction. The Commission perceived the international structural changes and the failure of existing national strategies, and seized the initiative.

To understand how the Commission's initiatives led governments to step beyond failed national policy, let us examine the case of telematics, the economically crucial sector combining microelectronics, computers, and telecommunications. By 1980, European policy makers were beginning to realize that the national champion strategies of the past decade or so had failed to reverse the steady international decline of European telematics industries. Throughout the 1970s, each national government in Europe had sought to build up domestic firms capable of competing with the American giants. The state encouraged or engineered mergers and provided research-and-development subsidies; state procurement heavily favored the domestic firms. By 1980, none of these approaches had paid off. Europe's champions were losing market shares both in Europe and worldwide, and most of them were operating in the red. Even Europe's traditional electronics stronghold, telecommunications equipment, was showing signs of weakness: the telecommunications trade surplus was declining annually while U.S. and Japanese imports were accounting for ever larger shares of the most technologically advanced market segments.[34]

In telematics, European collaboration emerged when the Commission, under the leadership of Etienne Davignon, struck an alliance with the twelve major electronics companies in the EC. Because of the mounting costs and complexity of R&D, rapid technological and market changes, and the convergence of hitherto separate technologies (e.g., computing

[34] Michael Borrus et al., *Telecommunications Development in Comparative Perspective*, BRIE Working Paper No. 14 (Berkeley, CA: BRIE, 1985), 38.

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and telecommunications), these twelve companies were motivated to seek interfirm partnerships. Although such partnerships were common with American firms, the possibilities within Europe had not been explored. The twelve firms designed the European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT) and then sold it to their governments. The RACE program (Research for Advanced Communications-technologies in Europe) emerged via a similar process.[35] In short, the Community's high-technology programs of the early 1980s took shape in a setting in which previous national policies had been discredited, the Commission advanced concrete proposals, and industry lent essential support. In a sense, the telematics cases prefigure the 1992 movement and display the same configuration of political actors: the Commission, certain political leaders and specific agencies within the national governments, and senior business leaders.

The Commission again took the initiative with the publication of its "White Paper" in June 1985. The initiative should be seen as a response to the stagnation of the Community enterprise as a result of, among other things, the budget stalemates. When Jacques Delors took office as president of the European Commission in 1985, he consciously sought an undertaking, a vision, that would reignite the European idea. The notion of a single market by 1992 caught the imagination because the need for a broader Europe was perceived outside the Commission. Helen Wallace and Wolfgang Wessels suggest that if the EEC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) had not existed by the late 1980s, they would have had to be invented.[36] Or, as was the case, reinvented.

The White Paper set out a program and a timetable for the completion of the fully unified internal market.[37] The now famous set of three

[35] This is a radical simplification, but it captures the essence of events. For more detail, see Wayne Sandholtz, "Crisis and Collaboration in European Telematics" (Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1989), chaps. 7-8.

[36] Wallace and Wessels (fn. 18).

[37] Michael Emerson, "1992 and After" (EEC, Brussels, Summer 1988). The White Paper proposals can be grouped into sets, as follows:

1. Liberalization of government procurement; essentially opening national procurement to outside bidders.
2. Technical norms, by which the largest number of proposals set technical standards that otherwise preclude movement of goods through Europe.
3. Transport services.
4. Agricultural border taxes and subsidies.
5. National restrictions in the community's external trade relations; these matters are not strictly an element of the "internal bargain," but are included here for the sake of completeness.
6. Abolition of fiscal frontiers, there being no longer a need to assess taxes at the border.
7. Financial services, including banking, stock markets, and related services and insurance, with the bold aim of creating a European capital market.

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hundred legislative proposals to eliminate obstacles to the free functioning of the market, as well as the analyses that led up to and followed it, expressed a clear perception of Europe's position.[38] European decline or the necessities of international competitiveness (choose your own phrasing) require—in this view—the creation of a continental market.

The White Paper's program had the political advantage of setting forth concrete steps and a deadline. The difficult political questions could be obscured by focusing on the mission and by reducing the issues to a series of apparently technical steps. Advocates of market unification could emphasize highly specific, concrete, seemingly innocuous, and long overdue objectives rather than their consequences.[39] In a sense, the tactic is to move above and below the level of controversy. The broad mission is agreed to; the technical steps are unobjectionable. Of course, there is a middle ground where the questions of the precise form of Europe, the allocation of gain and pain in the process, become evident. A small change in, say, health and safety rules may appear unimportant, but may prove to be the shelter behind which a national firm is hiding from European and global competitors. Here we find the disputes about outcomes, both in terms of market results and of social values. Obscuring the issues and interests was crucial in developing Europe the first time, one might note, and has been instrumental once again.

Implementation of the White Paper required a separate initiative: the limitation, expressed in the Single European Act, of national vetoes over Community decisions. At its core, the Community has always been a mechanism for governments to bargain. It has certainly not been a nation-state, and only a peculiar kind of federalism. Real decisions have been made in the Council by representatives of national governments. The Commissioners, the department heads, are drawn from a pool nominated by the governments. Broader representative institutions have played only a fictive (or, more generously, a secondary) role. Moreover, decisions taken by the Council on major issues had to be unanimous, providing each government with a veto. For this reason, it has been painfully difficult to extend the Community's authority, to change the rules of finance, or to proceed with the creation of a unified market and change the rules of business in Europe. The most reluctant state prevailed. Furthermore, domestic groups could block Community action by persuading their government to exercise the veto.

Many see the Single European Act as the most important amendment

[38] Padoa-Schioppa (fn. 17); Emerson (fn. 37); Paolo Cecchini, *The European Challenge, 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market* (Hounslow, U.K.: Wildwood House, 1988).

[39] "Europe's Internal Market," *The Economist*, July 9, 1988, pp. 6, 8.

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to the Treaty of Rome since the latter was adopted in 1957.[40] This act has replaced the Luxembourg Compromise (which required decisions to be taken by unanimity) with a qualified majority requirement in the case of certain measures that have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. The national veto still exists in other domains, but most of the three hundred directives for 1992 can be adopted by qualified majority. As a result, disgruntled domestic interest groups have lost a source of leverage on their governments; the national veto no longer carries the clout it once did. Perhaps equally important, the Single European Act embodies a new strategy toward national standards that were an obstacle to trade within the Community. Previously, the EEC pinned its hopes on "harmonization," a process by which national governments would adopt "Euronorms" prepared by the Commission. The Single European Act instead adopts the principle affirmed in the famous Cassis de Dijon case. That principle holds that standards (for foodstuffs, safety, health, and so on) that prevail in one country must be recognized by the others as sufficient.

The third actor in the story, besides the governments and the Commission, is the leadership of the European multinational corporations. In a number of ways, they have experienced most directly some of the consequences of the international economic changes. They have acted both politically and in the market. The White Paper and the Single European Act gave the appearance that changes in the EC market were irreversible and politically unstoppable. Businesses have been acting on that belief. Politically, they have taken up the banner of 1992, collaborating with the Commission and exerting substantial influence on their governments. The significance of the role of business, and of its collaboration with the Commission, must not be underestimated. European business and the Commission may be said to have together bypassed national governmental processes and shaped an agenda that compelled attention and action.

Substantial support for the Commission's initiatives has come from the Roundtable of European Industrialists, an association of some of Europe's largest and most influential corporations, including Philips, Siemens, Olivetti, GEC, Daimler Benz, Volvo, Fiat, Bosch, ASEA and Ciba-Geigy. Indeed, when Jacques Delors, prior to assuming the presidency of the Commission in 1985, began campaigning for the unified internal market, European industrialists were ahead of him. Wisse Dek-

[40] This view is sometimes expressed in EEC materials lauding 1992. Not everyone would agree; they would cite budget initiatives in 1970 and 1975 and the direct election of the European parliament. We cite the single European Act because it rejects the national veto.

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ker of Philips and Jacques Solvay of Belgium's Solvay chemical company in particular were vigorously arguing for unification of the EC's fragmented markets.[41] In the early 1980s, a booklet published by Philips proposed urgent action on the internal market. "There is really no choice," it argued, "and the only option left for the Community is to achieve the goals laid down in the Treaty of Rome. Only in this way can industry compete globally, by exploiting economies of scale, for what will then be the biggest home market in the world today: *the European Community home market*."[42]

It is hard, though, to judge whether the business community influenced Europe to pursue an internal market strategy or was itself constituted as a political interest group by Community action. Business began to organize in 1983, when the Roundtable of European Industrialists was formed under the chairmanship of Pehr Gyllenhammer, of Volvo. Many of the original business discussions included senior Community bureaucrats; in fact, Etienne Davignon reportedly recruited most of the members of the original group. The executives constituting the Roundtable (numbering 29 by mid-1987) were among the most powerful industrialists in Europe, including the non-EEC countries. The group initially published three reports: one on the need for development of a Europe-wide traffic infrastructure, one containing proposals for Europe's unemployment crisis, and one, *Changing Scales*, describing the economies of scale that would benefit European businesses in a truly unified market.[43]

The European Roundtable became a powerful lobby vis-à-vis the national governments.[44] One member of the Delors cabinet in Brussels has declared, "These men are very powerful and dynamic . . . when necessary they can ring up their own prime ministers and make their case."[45] Delors himself has said, "We count on business leaders for support."[46] Local and regional chambers of commerce have helped to establish about fifty European Information Centers to handle queries and publicize 1992.[47] In short, the 1992 process is repeating the pattern established by

[41] "Europe's Internal Market" (fn. 39), Survey, p. 6.

[42] *Europe 1990* (Brussels: Chez Philips S.A., no date), 5; emphasis in original.

[43] Rob van Tulder and Gerd Junne, *European Multinationals in Core Technologies* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988), 214-15.

[44] Based on interviews and discussions.

[45] Quoted in van Tulder and Junne (fn. 43), 215, n. 8.

[46] Axel Krause, "Many Groups Lobby on Implementation of Market Plan," *Europe* (July/August 1988), 24.

[47] Another business group collaborating with the Commission and actively promoting the 1992 process is the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations in Europe (UNICE), which includes over thirty industrial associations from throughout Europe. The secretary general of UNICE, Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, described the union's working groups and lobbying as follows: "Nine-tenths of our work comprises the regular, invisible interchange of ideas between our experts and the E.C. Commission's civil servants." Krause (fn. 46), 24.

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ESPRIT: major businesses have allied with the Commission to persuade governments, which were already seeking to adapt to the changed international structure.

At the same time that the business community has supported the political initiatives behind the 1992 movement, it has been acting in the market place. A series of business deals, ventures, and mergers form a critical part of the 1992 movement. Even if nothing more happens in the 1992 process, the face of business competition in Europe is being changed. The structure of competition is being altered.

There has been a huge surge in joint ventures, share-swapping, and mergers in Europe. Many are justified on the grounds of preparing for a unified market, some for reasons of production and marketing strategies, and some as a means of defense against takeovers.[48] But much of the movement is a response to business problems that would exist in any case. Still, the process has taken on a life of its own. The mergers provoke responses in the form of other business alliances; the responding alliances appear more urgent because of the political rhetoric. As the Europeans join together, American and Japanese firms scurry to put their own alliances in place and to rearrange their activities.

The meaning of the process is far from evident. Are we watching the creation of European competition, or the cartelization of industry at a European level? In some sectors, such as textiles and apparel, there already is an effective European market. In others, such as telecommunications, the terms of competition—whatever the corporate reshufflings—will turn on government regulation and choice. Since U.S. firms are already entrenched, the real newcomers are the Japanese. A surge of Japanese investment is taking place in Europe.

Many of the business deals are quite instructive about the broader policy process. An Italian entrepreneur, de Benedetti, tries to take over the Société Générale de Belgique. The Société Générale, though, is not simply another bank; it is an institution that played a vital role in the nineteenth-century development of Belgium. Apart from its symbolic importance, the bank has its fingers in a substantial chunk of Belgian industry. The attempted foreign takeover had immediate political ramifications in Belgium; it was blocked by an alliance led by the French Bank of Suez with encouragement from the French government. Eventually, British interests were brought in as well. The Société Générale became a European development bank, controlled at once by Belgian, French, Italian, and British interests.

[48] See Craig Forman, "European Firms Hope Swapping Stakes Gives Them 1992 Poison-Pill Protection," *Wall Street Journal*, October 18, 1988, p. A26.

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A second instance is the recent and apparently successful takeover of Plessey, a British telecommunications and electronics firm, by GEC of Britain and Siemens of Germany. The cross-national nature of the move is itself significant. The acquisition of Plessey by GEC alone had been blocked by the British monopolies commission in an earlier bid; but in the European context, the takeover proved acceptable. Equally important, the question of who controls Plessey at once shapes the market structure in telecommunications and defense. It should be noted that the British Ministry of Defence originally opposed GEC's takeover of Plessey because it feared facing a single British seller in critical defense products.

A third case is the merging of the semiconductor interests of the French firm Thomson with the Italian firm SGS, apparently under SGS control. What was surprising is that it happened at the same time that Matra was backing out of the semiconductor business. Although the French retained research and development capacity as well as influence within the SGS operation, the development is a startling one. French electronics now seems to be entirely dependent on foreign sources for the final development and production of microelectronics, though the French industry's ties within Europe have been strengthened. As a business deal it makes eminent sense, and was a virtual necessity. That, however, has not always been decisive in French electronics policy. Computers and semiconductors have been viewed as instruments and elements of national power and policy. Whether the government simply acquiesced in management's choice or actively promoted the deal, the merger represents a real change in its attitude and policy: a European partnership is now acceptable in France. Finally, ASEA of Sweden and Brown Boveri of Switzerland, two giants in the electrical generation business, have merged. Swedes, and a Swedish chairman, are now managing the business from Zurich and implanting themselves in the United States through the purchase of elements of Westinghouse. In a direct response, Britain's GEC and Alsthom of the French CGE group have merged their power generation businesses.

Of course, one must not exaggerate. Deals linking European firms are roughly equal in number and value to those joining European to American enterprises. And the volume of mergers and acquisitions within the U.S. has far outstripped that involving European firms. Still, the boom in intra-European mergers and alliances is a new development.

These deals clearly represent decisions by major companies to join together on a European scale in order to position themselves for global competition. In many sectors, as Stephen Cohen points out, 1992 may

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consist fundamentally of these business alliances and mergers; that is, even if the process is limited to these alliances, big business in Europe will have been transformed. The moves by major business will affect smaller businesses, including transport, and the political form and position of Europe. The business deals also represent a change in governmental attitudes to accept and encourage that process. The pace of European mergers was accelerating in the mid-1980s; in 1987, it became a rush. Perhaps not by accident, that is the year in which the political initiatives for a unified market became fully believable.

The Bargains on which the New Europe Will Rest

It is not yet possible to characterize the overall shape of the deal that is emerging in Europe. The movement rests on the White Paper, the Single European Act, and the mergers and acquisitions already discussed. These dimensions of 1992 represent a sharp change from the first integration project. Recall our specification of the original construction and note that each of its elements is changing. The internal market is being extended. National interventions are being limited and openly constrained by European institutions. The Commission is taking the political initiative in diverse areas, from tax and regulatory policy through technology development. Direct foreign investment and joint ventures, not just trade, are forming the links among countries.

The real issue is whether the European Communities will pursue their objectives of growth and a greater role in the world through projects and policies that go beyond the unified market. The vision of 1992 implies the need for future bargains—both internal and external—that are outside the formal 1992 process and its three hundred technical measures. They consist of a diverse set of issues whose resolution will determine not only how complete the market unification will be, but, more broadly, its character: Will Europe move toward a unified and coherent position in the global economy? For example, it is improbable that the surge of momentum in 1988 that seemed to make the drive for market unification inevitable could have occurred without a resolution, or at least a temporary truce, on budget and agricultural issues. We first address the unresolved internal issues; in the section that follows, we shall discuss the outlines of the key external bargains.

Let us mention the four issues we consider most critical. They were excluded from the 1992 project at first; confronting them will necessarily broaden participation in the 1992 process to include political actors beyond the narrow elites involved in its inception. First, and recently most

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visible and controversial, is the link between a European capital market, exchange-rate policy, and the European Monetary System. Will there be a financial and monetary entity called Europe? Free capital movements imply stricter joint controls to maintain exchange-rate stability, which in turn will be difficult to manage without a central financial institution. Without one, can there be a unified or even a partially unified capital market? This question quickly broadens to the problem of coordinated management of macroeconomic policy.

Second is the issue of redistributive and social bargains. The structural adjustment funds are the payoff from the richer north to the poorer south for its sustained participation in the project. An essential part of the bargain appears to be a massive increase in funds for the poorer regions, mostly in the south. The estimates are that these funds will amount to as much as 5 percent of Greece's GNP and 1.5 percent of Spain's GNP.[49] Then there is the related problem of social Europe. Some fear that the very system of social protection and welfare that has become the cornerstone of political bargains in many of the European nations will be at risk. Even the business community is aware and concerned. As one conservative European business leader remarked, "One of the risks is in the social arena. If, in effect, we give in to the temptation to harmonize work conditions throughout Europe, all that we have succeeded in developing and modernizing will be put into question."[50] The EEC, as we have noted, has generally set rules about business behavior. Except in agriculture, it has rarely directly affected outcomes or directly altered the welfare of specific groups in the society. A genuine internal market without restriction or subsidy will make social policy and tax rules appear—whether they actually do or not—to affect industry outcomes. Domestic social policy will become an issue of internal market negotiation.

Third, defense policy may prove to be the most vital matter. A range of questions in the White Paper in fact turns on European defense strategies and the character of force and procurement integration. In particular, public procurement and high technology development will be shaped by defense questions. Although these matters are not formally under discussion, and were brusquely shoved off the table by Mitterrand in the fall of 1988, they are likely to reemerge continually. Will Europe form a more coherent defense position which might include some countries that are currently outside the NATO structure, such as France and Sweden? The answers are likely to turn on developments in the Soviet

[49] Michael Emerson, "1992 as Economic News," (EEC, Brussels, 1988), 5.

[50] François Perigot, "L'Europe ardente obligation," [Europe's burning obligation], *Politique industrielle* 10 (Winter 1988).

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Union and Eastern Europe and the character of the defense postures that France, Germany, and Britain select for themselves.

Fourth, there is the question of the balance between Community and national decision making. If Brussels begins to make substantial numbers of decisions with visible implications for people's lives, what mechanisms of political control will be established?

Given these thorny issues on the edge of the EC agenda, the move toward 1992 is likely to be accompanied by social and political mobilization at the European level. This might lead to a broader European political identity. It could lead to, as neofunctionalist theorists once argued, a reconfiguration of politics from the national to the supranational level—either a shift of decisions from political to Eurocrat hands or a restructuring of mass politics. On the other hand, the European internal market and the processes to which it is expected to lead could sink in the mire of mass politics. The mix that emerges is, of course, the object of speculation.

The External Bargain: Open Trade and a Regional Economy

The 1992 process may have been sparked by a change in global structure; its outcome is certain to shape both the organization and the regimes of the international system in the coming decades. The advanced countries are likely to become three trading regions organized around the United States, Japan, and the European Community. Indeed, Western Europe and the United States each represent about one-quarter of the global GDP, and Japan about one-eighth.[51] Whether the regions remain open or become closed to each other, and whether they encourage direct foreign investment rather than trade, remains to be seen. In any case, the reality of three regional trading groups must be recognized if we are to understand the dynamics of trade in the years that lie ahead.

Europe as a relatively self-contained economic unit already exists. For nearly twenty years, Western Europe as a whole has represented roughly one-quarter of global gross national product, and the European Community over 20 percent.[52] Our understanding of the global trading system is radically different if we consider Europe as a single unit rather

[51] This information is taken both from Bureau d'Information et Prévision Economique, *Europe in 1992* [Europe in 1992] (Paris: BIPE, October 1987) and from Gerard Lafay and Colette Herzog with Loukas Stemitsiotis and Deniz Unal, *Commerce international: la fin des avantages acquis* [International trade: The end of acquired advantages] (Paris: Economica, 1989); figures are taken from diverse charts and tables in Section 1.

[52] These conclusions are drawn from a map of global GDP developed by the BIPE, and relabeled with their permission by BRIE. BIPE, the Bureau d'Information et Prévision Economique, calculated these numbers from OECD figures. The map is in "La France dans l'Europe de 1993," [France in the Europe of 1993] (Paris: BIPE, n.d.), Vol. 1, pp. 8 and 9.

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than the sum of its constituent elements. If we take Europe as a whole, it is already a fairly insulated regional bloc. The data that show high levels of imports and exports, suggesting the openness of Europe to trade, actually reveal increasing levels of trade within the region. This was no small political achievement, which should be acknowledged.

Yet Europe's imports per inhabitant from outside the region are, according to some sources, even lower than Japan's.[53] More than is recognized, a self-contained economic region has already emerged. If taken nation by nation (with trade within the region included) Western Europe in 1986 had 44.6 percent of global exports (up from 42.4 percent in 1967) and roughly 42.6 percent of global imports (down from 44.1 percent in 1967). Thus, foreign trade (imports and exports) constitutes a large percentage of domestic product for each of the European countries. France (26.8 percent) and Germany (32.1 percent) define one end, while Belgium (87 percent) and the Netherlands (58.9 percent) represent the other, with Britain (41.2 percent) falling in between.[54] However, if we exclude intra-European trade (as we would trade between California and Michigan from American trade statistics), the picture changes. In that case, Europe (the EEC and EFTA) represents 13.8 percent of global exports in 1986 (down from 15.3 percent in 1967) and 11 percent of global imports (down from 17.0 percent in 1967.[55]

There are two competing images of Europe. One image is Europe as a set of small- and medium-sized countries that have opened themselves to the global economy and must adjust to it. The other image is of the European nations moving over the last thirty years from interlinked national economies to a regional economy. In the second view, the countries of Europe are, together, no longer passive takers in the system; they are able to shape their international environment. The new Europe, as Lafay and Herzog emphasize, really lies between these two images. It consists of one tight bloc, the Community, and a looser confederation, the European Free Trade Association. Increasingly, the EFTA appears to be adjusting to the recent EEC initiatives.[56] What the mechanism may be—from status quo through full membership—does not much matter for the central argument here. Europe will be concerned with itself. The political boundaries are beginning to correspond to the existing pattern of economic and trade policies.

This shift does not mean that Europe will become a fortress, but in

[53] Colette Herzog, "L'ouverture du marché européen: une autre vision," [The opening of the European market: Another view], *Economie Prospective Internationale: Revue du CEPII*, Premier Trimestre 1988, pp. 81-89.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] Lafay and Herzog (fn. 51), from diverse charts and tables in Section I.

[56] Wallace and Wessels (fn. 18).

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itself the creation of a politically unified trade region, capable of coherent action, is significant. It does mean that Europe will now consciously develop joint policies to benefit the Community, policies in which internal considerations are primary. The direction that Europe's external policy takes will depend as much on choices made by its trading and financial partners as on its own predilections and internal politics. The structural shifts that compel European adjustments are also changing American and Japanese trade policies; these changes will alter Europe's choices in their turn.

The most recent American trade bill represents a fundamental challenge to the intellectual premises on which policy has rested even while its implementation preserves, for the moment, the substance of U.S. policy. Since World War II, the United States has sought a world of increasingly open flows of goods and finance, but not of labor.[57] The principles of multilateral negotiation, extending to all countries concessions that are made to one, encouraged a focus on rules that would promote the general welfare. "Reciprocal" concessions were required from all parties; reciprocity implied rules for the game, not specifications of the score. Put differently, the U.S. sought to promote market processes and to avoid bargains about outcomes; the reciprocity was "generalized" reciprocity.[58] The new intellectual frame includes the notion of specific reciprocity; trade is fair when the outcomes are balanced, and outcomes—not process—are the core of discussion.

Specific reciprocity emerges in two contexts. In the broadest context, it tries to place the burden for the American trade deficit on the countries with trade surpluses, on the premise that limits to American exports and subsidy of foreign products are the core of the problem. Of course, the same national policies to which the U.S. now objects have been in place

[57] It has often been said that, at the moment of its economic and political dominance, the U.S. structured the global trading system around these principles and embedded them in its own legal practice. The reality, of course, has been more complicated: it involved a series of exceptions to these principles. One set of these exceptions, made from a position of economic strength, was made for reasons of foreign policy objectives. The United States—at least in its conception—opened its market to Japan, the developing economies, and Europe, and tolerated trade discrimination. The second set of exceptions, made from a position of sectoral weakness, has involved bilateral bargains to contain imports in specific sectors: autos, textiles, steel. Such sectoral bargains were often made to accommodate those who would challenge the general principles of trade policy. Significantly, the level of imports that triggers substantial protectionism has been quite high. The delicate hypocrisy has been more difficult to maintain as the coalition in support of open trade has narrowed. The balance between principles of multilateralism and a reality of bilateralism has slowly tilted toward bilateralism as a growing number of sectors has achieved protection; with the growth of the deficit, that tilt has become more pronounced.

[58] For the differences between general and specific reciprocity, see Jagdish Bhagwati, *Protectionism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).

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during the thirty-plus years in which this country dominated trade. A somewhat narrower context is in telecommunications, the notion being that closed markets in Japan alter the dynamics of competition in advanced technology. The American policy debate thus pushes a new kind of reciprocity (and a debate about outcomes) onto the negotiating table.

Japanese policy, by contrast, has moved from a language of restriction in a developmental strategy toward a language of liberalism. The reality has been a loosening of the developmental system, but apparently not its abandonment.[59] Markets have been formally opened, primarily where Japan has an established advantage in global markets. However, in sectors where advantage is yet to be established or where Japanese firms have lost the advantage, a band of protectionism still remains. Barriers remain both in policy and business practice. Their significance lies in several domains. First, in emerging or transforming sectors, if one powerful national player maintains a closed domestic market, its firms gain substantial competitive leverage. Second, if the United States is not able or willing to absorb the world's exports, will Japan do so? Third, if barriers of access to financial markets are maintained, Japan gains leverage in global financial and product markets. Japanese financial institutions can then use their role in intermediating the massive Japanese savings to entrench themselves in the financial markets of the United States and Europe.

These American and Japanese developments press on Europe questions that it must resolve in any case—those of reciprocity and outcomes on the one hand, and the choice between free-market and developmental policies on the other. The notion of general reciprocity in trade bargains, which focuses on maintaining market processes, gives way to specific reciprocity, which focuses on specific outcomes. Most concretely, there are manufacturing sectors where national restrictions must either be abandoned or generalized to Europe. The real challenge to national producers is not, for the most part, other European or American producers, but Japanese producers. Consequently, in a range of products from automobiles to dot-matrix printers, the question becomes on which terms the European market will be available to Japan. For instance, at present, anti-dumping rules are applied to restrict imports of printers and photocopiers. In automobiles, should Europe exact a price for opening the French and Italian automobile market to Japanese competition? At this writing, the French have agreed to treat Japanese car production within

[59] Laura Tyson and John Zysman, "Developmental Strategy and Production Innovation in Japan," in Chalmers Johnson, Laura Tyson, and John Zysman, eds., *Politics and Productivity* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1989).

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Britain as European, but the argument hardly seems over. Policies are pressing toward requiring direct foreign investment in components and assembly; the largest surge in new investment will come from Japanese manufacturers. Indeed, 1992 is accelerating Japanese entry into the European automobile market.

In a different area, public procurement, decisions involving foreign suppliers are always political and never entirely technical; some suggest, therefore, that any opening of public procurement—particularly in telecommunications—should require direct reciprocity from trading partners. It would be difficult to measure reciprocity in this sense in any way other than by outcome. Just as difficult is the issue of reciprocity in financial services. For one thing, the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) do not cover trade in services. Here it is not a matter of changing, but rather of making the trade system. There is a diverse range of matters, from transports through telecommunications and information services. As these issues have become more important to the European debate, Europe has become more supportive of a multilateral debate over trade in services.[60] The Commission itself is led by determined free-traders who are seeking to commit the EC irrevocably to a free-trade strategy. It is not clear whether they will succeed. Indeed, this issue may be one that broadens Europe-level politics.

Much also depends on whether a more unified Europe adopts a developmental strategy, manipulating access to its new internal market in the interest of the competitive development of European firms and crucial sectors. Will Europe, whatever the rhetoric, in practice preserve its own market, in a consistent series of cases, as an instrument of development? In discussions of telecommunications, automobiles, consumer electronics (next-generation high-definition television in particular), and information technology products, this is not simply a matter of whether foreigners will be allowed in; they will. The question is on what terms. In any case, Europe's choices will undoubtedly affect not only the rules of the global trading system, but also the language and terms of the debate.

Conclusion

Europe is throwing the dice. It is confronted with a change in the structure of the international economy, with emerging Japanese and dwindling American power and position. It feels the shift in Asian com-

[60] David Buchan, "Brussels Not to Seek Backdated Banking Pacts," *Financial Times*, October 20, 1988, p. 1.

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petitive pressure in industry and finance. The problems are no longer those of American production in Europe, but of Japanese imports and production displacing European production. More importantly perhaps, Europe also feels the shift in rising Japanese influence in the monetary and technology domains. The industrial and governmental presumptions and deals with which Europe has operated are changing or will change. Indeed, Europeans may have to construct a coherent political presence on the global stage in order to achieve the most attractive accommodation to the new order.

We hypothesize that change in the international economic structure was necessary for the revival of the European project. A full-fledged test of this proposition will require detailed analysis of the perceptions and beliefs of those who participated in launching the 1992 movement. We have mentioned other analytical approaches—based on integration theory and domestic politics—that appear logically unsuited to explaining 1992. Of course, these approaches are not really alternatives. There are functional links among some of the bargains being struck, and domestic factors clearly shaped governmental responses to the international changes. But tests of alternative explanations often create a false sense of scientism by setting individually weak explanations against each other and finding "confirmation" by denying the worst of them. Competing explanations often represent different types of explanation, different levels of analysis. In the end, it is not a matter of which one is better, but of whether the right questions are being asked. This article is an effort to frame the proper questions and propose analytical links among them.

We argue that structural situations create the context of choice and cast up problems to be resolved, but they do not dictate the decisions and strategies. In other words, the global setting can be understood in neorealist terms, but the political processes triggered by changes in the system must be analyzed in other than structural terms. The choices result from political processes and have political explanations. In this case, the process is one of bargains among nations and elites within the region. The political process for implementing these bargains is labeled "Europe 1992," a complex web of intergovernmental bargains and accommodations among the various national business elites.

In the first half of this essay, we showed why 1992 has so far been a project of elites; in the second half, we suggested that the elites are unlikely to maintain that monopoly. The commitment of the governments to the process, the fundamental bargain, is expressed by the end of the single-nation veto system, which changed the logic of Community decision making. Europe's states have thrown themselves into the drive for

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a unified market, unleashing business processes that in themselves are recasting the terms of competition within Europe. The terms of the final bargains are open.

The effort to reshape the European Communities has so far been guided by three groups: Community institutions, industrial elites, and governments. The Commission proposes and persuades. Important business coalitions exercise indispensable influence on governments. Governments are receptive because of changes in the world economy and shifts in the domestic political context. The domestic context has changed in two key ways: (1) with the failure of traditional models of growth and purely national strategies for economic management; and (2) with the defeat of the left in some countries, and with its transformation because of the weakening of communist parties in others. These changes opened the way for an unlikely set of elite alliances. In this context, EC initiatives began to demonstrate that there were joint European alternatives to failed national strategies. The telematics programs were one precursor. Delors built on the budding sense of optimism and gave energy and leadership to the notion of a genuine single market. Whether a broader range of political groups will become involved is an open issue, one that may determine both whether the process continues and what form it takes.

The outcomes are quite unknowable, dependent on the timing and dynamics of a long series of contingent decisions. But the story, and consequently the analysis, concerns political leadership in creating a common European interest and then constructing a set of bargains that embody that understanding. Many of the choices are simply calculated risks, or perhaps explorations that will be entrenched if they work and refashioned if they don't. Even if we could predict the outcomes of any single choice with a high degree of confidence, the sequencing of diverse decisions and their cumulative effects would be impossible to foresee. It would be ironic if 1992 succeeded formally but economic rejuvenation did not follow. In any case, Europe's choices—particularly the possibility of a coherent Western Europe emerging as an actor on the global stage—will powerfully influence the world economic system, and perhaps the security system as well.

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Review Article

THE USSR AS A "WEAK STATE": Agrarian Origins of Resistance to Perestroika

By DON VAN ATTA*

Marshall I. Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1987, 280 pp.
Ed A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988, 391 pp.
Cynthia S. Kaplan, *The Party and Agricultural Crisis Management in the USSR*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, 183 pp.
Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, 256 pp.

GENERAL Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has now been in office slightly longer than a one-term U.S. president. His ultimate goal remains modernizing the Soviet system so it can retain its viability and competitiveness as a superpower. But the general secretary's policies have evolved from minor tinkering by demanding the acceleration of economic growth and better social discipline to a fundamental reconstruction he calls "revolutionary *perestroika*."

The reform process has made great strides in some areas. Public discussion of political and historical issues has broadened immeasurably. Political reforms, including the prospect of a multiparty democracy, are seriously debated.[1] Relatively free elections have been conducted for the first time since the fall of 1917. Some ideas of even such apostles of free-market economics as Milton Friedman are seriously presented.[2]

* Research during a five-month stay in the Soviet Union supported by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) in 1988 materially influenced the ideas expressed in this essay. Robert L. Paquette commented on an earlier draft. The manuscript was revised during a period as a Title VIII Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford.

[1] B. Lazarev, " 'Razdelenie vlastei' i opyt Sovetskogo gosudarstva" ['Separation of powers' and the experience of the Soviet state], *Kommunist*, No. 16 (November 1988), 42-51.

[2] V. Bogachev, "Eshche ne pozdno: denezhno-finansovoe ozdorovlenie v sisteme antikrizisnykh mer" [It's still not too late: monetary-financial stabilization in a system of anti-crisis measures], *Kommunist*, No. 3 (February 1989), 31-41, at 33.

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Yet even the general secretary's greatest victories, such as the sweeping changes in the Politburo accomplished in the fall of 1988, seem not to be decisive. Little seems to change in daily life as Soviet citizens continue stoically to stand through long lines for scarce commodities. If anything, the development of cooperative trade and lifting of restrictions on some kinds of private enterprise have fueled inflation and made shortages worse for those without privileged access or fat bankrolls. So far as it can be gauged, popular doubts about the durability and success of perestroika in changing the conditions of the Soviet people's everyday lives remain very deep.[3]

Why has perestroika so far failed to bring about the promised results? Surely a large part of the answer is that the kind of changes Gorbachev has proposed are difficult to achieve and require more than a few months, or years, to become effective. But the history of previous attempts at reform in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death suggests that time for reforms to take effect is hardly the whole problem. Most of the devices now being endorsed in the Soviet Union have been tried before, and failed. So the Soviet media and popular opinion tend to blame not the friction of change, but intentional opposition to perestroika for its slow pace.

Soviet and Western assessments alike tend to identify individuals, such as Gorbachev's fellow Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Yegor Ligachev, or particular groups such as the bureaucracy, as perestroika's enemies. Marshall Goldman, for instance, writes that "as has happened so often, *the bureaucracy's* first concern is to protect its prerogatives, even if reform suffers" (p. 77, emphasis added).[4] It is, of course, likely that many of these people do oppose perestroika to greater or lesser degree. But blaming individuals and particular groups for their selfish opposition to perestroika may obscure as much as it clarifies about the dynamics of change and the intense political struggles now occurring in the Soviet Union. Ed Hewett, for instance, argues that more than just individual fears or personal beliefs power the opposition to reform. Managerial cadres in the vast network of ministries which administer the Soviet economy on a daily basis have to keep the goods, and the paper,

[3] For instance, a recent *Time* magazine poll of 1,000 Muscovites found that 20% thought perestroika had, "in substance, been braked"; 56% thought it was "experiencing major difficulties"; 15% thought it was "experiencing some difficulties"; and only 2% thought "perestroika is developing without problems." Vsevolod Marinov, "What the Comrades Say," *Time*, 10 April 1989, 62-63.

[4] Andrei Nuikin has made the most striking version of this argument in an essay, "Idealy ili interesy? Po stranitsam gazet i zhurnalov" [Ideals or interests? From the pages of newspapers and magazines], *Novyi mir*, No. 1 (January 1988), 190-211, and No. 2 (February 1988), 205-28, which sometimes seems to echo Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed*.

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flowing. They are not simply "saboteurs, driven by a desire to protect their considerable power in the system." They do the best job they can. From the point of view of working managers and administrators, criticism focused on bureaucrats

> fails to take into account the flaws in reform design that create incentives for ministries to preserve controls over enterprises. . . . Most important, this simple view of the impediments to reform ignores the large and important political issues that affect in a fundamental way the choices made in the design of reforms and the fate of the resulting decrees (Hewett, 276).

A similar point is made by the Soviet publicist Gennadii Lisichkin:

> The incorrect and scholastic ideas about socialism formulated by Stalin were thoroughly incorporated by him in the practice of our economic and state structure, in the skeleton of the bureaucratic administrative-command system which is so furiously resisting perestroika today. . . . Stalinism's . . . ideas are not just alive in the dogmas firmly instilled in our minds ever since childhood, they are also part and parcel of our ideas of life and of some still-existing structures.[5]

Attempts to discern individual and group opponents of perestroika tend to focus on inputs to the political process and how decisions are made. Hewett and Lisichkin, however, emphasize that the problem is how decisions, once made, are carried out and how the results of policy implementation are interpreted for a next round of agenda setting and policy making. From this perspective, the problem of perestroika is less people than the sociopolitical structures which constrain them to act in particular ways. So long as the political-administrative structure exists in its present form, it will not be capable of effectively carrying out Gorbachev's reforms. At the same time, the constraints of operating within it will produce people temperamentally opposed to, and incapable of, implementing the changes.

Having intentionally destroyed all competing centers of power within society, the Soviet state is enormously powerful. Yet its ability to execute millions of people or build massive projects in relatively short order is balanced by an inability to make the kind of fine adjustments in social policy possible in states which are limited by, but can act through, market mechanisms; as Charles Lindblom commented, Soviet-style systems have "strong thumbs, no fingers."[6] The very organizational structure which gives the state its centralized power also weakens it, so the mighty Soviet state cannot control fully what seems most firmly in its hands. The ad-

[5] Lisichkin, "Dogmas and Life," *Izvestiia*, 26 January 1989, 3, as translated in *FBIS Daily Report—Soviet Union* (hereafter FBIS-SOV), 1 February 1989, 82.

[6] Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

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ministrative structures through which the party-state apparatus works, in particular the Soviet state's limited and peculiar mechanisms for implementing elite policy decisions, are the primary obstacle to perestroika. This observation suggests that a useful focus for analyzing perestroika's difficulties might be the structure and capacities of the Soviet state.[7]

This essay sketches such an analysis. The books reviewed contribute to an understanding of the genesis of the particular capabilities and weaknesses of the Soviet state in implementing political decisions made at the center, in particular the system's origins in Stalin's conquest of the peasantry. They describe the functioning of the Soviet state's major policy-implementation tool, the administrative "campaign." Their prescriptions for how perestroika should be conducted suggest why Gorbachev must create new instruments to implement reforms successfully and illuminate the structural sources of opposition to those reforms. Finally, this review suggests some conclusions on the usefulness of contemporary "neo-institutionalist" theories of the state in thinking about the USSR.

Collectivization Establishes the "Campaign" System

The instruments and institutions of state power and policy implementation which have run Soviet society since the end of the 1920s developed in the struggle to subdue the peasantry. The regime's decision to institute what Nikolai Bukharin stigmatized as a "military-feudal regime" in the countryside infected the entire economy and produced the command system of economic management which opposes reform today. As Soviet Academician Vladimir Tikhonov, an occasional advisor to General Secretary Gorbachev, noted, under Stalin the country "shifted completely to forced requisitioning (*prodrazverstka*): at first in the countryside, and then in the entire planned economy."[8] An understanding of how the structure of the state hinders reform, and so the formulation of successful strategies for reform, must begin with agrarian policy. Barrington Moore's comment that how the modernizing state deals with its peasants goes far

[7] Discussing the Soviet "state" in this way raises a terminological problem. Students of the USSR often counterpose the "state," i.e., the structure of Soviets and ministries, to the role of other agencies, most notably the Communist Party but also the competing hierarchies of trade unions, secret police, "people's control," etc. "State" in the context of state theory refers to all that is not civil society, the whole complex of devices for political input, decision making, implementation, and verification. In that broader sense, the Soviet state is of course much more pervasive than the state in any Western country.

[8] "Chelovek i ekonomika: 'LG' v derevne: Akademik VASKhNIL V. A. Tikhonov i obozrevatel' 'LG' Kapitolina Kozhevnikova obsuzhhdaiut polemicheskie pis'ma chitatelei" [Man and the economy: 'LG' in the countryside: VASKhNIL Academician V. A. Tikhonov and 'LG' Commentator Kapitolina Kozhevnikova discuss readers' polemical letters], *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 15 (8 April 1987), 12.

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to determine the shape of the social order which emerges surely applies to the modern Soviet Union.[9]

How to cope with the peasants and insure food for the developing cities was the key issue in the policy debates and succession struggles of the 1920s. Whether there really was a grain shortage in the late 1920s as Stalin claimed or not, the Bolsheviks knew that they needed the peasant farmers' produce to maintain their political appeal to the workers. The peasants, however, needed few industrial products. Redressing this balance to cement Bolshevik power in the cities was the ultimate point of the mass collectivization embarked on in 1929.

> In 1927-28 Stalin viewed the . . . dangers of the grain crisis in terms of the consequences which they would have for the working class. For Stalin the lesson of the Civil War was the loss of working-class support for the state in 1921. In his speeches of 1927-28 he dwelled upon the threat of *urban* famine and proposed the collectivization of Soviet agriculture as the ultimate solution to the problems of food supply, industrialization, and defense (Viola, 26, emphasis added).

The Soviet regime could survive peasant resistance, but it might not survive active working-class opposition. It certainly could not survive if both turned on it together. The party preferred to provoke the clash on its own terms rather than passively wait for it to come. State-enforced starvation in rural areas was preferable to the famine peasant reluctance to provide grain could cause in the cities. Collectivization was intended to build an administrative apparatus capable of exercising effective, constant control of the peasant. It was only secondarily an economic policy. For that reason, cadres' successes in organizing the new farms were evaluated only in terms of what percentage of families joined the farms, ignoring the economic effectiveness of the new units.[10]

Implementation of the party's decision to collectivize Soviet agriculture depended on a mass mobilization of people directed by a hierarchy of party officials assisted by "activists," party members who did other work as well. An important part of the mobilizing process was the organized direction (*napravlenie*) of trustworthy urban cadres, "skilled . . . workers, civil war veterans, shock workers, factory activists, Communist party members," out to the countryside (Viola, 3). Lynne Viola's study deals with the major and most successful such movement during the

[9] Unfortunately, Moore never extended this analysis to the Soviet Union. See his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. the preface and chaps. 7-9.

[10] N. I. Nemakov, *Kommunisticheskaia partiia—organizator massovogo kolkhoznogo dvizheniia: 1929-1932 gg.* [The Communist Party—organizer of the mass kolkhoz movement, 1929-1932] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1966), 100.

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collectivization period, the "25,000er" campaign (named for the number of volunteers called for).

Viola's work emphasizes the confusion and chaos of collectivization. Whether or not any peasants in a locality were receptive to the formation of a collective farm (*kolkhoz*) depended on a host of factors, including the particular village's geography, its economic and social structure, peasant feuds, and the organizer's personality and tactics.[11] Whatever their ultimate experience in the villages, however, the 25,000ers were generally distinguished by their fervor and their genuine desire to help the people they found in the countryside. They also had baser motives, of course—to advance their careers, make money, or find better housing. Like many "volunteers" they may have felt they had little choice, but like their predecessors in the Russian populist movement of the 1870s they were sincere in their ambition to bring the benefits of superior urban civilization to the benighted peasantry.[12]

The 25,000ers' movement was a long one. Cadres who thought they had come for a brief stay to help the peasants quickly remake their lives often found themselves confronting a hostile village which had little desire to help the urban locusts strip its granaries and destroy its accustomed life in return for mere utopian promises. As a result,

> The majority of the 25,000ers remained in the countryside until the end of the First Five-Year Plan. By that time the campaign had evolved from a crusade to a state of siege. . . . The revolution gave way to repression, and the dynamism and enthusiasm of the first phase of collectivization were replaced by consolidation and entrenchment (Viola, 4).

That state of siege has been the normal condition of the Soviet countryside ever since.

The 25,000ers were mobilized to replace the existing rural party-state bureaucracy. The village cadres had not wanted to carry out mass collectivization when the policy was first announced. Then, after Stalin's March 1930 "Dizzy with Success" speech condemned them for too-hastily driving the peasants into the kolkhozy, those same officials refused to accept blame for the "excesses" Stalin claimed they had committed in carrying out the campaign (pp. 210-13). So the 25,000ers were sent out to supplant them.

[11] The memoirs of Ivars Jansons, a veteran of collectivization in Latvia, underline these microfactors and emphasize the variability of peasants' response to collectivization. K. Pakalin, "Gody i sobytiia—protivorechivye, slozhnye, vseliaiushchie nadezhdy: geroi sotsialisticheskogo truda Ivars Ianson o nachale kollektivizatsii v bauskom uezde," *Sovetskaia Latviia*, 16 March 1988, 2-3.

[12] In their mixed motives the 25,000ers Viola studied seem very like the urban Chinese youth sent down to the countryside in the 1970s, described, for instance, in Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village: The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao's China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

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Viola argues that the 25,000ers represented the last such "revolutionary" mobilization of committed rank-and-file activists against the apparatus. After collectivization, she writes, "the state would no longer appeal to a working-class vanguard for aid in policy implementation in order to circumvent a suspect bureaucracy; the state would now rely (albeit with major lapses into paranoia) on a transformed bureaucracy which had become, at least to the satisfaction of the state, a bastion of the working class or the new preserve of the old vanguard" (p. 213). This was certainly the perception of her heroes themselves, men who found themselves doing much more, and less, in the long run than they had signed on for. But it may not be an accurate description of the process of policy implementation even in the early 1930s. Mass mobilizations of trusted party and nonparty activists by one portion of the bureaucracy against another at the orders of the center in Moscow (in the case of the 25,000ers, by the urban against the rural apparatus) have been repeatedly used in Soviet history as a way of stirring up mass enthusiasm, deflecting criticism from the central authorities, and making one leadership faction's policy preference into a fait accompli. Khrushchev's decision to open up the Virgin Lands rather than investing in central Russian agriculture in the early 1950s and Brezhnev's drives to open up the huge Siberian Tiumen' oil fields and build the Baikal-Amur Main Line (BAM) in the 1970s are more recent examples. Mobilizations of cadres from one part of the apparatus to assist another have remained common up to the present; the "Ipatov method" which helped propel Gorbachev to Moscow[13] used this technique, as did attempts to clean up police corruption by setting up political departments in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1983.[14]

Viola's picture of urban cadres surrounded by a sea of peasants highlights the limits of kolkhoz agriculture. The new order stifled peasant initiative, eliminated the threat of peasant rebellion, and led to the death of millions in politically motivated famines. But, despite the assertions of Stalinist ideologists and the assumptions of the totalitarian model elaborated in the West after World War II, mass collectivization failed in its positive goal of establishing reliable "transmission belts" between regime and peasantry which would allow the political elite, simply by expressing its desires, to affect events on the farms. The new apparatus could exact

[13] The "Ipatov method," named for the district in Stavropol' region where it was first used, called for the operation of large groups of agricultural equipment around the clock to speed up harvesting. The party district committee became the harvest headquarters (*shtab*) directing all supply, transport, and operations for the whole harvest. The method's success in 1977, quickly noted and approved by Brezhnev, helped to single out Gorbachev as a candidate for Central Committee agriculture secretary when the post unexpectedly came open the next year.

[14] "V Politbiuro TsK KPSS," *Pravda*, 19 November 1983, 1.

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only intermittent obedience from the village. "Rule by administrative fiat and repression ... did not represent effective control, but its opposite. The state ruled by circular, it ruled by decree, but it had neither the organizational infrastructure nor the manpower to enforce its voice or to ensure correct implementation of its policy in the administration of the countryside" (p. 216).[15] Collectivization made it necessary for the party and state apparatus to mobilize the peasants to get the soil prepared, crops sown, and the harvest gathered. But those campaigns have never been done very efficiently, and the state could do little more. The collectivizers' ad hoc administrative arrangements became as oppressive and permanent as they were ineffectual at promoting real change in the countryside.

The basic unit of rural society was the peasant extended family. To break the households' anticipated resistance, the citified collectivizers adopted the organizational model they knew best, the industrial work brigade, in which individuals were grouped by task and skill rather than blood ties and reward was made contingent on productivity, not need.[16] The cadres claimed that the change would make the farmers more skilled and efficient. Moreover, only when the peasants had become factory workers in plants without roofs would they be real proletarians and so trustworthy members of society.

This ideology of "industrialized" agriculture remained an unquestioned assumption of Soviet agrarian policy from the late 1920s until very recently. De-skilling of the peasants resulted.[17] Their traditional understanding of how agricultural work should be done was ignored, replaced by the specialized, supposedly more scientific knowledge of brigadiers, agronomists, and farm chairmen whose function was to give orders that the peasants were passively to accept. But these new collective-farm "specialists" could not organize production efficiently. There were far too

[15] See also Roberta T. Manning, "Government in the Soviet Countryside in the Stalinist Thirties: The Case of Belyi Raion in 1937," *Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* (Pittsburgh, PA: Russian and East European Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh, 1984).

[16] Kenneth Jowitt, *The Leninist Response to National Dependency* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), 65; Alain Pouliquen, "L'organisation du travail agricole collectif et le control social de l'activité économique en U.R.S.S." [The organization of collective agricultural labor and social control of economic activity in the U.S.S.R.], *Revue d'études comparatives est-ouest* 13 (September 1982), 5-48. R. W. Davies surveys the debates about how to organize work within the collective farm in his *The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia: The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929-1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), chap. 4.

[17] The concept of de-skilling, an attack on workers' political power embodied in their peculiar and personal knowledge of their trade without which management could not manage, comes from Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

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few of them. They were largely ignorant of agriculture and equally so of management. They were not trusted by their superiors, who cared only about fulfilling grain procurement quotas capriciously set by central authorities. Their inferiors, the peasants, saw no point in working hard for incompetent supervisors when they would be paid almost nothing for the job anyway.

Central policy discouraged low-level cadres from identifying with their villages. Local officials were rotated frequently and without warning. The internal passport system, introduced at the time of collectivization largely to keep peasants who were starving as a result of rapacious grain procurements from following their produce to the cities, also helped to distance the peasants from local officials. The rural cadres, like city dwellers, held their own personal identity document, so they could travel about the country at will, but the rank-and-file peasant's passport was kept in the farm office and given to its nominal owner only when the kolkhoz chairman thought it appropriate. (The regime began to issue passports directly to collective-farm peasants only in the late 1970s.) In practice, meeting quantitative targets for grain deliveries was the sole indicator of a cadre's success, and those plans were set with little regard to a farm's actual production capacity.[18] Harsh legal and party penalties applied to cadres who put their peasants' interests ahead of the Stalinist "first commandment" to fulfill state grain delivery quotas at any cost.[19]

Such pressures confronted the cadres with a moral dilemma, because they could not fulfill the two incompatible tasks set by the central authorities. In practice, they forcibly maximized immediate production, quickly ending serious attempts to persuade the peasants to voluntarily adopt new, industrial methods of life and work which could, in the long run, have converted them into loyal citizens who would have honestly worked for the good of the farm.[20] The collective farms' supposed function as schools of communism for the peasants was forgotten as a vast network of checkers, guards, and overseers grew up to prevent the kolkhozniks from increasing their incomes by theft from "their" farms.

[18] Moshe Lewin, " 'Taking Grain': Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurements Before the War," in C. Abramsky, ed., *Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr* (Hamden, CT: Archon Press, 1974).

[19] For instance, Nemakov (fn. 10), 180, describes the fate of N. K. Solov'ev, a 25,000er convicted of a right deviation by his district party committee for refusing to take all the peasants' grain after his farm had fulfilled its plan.

[20] Although both Viola and Kaplan touch on it, this dilemma has been examined more systematically by scholars of the People's Republic of China, where access to farms and/or peasants has generally been easier. See Richard Madsen, *Morality and Power in a Chinese Village* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 72-80.

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Management by Campaign

Lynne Viola writes that "the legacy of collectivization would be an enduring distrust of peasant spontaneity, a continued reliance on appointed officials and campaign methods of policy implementation, and the perpetuation of a siege mentality which colored the relations of the state and countryside throughout the 1930s" (p. 214). Cynthia Kaplan shows that this legacy remained through the late 1940s and early 1950s, the period of her detailed research. As her final chapter notes, the administrative campaign is still the basic means for managing agriculture. Each job in the agricultural year—repairing equipment for the next season, sowing, tending the growing crops, harvesting, and shipping the produce to state storehouses located off the farms—is still done by mobilizing the rural population, even in the age of perestroika. Party committees' resolutions set the starting and ending dates for each task. "Plenipotentiaries" of the district party committee, assigned to each collective or state farm for the duration of the campaign, temporarily supersede the farm's own managers. (As communication in the countryside has improved, telephone calls to the farm and demands that brigadiers, kolkhoz chairmen, and state farm [*sovkhoz*] directors come to the district center to report have lessened the role of these representatives but by no means eliminated them.) Farms that report quickest completion receive banners and premiums of money or scarce consumer goods.

Because agriculture is so dependent on the weather and local conditions, these campaigns have almost always been harmful. They ensure that all the farms report that the campaign has been completed, but at the cost of losing potential produce. The apparatus has many ways of enforcing its demands. A few of the best managers may stand against those orders, but most cannot, since they are dependent on their superiors for too much.[21] So most local cadres act on the "unwritten law of campaigns—to be the fastest" at carrying out the assigned task.[22] That their efforts often result merely in good reports has mattered little.

Kaplan argues that this direct interference by local cadres acting to carry out centrally directed campaigns distinguishes agriculture from in-

[21] See, for instance, the reported reflections of Viktor Gulov, one of the first kolkhoz chairmen to convert his farm into a "cooperative of cooperatives" during the current campaign. He was struck by how even the best-known farm chairmen constantly had "to overcome, to evade, to defend" in order to preserve their farms' relative freedom of action. What chance, he asks, would an unknown chairman of a not-very-successful farm have of doing so? Vladimir Fomin, "Po vsem krest'ianskim pravilam" [According to all peasant rules], *Don*, No. 7 (July 1988), 129.

[22] Ivan Vasil'ev, *V kraiu istokov: Razmyshleniia o russkoi derevne* [At the wellsprings: reflections on the Russian countryside] (Moscow: "Sovremennik," 1981), 5.

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dustry. The usual image of the local party official, expressed in Jerry F. Hough's seminal work,[23] is that of the prefect who monitors (exercises "*kontrol'* ") over industry, occasionally intervening to help his factories achieve their plan targets (pp. 6-7, 10-11). Agricultural officials, Kaplan writes, do this kind of work, but "unlike the industrial raikom [party district committee], which checked the results of other institutions' activities, the rural raikom implemented the demands of the central and obkom [party province committee] authorities" (p. 121). The relative weakness of the Ministry of Agriculture, which has much less power over its farms than an industrial ministry does over its enterprises, is a sign of this distinction (p. 21).[24] Kaplan concludes that the rural party authorities shift with the seasons from a normal mode of party work to the crisis methods of the campaigns for sowing, hay making, harvest, or equipment repair.

Kaplan's basic explanation for this urban-rural difference is the poor quality of party cadres in the countryside. Because cadres' training improved substantially in the 1960s and especially the 1970s, she assumes that crisis management as a routine mode of administration in the countryside can now be eliminated. Since her materials extend only through the early 1980s, however, she can only raise this change as a possibility rather than analyze how it might be done and what its effects might be.

An important reason for the apparent difference in the role of local and regional party authorities in agriculture and industry which *The Party and Agricultural Crisis Management in the USSR* does not emphasize is the effectiveness of economic incentives. In Soviet industry, plan fulfillment has generally been normal and possible. Workers and managers are motivated by the expectation of receiving a sizable bonus, the "thirteenth month," in their pay each year. In agriculture, by contrast, the extraordinarily low state purchase prices which prevailed under Stalin, the huge farm debt for equipment forcibly sold to the kolkhozy under Khrushchev, and the high prices for inputs and services standard more recently meant that most farms could not expect to turn a profit no matter how they were run. Since the mid-1960s, sovkhoz and kolkhoz wages have frequently been covered by state credits, and in many cases a farm worker has earned more money on a bankrupt farm which covered its wages bill with the bank's money than on a prosperous farm where wages were actually covered by produce sold. Since economic incentives

[23] Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

[24] Although the Ministry of Agriculture became part of the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee (Gosagroprom) in 1985, and Gosagroprom was itself abolished in March 1989, Kaplan's point remains valid because farms still retain their dual subordination to the central and district authorities.

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were not an effective way to influence managerial or work-force behavior in agriculture, there was little alternative to the campaign to get food produced.

However, this difference between industry and agriculture is only one of degree. Given the Soviet system of administered prices, economic incentives have historically worked poorly in industry. Managers act rationally within the set of price signals they receive, but those prices are themselves set administratively with little regard to their interactions or demand (Hewett, 191-96). In industry as in agriculture, administrators must often resort to campaigns in order to produce what the economy needs but industry lacks an incentive to make. "Storming" to fulfill the monthly, quarterly, and annual plans and the constant drumfire of socialist competition for early completion of tasks by some notable date (such as finishing the annual plan by November 7, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution), are forms of campaign at least as prevalent in industry as in agriculture.[25] Ed Hewett's description of "How the Soviet Economy Really Works" emphasizes that administrative rationality, not considerations of economic efficiency, governs industrial operations (despite his title, the book deals almost entirely with industry). Cadres who deal mostly with agriculture may show more of the campaignist style than those in jobs primarily concerned with industry, but all have been infected by the virus of "an extremely simple method ... sending demands."[26]

The Failure of Innovation by Campaign

Campaigns may be less important in the day-to-day management of industry than of agriculture. But both suffer equally from the effects of intermittent campaigns for organizational change. In the absence of other incentives, such as market competition, the authorities have been forced to rely on campaigns run by the party-state apparatus to introduce reforms. Hewett examines Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* (regional economic

[25] Joseph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), is the classic description of "storming." Il'ia Zemtsov recalls a particularly blatant example in his *Partiia ili mafiia: Razvorovannaia respublika* [Party or mafia: the stolen republic] (Paris: Les Editeurs Réunis, 1976), 39-40. In order to fulfill its annual plan, which had already been reported, the Baku Electrical Appliances Works, one of the largest factories in the city, collected all its employees' refrigerators, irons, and other home appliances on December 30 and 31, hastily repainted them, and included them in its annual production figures. The employees got their property back after the success had been verified and bonuses for plan overfulfillment paid.

[26] V. Orlov, "Stil' rukovodstva: Radi gladkogo otcheta," *Sel'skaia zhizn'*, 22 August 1986, 2.

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council) reforms, the 1965 "Kosygin" reforms, the 1973 industrial association reform, and the effects of the 1979 party-state resolution on "perfecting the economic mechanism" in order to learn how Gorbachev should fix what ails the Soviet economy. All these reforms, he argues, were more or less limited attempts to improve the basic command economy mechanism, in which

> The basic tool is the plan, construed as a detailed blueprint for microeconomic decisions in the enterprise and devised and enforced by the ministries. Its basic feature is the joint system of plan indicators and bonuses, which simultaneously specifies the most important indicators of enterprise performance and pays enterprises to do their best to conform with those indicators. Improvements in the system take the form of new incentive systems and new indicators; the devotion to a centrally determined blueprint for microeconomic decisions remains (p. 255).

Such attempts to reform while retaining the basic structure lead, Hewett argues, to the Soviets' continuing problem with quality control. In the absence of market competition to drive innovation, the regime can only tinker with bonuses to provide what amount to quasi-market incentives (p. 256). Although he does not use the campaign concept, his analysis shows that much of the difficulty encountered by those earlier reforms stemmed from the limited capabilities of the administrative mechanisms for implementing change and their ability to frustrate reform by "a combination—to use Gertrude Schroeder's apt characterization—of procrastination, assimilation, complication and regulation" (p. 237). Bureaucratic campaigns, in this case the several attempted reforms Hewett studied, substitute for market competition in stimulating organizational innovation and improved economic performance. Because the design of the reforms makes them impossible (as well as perhaps undesirable) for the ministries and the rest of the administrative hierarchy to carry out, they are transformed, and neutralized, in the process of implementation. Although Hewett claims the regime learned from its failures, so that each reform campaign was not simply a duplicate of the previous one, he shows that the attempt to substitute administrative for competitive pressures failed to achieve its purpose in all four instances.

Gorbachev's Reform Strategy

When he came to power, Mikhail Gorbachev's initial policy was to make the existing system work better by *uskorenie*, literally "speeding-up." His first statements as general secretary, as well as early social policy measures such as the now-infamous campaign against alcoholism, con-

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tinued Yuri Andropov's strategy of clamping down on wayward workers and apparatchiks in order to make the existing system function up to its potential.

In agriculture, too, Gorbachev began by reemphasizing an older innovation, the collective contract (*kollektivnyi podriad*), which has roots at least as far back as Khrushchev's 1959 wage reform.[27] The campaign for its general use on Soviet farms began in 1979, when Gorbachev was the CPSU Central Committee secretary in charge of agriculture. Such a contract pays a farm brigade, as a unit, for an agreed quantity of produce. Although in theory the particular crops and amounts are negotiated by the farm management and the brigade, in practice the management usually assigns them based on its production plan. Since contractual earnings are figured using the cumbersome apparatus of piece-rate wages and task output norms from the standard Soviet wages system, emphasizing payment based on the amount of work performed rather than the amount of product put in the barn, workers have little incentive to fulfill the contract. Nor does the brigade have any way to compel observance of the contract if the farm management violates its agreement—although the workers are not paid if they fall short on their end of the bargain.

The collective contract campaign failed to improve productivity in 1985 or 1986. Gorbachev had promised quick improvement in food supplies, but the harvests continued to be poor. A large part of the reason was the "formalism" (i.e., crash implementation everywhere by party agencies anxious to report early success) with which the new units were introduced. It turned out that in 1984, the contract groups were actually producing lower yields than old-style units![28]

Gorbachev's initial commitment to making the existing system of agricultural management work better is the most likely answer to a puzzle raised by Marshall Goldman, who asks why Gorbachev chose to begin reform not with agriculture but with industry. This strikes Goldman as odd, since "agricultural reform and increased production of consumer goods," in particular food, "are so important as to be almost preconditions to technological growth" (p. 43). But the new general secretary apparently believed he could make the existing agricultural arrangements

[27] See Karl-Eugen Wadekin, "The Re-emergence of the Kolkhoz Principle," *Soviet Studies* 41 (January 1989), 20-29.

[28] V. Ia. Uzun, "Melkogruppovaia i semeinaia formy organizatsii proizvodstva i truda v sel'skom khoziaistve" [Small-group and family forms of organization of production and labor in agriculture], *Vestnik sel'skokhoziaistvennoi nauki*, No. 6 (June 1987), 4. 1984 was, of course, the year before Gorbachev took over as general secretary. Data for later years are unavailable, but the continuing poor Soviet harvests even as the statistical yearbook reports a rising percentage of workers organized in collective contract brigades indicates that Orwell's year was no fluke.

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work better by general application of the collective contract. More efficient use of the enormous capital investments made in the countryside during the Brezhnev era would, Gorbachev seems to have hoped, quickly solve his country's food problem. When he stumped the countryside in the fall of 1985 calling for farmers to work harder and better, the general secretary said little about organizational change beyond urging the general introduction of the collective contract.

However, beginning with his speech at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in early 1986, Gorbachev adopted a more radical approach to improving Soviet agriculture. Since then, he has increasingly called for allowing the use of families as basic work groups in agriculture and loosening the restrictions on payment and organization along the lines of experiments with the so-called "autonomous team" (*beznariadnoe zveno*) in the late 1960s.[29] The general secretary has pushed harder and harder for the "land-lease contract" (*arendnyi podriad*), under which small groups, often families, would lease agricultural inventory and land for lengthy periods. (Leasing of land by individuals or private groups has been illegal since collectivization because rent for agricultural land was said to be a form of capitalist exploitation of the working peasant.) Seriously discussed since the June 1987 Central Committee plenum, general adoption of the lease contract was ordered by the general secretary at a Central Committee conference in May 1988.[30] Gorbachev reemphasized the importance of the lease (*arenda*) in October and November 1988[31] and at the often-postponed Central Committee plenary session on agriculture when it finally met in March 1989.[32] Some forms of the lease contract ignore the whole problem of norming, equitable wages, and so on entirely, simply promising farmers payment based on the state purchase price for what they grow, less agreed expenses. The arenda gives farmers real incentives to work by tying their income to what they produce and market (if only by selling it to the farm). It also makes them pay for their equipment and land, which gives them reason to care for their assets. However, by making the farmer responsible for his own labor, the land-lease contract also threatens to make the whole apparatus

[29] This alternative has been most passionately espoused by Alexander Yanov. See his *The Drama of the Soviet 1960s: A Lost Reform* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, n.d. [1984]).

[30] "Arendnyi podriad—kratchaishii put' k prodovol'stvennomu dostatku: Vstrecha v Tsentral'nom Komitete KPSS," *Sel'skaia zhizn'*, 15 May 1988, 1-4.

[31] Erik Whitlock, "Face to the Countryside: Further Developments in Soviet Agricultural Policy," *Radio Liberty Research*, 515/88, 15 November 1988.

[32] M. S. Gorbachev, "Perestroika agrarnoi politiki—revoliutsionnaia strategiia partii," *Pravda*, 17 March 1989, 1-3; "Zakliuchitel'noe slovo M. S. Gorbacheva na Plenume TsK KPSS 16 marta 1989 goda," *Pravda*, 18 March 1989, 1-2.

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of agricultural management, from the collective farm staff through the ministry, unnecessary.

From Marshall Goldman's point of view, this is precisely the right strategy. He argues that "only if Gorbachev makes the switch from the Stalinist model of economic development" with its emphasis on heavy industry and the military "to the Asian model of development" which emphasizes agriculture and light industry "will he begin to come to grips with the basic forces that hold the Soviet Union back" (p. 12). He argues that the People's Republic of China's amazing spurt of economic growth in the last decade has been largely powered by the transition from Soviet-style collectivized agriculture to the household responsibility system which began in 1978. He devotes the longest chapter in *Gorbachev's Challenge* to this Chinese agricultural reform.

Goldman is right in emphasizing the problem of restoring individual initiative to the Soviet citizen, and particularly to Soviet peasants. From this perspective, Soviet collectivization succeeded all too well. Not only have the peasants learned that the right way to fix a broken well is to write the authorities with demands that it be repaired, but after fifty years of being paid by the task and twenty years of guaranteed wages unrelated to the crop's success or failure, it is hard to convince many peasants that they should be paid according to the final output of their work. After all, the socialist slogan is "to each according to his labor," and if that labor is useless because it results in nothing—perhaps even making fields infertile because excessive working with heavy machinery has compacted the soil—so what? If the operations needed to produce tomatoes were performed, they should be paid for, even if the tomatoes rotted because the operations were mistimed or no trucks were available to move the harvest from the field.

But in arguing that the Soviets should emulate China's agricultural reform strategy, Goldman skims over some fundamental differences between Chinese and Soviet agriculture. China's population is still primarily rural. If the Chinese peasants can feed themselves and produce some surplus, Chinese agriculture will be wildly successful. The Soviet population, however, is now predominantly urban, and some rural areas even need to be repopulated. Producing a marketable surplus is the heart of the Soviet problem. Soviet farmers are tied much more tightly to industrial inputs and urban markets than most Chinese peasants because of their different crops and production technologies. Party-state control of agriculture, accordingly, has depended much more heavily on a state monopoly of inputs, whether through Stalin-era Machine-Tractor Stations or the later, equally monopolistic state agencies for supplying equipment and supplies to the farms. The Soviet farmer has always been

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forced to pay for machinery he did not want and repairs that were not done in order to get supplies he did need. Even then his control over their quality and delivery schedule was limited. Moreover, previous attempts to give small collectives substantial independence and authority over their production have repeatedly failed in the Soviet Union because they violate existing rules and regulations on wage distribution, plan assignments, and machinery upkeep (which are, of course, scrupulously enforced by the various higher agricultural management authorities). These are the levers of power dominated by the party and state administrative cadres. They have held onto them much longer and more thoroughly in the Soviet Union than in China.

Goldman is right that the land-lease contract in the USSR, like the household responsibility system in China, will (indeed, must) overturn much of this system if it is to work and increase agricultural output. In both cases, the underlying logic of the reform points toward a market rather than a command economy, albeit one with some state controls and protections left in place. The problem of incentives can only be solved when the measure of work done is no longer hours of labor, but the value of production.[33] If peasants are to produce based on what they can earn, the prices for their commodities must reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, demand for given crops so that they can be sold. The logical conclusion is a market for agricultural goods. Market relations will work only if the system of state credits and subsidies to agriculture and arbitrary and highly differentiated purchase prices for required deliveries of produce is destroyed. This means price reforms throughout the economy, and, in particular, consumer price increases, a politically hazardous result.

The farmers themselves will need, and if experience in other countries is any guide will demand, some protection from the market. The individual leaseholder will confront a few sources of supply and perhaps more channels of sale for his produce, all subject to manipulation by the party and state bureaucracies. If his landlord is the old collective or state farm, he will also be subject to interference from farm authorities.

The radical plan for constructing agricultural cooperatives that Gorbachev advanced in his speech at the Fourth Congress of Collective Farmers in March 1988 attacks these problems.[34] Farmers, the general secretary proposed, would be free to purchase inputs from a variety of suppliers and to sell their products to whom, and when, they wished.

[33] V. Tikhonov, "Perestroika: Shag za shagom: Chtoby narod prokormil sebia . . ." [Perestroika step by step: so that the people should feed themselves . . .], *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 31 (3 August 1988), 10.

[34] M. S. Gorbachev, "Potentsial Kooperatsii—Delu perestroiki," *Sel'skaia zhizn'*, 24 March 1988, 2-4.

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However, by forming cooperatives, usually on the basis of collective farms or even whole rural districts, they would be able to enter the market not as individuals but as aggregates with some purchasing power. This reform of supply and sales is, if anything, more important than simply permitting a farmer to contract to sharecrop a plot of land for several years, radical though that is for the Soviet Union. The creation of voluntary cooperatives to handle supply and marketing could give farmers some real power over their suppliers and liberate them from the suppliers' monopoly. Such freedom would make the leasing scheme meaningful and prevent it from being choked by suppliers (or local cadres) who could determine a leasee's fate by granting or withholding scarce supplies or marketing assistance.

Even more important, the creation of rural cooperatives functioning in a semimarket economy, together with other new forms of agricultural organization such as the *agrofirma* (a vertically integrated farm combine with its own transportation, food processing, and retail outlets) and even true individual peasant farms[35] would begin to create a political constituency in the countryside capable of resisting apparatus pressure and eventually making that apparatus obsolete. Fear that the lease contract and cooperatives will make the entire apparatus of administrative management in the countryside redundant is the underlying issue in the ongoing debate on whether or not only the kolkhozy and sovkhozy can lease land to the rental collectives, so confining the arendnyi podriad within the old system.[36]

Overcoming the Campaign Mechanism

The Soviet strategy for agrarian reform which has emerged since the beginning of 1987 is potentially a good one. Despite the inevitable polit-

[35] The Baltic republics are all discussing legislation to allow private farms. This decollectivization is justified by the particular history of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, where individual farmsteads rather than peasant villages as in Russia were usual before the Soviet annexation. At this writing, there is no indication that true individual peasant farming will be allowed to spread throughout the Soviet Union. For the Latvian draft law on peasant farming see *Sovetskaia Latviia*, 29 January 1989, 3, as translated in FBIS-SOV, 10 February 1989, 49-54. The Lithuanian draft law is in *Sovetskaia Litva*, 21 February 1989, 1-3.

[36] Whether lease collectives should exist only within state and collective farms was the most hotly debated point in preparations for the March 1989 plenum. That meeting did not settle the matter, fudging the issue with a call for diversity in forms of agricultural organization. However, the plenum resolution lays the groundwork for abolition of the kolkhozy as they have existed since the 1930s by urging their restructuring into "cooperatives of cooperatives." "Ob agrarnoi politike KPSS v sovremennykh usloviiakh," *Pravda*, 1 April 1989, 1-2. Soviets would probably think of such a system as a different kind of socialism rather than capitalism. See V. A. Tikhonov's comments on "cooperative socialism" in Igor' Abakumov and Valerii Gavrichkin, "Budet li u zemli khoziain?" *Izvestiia*, 20 December 1988, 2.

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ical compromises, it takes on the main problems within and outside of individual farms. It makes the needed connections back to the rest of the economy. But can it be set in place? Complaints that the arendnyi podriad is being reduced to a version of the old piece-work system in new clothes are already heard as the apparatus goes into action to implement the reform in its own way. Since the new instruments of state power, such as the reformed Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet are not yet in place, Gorbachev has little choice but to begin by acting through the old system. He even approved a campaignist approach at the Central Committee conference in May 1988, demanding that introduction of the lease be wholesale (*sploshnaia*), as collectivization was, but without its excesses.[37]

Agricultural perestroika (and, if that succeeds, restructuring throughout the economy) has several advantages over previous attempts to reform the Stalinist system, however. First, Soviet rural society has been transformed since Stalin's time. Soviet industry possesses the capacity to provide the inputs agriculture needs—that it often does not do so is a different matter. Migration to the cities has removed much of the excess rural population which has often stymied attempts at agricultural modernization in other developing countries. Brezhnev's policy of making huge investments in the countryside put some new capital goods on the farms and legitimized the idea of allocating more resources to agriculture—although most of the money seems to have been wasted on grandiose and empty livestock palaces or poorly designed irrigation works, some of which might take a century to recoup their cost.[38] The trauma of collectivization is far enough distant in time that memories of it have begun to fade in the village, and the people who carried out the policy are generally no longer active—although, as recent Soviet literature and films indicate, it will be generations before the scars are really healed. Thus, Gorbachev can now make peace with the remaining peasants. Indeed, he must do so if he is to prevent virtual depopulation of large areas of the Russian countryside and their complete withdrawal from agricultural production. In some areas, such as the Non-Black Earth Zone of north-central European Russia, population out-migration may already have gone too far to be reversed, and it is in just those places that the most radical reforms are being introduced.

Second, Gorbachev apparently has allies in the apparatus itself. Although the logic of work as a full-time administrator forces an apparatchik into carrying out the system's decisions, the emergence of Gor-

[37] The evening news tape of the speech showed him saying this, although it was cut from the published text. See FBIS-SOV, 17 May 1988, 84, for a translation of the news broadcast.

[38] Tikhonov (fn. 33).

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bachev himself, and such more radical supporters of perestroika as Boris Yel'tsin, suggests that some politicians understand the necessity for reform even as they are caught in the old system. The comparison with the American New Deal, which gave up some of capitalism's freedoms to save the system as a whole—an analogy explicitly accepted by Politburo member A. N. Iakovlev—is perhaps most telling in this regard.[39]

Third, Gorbachev's strategy aims at setting up alternative structures for implementing policy. The Congress of People's Deputies, together with the constitutional reforms which make the regional party committee first secretaries subject to confirmation by popular vote in their new coordinate job as chairmen of the regional Soviets, is one such mechanism. The growth of "informal political organizations" and cooperatives is another. Plans for legal reform and the establishment of a "socialist state of laws" (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*) are yet another.

Fourth, and so far most controversially, the general secretary has attempted to make reform irreversible by restoring the nation's history, emphasizing the origins and effects of Stalinist collectivization. Discussion of collectivization is a way of apologizing for it, guaranteeing to the farmers that it will not be repeated. This is a dangerous strategy since it threatens the CPSU's legitimacy: If everything the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has done since 1929 was wrong, why should the party still maintain its political dominance? Gorbachev's answer is to emphasize alternate strategies which emerged during the 1920s, in particular the ideas of Nikolai Bukharin, around whom a minor personality cult blossomed in 1988.[40] Opposition to perestroika has emerged most sharply here as well; the most important antiperestroika manifesto, Leningrad college instructor Nina Andreeva's "letter," appeared shortly before the 1988 Congress of Collective Farmers at which Gorbachev laid out his plans to revise the system of agricultural supply and production by creating cooperatives.[41] It may be that the CPSU is too closely tied to the old administrative system to survive in its present form if agrarian relations change radically.

Conclusion

Many observers see perestroika as leading to the emergence of a "civil society," an arena of public activity organized by but autonomous from

[39] Bill Keller, "Moscow's Other Mastermind," *New York Times Magazine*, 19 February 1989.

[40] See especially E. Verigo and M. Kapustin, "Lichnost' v kontekste istorii: Gibel' i voskresenie Nikolaia Bukharina" [A person in historical context: the death and resurrection of Nikolai Bukharin], *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 6 October 1988, 6.

[41] Nina Andreeva, "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu prepodavetelia leningradskogo vuza: Ne mogu

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the state. This development will, by definition, lead to the end of the old "totalitarian" state which attempted to subordinate all of society to itself. However, concepts of the "totalitarian" state have often missed the problem of implementation which always confronted it because, in focusing on how the regime came to monopolize power in society and on conflict within its elite, totalitarian theorists tended to assume that the regime's decisions were carried out once made. Even scholars who argued that Stalin-style terror served a basic systemic purpose in insuring policy implementation tended to assume that, once terrorized, the cadres did what the regime wanted (which was, of course, the point of the terror).[42] The various flavors of pluralist theory advanced to explain changes in the USSR since Stalin generally also paid little attention to this implementation problem because they borrowed their concepts from that most law-abiding of modern states, the United States, and tended to concentrate on group influence in policy formation. Thane Gustafson's conclusion that the Brezhnev-era Soviet regime was a "second-generation bureaucracy" confronted with "third-generation" tasks pinpointed the problem, but did not go far to analyze its sources.[43]

The Soviet state has historically been able to exert many more negative sanctions on people's behavior (to prevent undesired activity) than positive sanctions (to reward desired actions). This weakness in the state's implementation capacity has emerged more and more glaringly as the tasks of administering Soviet society have become more complex. In this respect, the Soviet Union is often a very weak state. Indeed, the emergence of a limited market and social institutions which are not directly dominated by the state may strengthen the party-state even as they transform it by giving the authorities new capacities to influence and shape society. In the 1970s, political sociologists debated how much the institutions of the capitalist state were autonomous from society. Study of the Soviet Union suggests that autonomy itself, the existence of society outside of the state's control, makes the state stronger.

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postupat'sia printsipami," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 13 March 1988, 3. A history of this curious document is given by Giuletto Chiesa, "Secret Story Behind Anti-Gorbachev Manifesto," *L'Unità*, 23 May 1988, as translated in FBIS-SOV, 31 May 1988, 55-58.

[42] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).

[43] Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics: Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and Water* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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